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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 SOCIAL CONTEXT AND CRIME 
 
Crime is a central theme of debate among the general public, among policy makers and within 
the scientific community. Time and again attention goes out to areas that are overwhelmed 
with crime. Concern and fascination with these places is partly triggered by the sharp contrast 
they form with the many areas where social order is maintained quite well. Thus, the question 
that comes to mind when faced with crime-ridden areas is not only why there is crime in 
general, but also why it emerges in specific places. Furthermore, within spatial areas, crime 
targets do not face equal risk of victimization. Rather, some targets are victimized, perhaps 
even multiple times, while others are left undisturbed. Therefore, an additional issue 
associated with the distribution of crime is why some objects (people, houses, cars, etc.) are 
selected by offenders as their targets, while others are not. 
 Spatial differences in crime have been well-documented in criminological research. 
For instance, Sherman et al. (1989) examined ‘hot spots’ of crime in Minneapolis and found 
that 50% of all telephone calls to the police on criminal incidents could be traced to 3% of the 
addresses in the city. Morenoff et al. (2001) found that 70% of the homicides in Chicago in a 
three-year period occurred in just 32% of the city’s neighborhoods. Wittebrood (2000) 
documented considerable differences in violent victimization between Dutch neighborhoods. 
In the 25% most-safe neighborhoods, the risk of becoming a crime victim was more than ten 
times less than in the 5% most-unsafe neighborhoods: 0.8% versus 9.2%. In a study on 
neighborhood burglary differences in The Hague (Netherlands), Bernasco and Luijkx (2002) 
found victimization risks ranging from 0.8% to 5.4% for households. This list of findings can 
be continued exhaustively. Though most of the examples cited relate to neighborhood 
differences, spatial variation in crime has also been found across many other types of spatial 
units: street blocks (Smith et al. 2000; Taylor et al. 1984), cities and metropolitan areas (Blau 
& Blau 1982; Land et al. 1990; Sampson 1986), subnational regions (Rosenfeld et al. 2001) 
and countries (Bennett 1991a; Gartner 1990; Messner 1989; Neapolitan 1998). Furthermore, 
unequal distributions of crime have long been documented, dating back to early 19th-century 
cartographers (Guerry 1831; Quetelet 1842). 
Differences in victimization risk between crime targets have also been the object of 
criminological research, albeit more recently than spatial crime differences. The emergence of 
victimization surveys in the United States (Ennis 1967) revealed that victims of theft and 
violence are concentrated in certain social categories, such as youngsters and singles. For 
instance, in one early study on criminal victimization, Hindelang (1976) found that the 
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combined risk of becoming the victim of a personal theft or assault was 11.4% for 16- to 19-
year-olds, while risk declined for the older age categories, down to 2.9% for persons 65 years 
of age or older. Survey results from other countries show comparable patterns for 
victimization across social categories (e.g., Fiselier 1978; Lee 2000; Van Kesteren et al. 
2000). 
Why do crime differences exist between spatial areas? And why do certain kinds of 
people face higher victimization risk than others? These two questions are to some extent 
intertwined. On one hand, social conditions within an area, such as the level of collective 
social control, may determine individual victimization risk and, in consequence, also affect 
aggregated crime outcomes. On the other hand, individual characteristics of potential targets, 
such as age, may determine their victimization risk as well. Thus, spatial clustering of people 
with certain characteristics also has consequences for aggregated crime outcomes. Therefore, 
for studying the spatial distribution of crime, one need not focus on offenders, since the 
location of crime victims also offers pertinent information. Studying criminal victimization in 
terms of ‘who’ and ‘where’ is relevant for testing criminological and sociological theories on 
crime and target selection. Moreover, data on victimization offer several desirable properties 
over crime data from official sources and offender self-reported data. For these reasons, this 
study argues that data on victimization allows for the most optimal testing of hypotheses on 
the spatial distribution of crime. 
The present study examines the social and spatial distribution of criminal victimization 
by addressing the relation between crime, the spatial structure of areas and the behavior and 
social background of crime targets. Patterns of individual victimization risk are analyzed, as 
well as neighborhood, city and country levels of victimization. In general, this study builds on 
classical research traditions that have examined how social conditions influence crime. 
Several criminological theories deal with this issue, each focusing on different social 
mechanisms, such as material inequality, lack of social cohesion and people’s lifestyles 
(Cohen & Felson 1979; Merton 1957; Shaw & McKay 1942). Although much research has 
already been conducted to test the tenability of the theories’ hypotheses, earlier studies had 
certain shortcomings on which this study intends to improve in various ways. 
 First, the current study integrates the main theories on the spatial distribution of crime 
into a single general framework. The idea of this framework is straightforward: crime rates 
are expected to be higher the more motivated offenders and suitable targets converge in space 
and time in the absence of local guardians. These three basic elements constitute the separate 
foci of strain/anomie theory (Merton 1957), routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson 1979) 
and social disorganization theory (Shaw & McKay 1942), respectively. However, many 
previous empirical tests of these theories concentrated on only one of the three elements, 
ignoring the fact that crime can be understood only by examining the social causes of each of 
its disparate elements (Miethe & Meier 1994). The present study follows this theoretical 
suggestion by including the ideas from the three theories mentioned and subjecting them to 
empirical tests. Moreover, it explores whether the influences of these elements on crime are 
interdependent by examining whether their relation with victimization is contingent upon the 
presence of the other elements. For instance, is the suitability of targets especially important 
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for predicting victimization in areas that provide little protection through informal 
surveillance? Or, are target selection processes the same, regardless of the social context in 
which they occur? The examination of such conditional effects is an important issue in 
spatially oriented criminology, which however, has received little attention in empirical 
research (but see, Miethe & McDowall 1993; Smith et al. 2000). 
Second, this study examines the social and spatial distribution of crime using a broad 
analytical lens. More specifically, hypotheses on victimization are tested (1) across a large 
number of respondents from different social categories, (2) across several types of spatial 
units (i.e., neighborhoods, cities and countries) (3) for a large number of observations for each 
of these units and (4) for several types of crime (i.e., homicide, non-lethal violence, burglary, 
personal theft, car-related theft, car vandalism and other vandalism). This offers the 
opportunity to verify general hypotheses across crimes or rather, if appropriate, to test the 
specificity of hypotheses to certain crimes. Especially in cross-national crime research, which 
has focused primarily on homicide (e.g., Krahn et al. 1986; Neapolitan 1998), testing 
hypotheses across multiple crime types represents an advance in the research field. 
 Third, using appropriate models, the crime-inducing impact of traits of individual 
targets, neighborhoods, cities and countries is estimated simultaneously. Thus, while 
addressing the crime-inducing impact of social context, the relation between individual 
characteristics and victimization is examined as well. To achieve this, multilevel models are 
employed, which allow compositional differences between areas to be adjusted for. For 
example, it may be that two neighborhoods have different levels of social control, but yet the 
same rate of victimization. At first, it would therefore seem that social control is unrelated to 
victimization. However, perhaps the neighborhood with the higher level of social control is 
populated with more inhabitants (e.g., youngsters) who have a risky lifestyle compared with 
the low-control neighborhood. In this case, the difference in population composition between 
the neighborhoods needs to be taken into account, because it affects neighborhood-level 
outcomes. In general, when assessing relations between social context and victimization, 
relations between individual characteristics and victimization need to be adjusted for, as well 
as the differential distribution of these characteristics across contexts. If this procedure is 
followed, observed relations between crime and social context are less easily accepted as the 
product of unobserved differences within spatial units, and thus, contextual hypotheses are 
tested more rigorously. Previous criminological research has focused either on a single type of 
context (e.g., the country), and thus not taken into account the social conditions in other 
contexts, or has focused simultaneously on individual and neighborhood context (e.g., 
Rountree et al. 1994; Sampson et al. 1997; Wittebrood 2000). Therefore, the present study’s 
simultaneous estimation of individual, neighborhood, city and country effects on 
victimization is a major improvement in the research field.  
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1.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
There is a rich tradition of research on how crime and social context are related. An overview 
of the literature can be given most clearly by considering the basic elements that are necessary 
for the occurrence of crime: a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of local 
guardians. Basically, area crime rates are assumed to be higher the more these elements 
converge in space and time. Because criminological theories on the distribution of crime have 
traditionally been oriented towards offenders, this general notion was not used until the 
emergence in the 1970s of victimization theories, which explicitly include the importance of 
target characteristics for the realization of criminal events (Cohen & Felson 1979; Hindelang 
et al. 1978). In the present research, each of the three basic elements of crime (motivated 
offenders, suitable targets, absence of local guardians) is assumed to vary under specified 
conditions, resulting in a certain amount of victimization risk.  
The following sections discuss the theoretical background on each of these three basic 
elements. To start with, section 1.2.1 discusses the importance of target suitability for 
victimization risk. Section 1.2.2 focuses on the crime-inducing impact of an absence of local 
guardians, seen as the product of a lack of community cohesion. Furthermore, risks and rates 
of victimization are assumed to depend on the supply of motivated offenders, which section 
1.2.3 highlights. Finally, section 1.2.4 addresses the extent to which combinations of risk 
factors may exert additional crime-inducing effects. 
 
1.2.1 Suitable Targets: Routine Activity Theory 
Leading criminological research from the 1970s and 1980s identified the presence of criminal 
opportunities as an important explanation for the occurrence of crime. Though the lines of 
research engaged with this topic relate to different subjects (offenders, victims, crimes) and 
different levels of explanation (country, local area, individual), they share notions of a rational 
choice model of behavior (Cornish & Clarke 1986). In its rudimentary form, the rational 
choice model assumes decision making to be dependent on economic principles. The 
individual’s behavior is modeled as the outcome of an analysis of the costs and benefits 
associated with alternative courses of action. As an extension of formal economic theories of 
crime (Becker 1968), crime-oriented rational choice theory1 assumes that offenders avoid risk 
and effort when committing crimes, yet they try to realize optimal profits within these 
constraints. Targets that satisfy these conditions best, are the most suitable ones for offenders. 
Therefore, offenders are most likely to select targets that are readily accessible, extend a low 
risk of being caught, and simultaneously, give access to a high reward (Cornish & Clarke 
1986). It must be mentioned that money is not the only reward of crime for ‘the reasoning 
criminal’. Rather, specific crimes may provide other benefits as well, such as status or 
excitement (Clarke 1995). Routine activity theory argues that criminal events relate to 
decisions made by offenders, because opportunities are present at a specific time and place. 
                                                 
1 Previous research on victimization, as well as the current study, refers to this perspective as the ‘routine activity 
theory’.   
Introduction 
 5  
The causes of crime are therefore situational and, assuming that criminal decisions are 
purposively made to reach specific goals, crime-specific (Clarke 1995). 
One of the theoretical elements of routine activity theory is the acknowledgement that, 
in order to understand the distribution of crime across individuals, space and time, an explicit 
distinction must be made between the three basic elements of crime: motivated offenders, 
suitable targets and lack of capable guardians (Cohen & Felson 1979). Routine activity 
theory’s basic notion is that people’s routine activities of everyday life shape an opportunity 
structure that determines how often these three basic elements converge in space and time. 
Focusing on the importance of target suitability, its claim is that increases in crime rates are 
possible even if changes in structural conditions do not induce larger supplies of motivated 
offenders (Miethe & Meier 1994). Routine activity theory thus treats the presence of 
motivated offenders as given and concentrates on relations between crime and patterns of 
target suitability. As such, the theory is a reply to traditional, offender-oriented criminological 
theory, which proved unable to explain the trend of increasing U.S. crime rates after World 
War II, since conditions fostering criminal dispositions (e.g., income inequality) had been 
decreasing since then.  
Cohen and Felson (1979) argued that shifts in the ownership of luxury goods as well 
as the routine activities of everyday life – from home-centered to non-domestic – are 
important causes of this phenomenon. In short, higher levels of ownership of luxury goods 
increase the attractiveness of households as crime targets, while higher levels of non-domestic 
activity increase the exposure to likely offenders and decrease the capacity to guard domestic 
property. In a similar vein, as an explanation of victimization differences between spatial 
units, routine activity theory relies on the same micro-level assumptions: victimization rates 
are expected to be highest in neighborhoods, cities and countries that consist of many suitable 
targets. 
Along with Cohen and Felson’s (1979) work, several other research traditions have 
emerged, each in one way or another treating the suitability of targets as an important causal 
factor for the occurrence of crime. First of all, the victimization surveys that were initiated in 
the late 1960s and refined in the 1970s (Ennis 1967; Fiselier 1978; Hindelang 1976) made 
clear that the risk of being victimized varies considerably between social categories. For 
instance, youngsters appear to have a higher chance of becoming the victim of an assault, 
while single-person households have a higher likelihood of becoming burglary victims. 
Hindelang et al. (1978) lifestyle theory was the first systematic attempt to explain the 
empirical patterns found in these surveys; their central argument was that people who have a 
lifestyle similar to that of offenders run higher risk of becoming crime victims. Secondly, 
‘environmental criminologists’ revealed that offenders are likely to commit crimes within the 
territory they are acquainted with through their daily activities (Brantingham & Brantingham 
1981). Thus, many crimes are committed in the vicinity of an offender’s home, work and 
places of leisure and along the paths connecting these places. Targets living in these areas are 
the ones most likely to be victimized. Thirdly, several studies on environmental design 
emphasized the potential for crime control by decreasing the attractiveness of local areas as 
places to commit crimes by reducing escape routes and anonymity (Jacobs 1961; Jefferey 
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1971; Newman 1972). Also, early studies done by the British Home Office focused on the 
possibilities for individual households to protect themselves against offenders through target-
hardening measures (Clarke & Mayhew 1980). 
Elaborations of routine activity theory have led to the conclusion that the likelihood of 
a target being suitable for offenders is dependent on four risk factors: proximity to offenders, 
exposure to offenders, target attractiveness and guardianship (Cohen et al. 1981; Miethe & 
Meier 1994). Proximity refers to the distance between the area where a target lives and the 
area where offenders routinely move about in the course of their daily work and leisure 
routine. Indeed, offenders have been found to commit crimes most often within this 
‘awareness space’ (Brantingham & Brantingham 1993; Rengert & Wasilchick 1985). 
Exposure refers to the routine activities of targets and the extent to which these activities 
place them in risky situations (i.e., places where offenders are present). A research example of 
exposure to offenders is the extent to which targets perform night-time, out-of-home leisure 
activities (Miethe et al. 1987; Mustaine & Tewksbury 1998), which has indeed been found to 
be associated with higher victimization risk. Target attractiveness refers to the (economic) 
value and the accessibility of goods. Targets that offer access to a high reward are considered 
more attractive. However, for theft, target attractiveness is also dependent upon the portability 
of goods (Clarke 1999), while for violence, the extent to which the target is capable of self-
defense is an indicator of this risk factor (Felson 1996). Finally, multiple interpretations have 
been assigned to guardianship as a risk factor for victimization. Some consider guardianship 
to be the total amount of protection against crime that is enjoyed by a person or property (e.g., 
Cohen et al. 1981; Miethe & Meier 1994). For this reason, theoretical linkages have been 
proposed between routine activity theory and social disorganization theory, because the latter 
perspective concentrates on neighborhood surveillance, which is a specific aspect of 
protection against crime (Cohen & Land 1987; Felson 1986). Section 1.2.2 elaborates on 
social disorganization theory in more detail. However, in order to distinguish routine activity 
theory’s concept of protection against crime from social disorganization theory’s concept of 
collective social control, it is proposed here that guardianship refers to the individual ability of 
persons or households to prevent crime through their personal presence or physical, target-
hardening measures. Indeed, burglary risk has been found to be lower among households that 
have taken precautionary measures (Intomart 1995; Miethe 1991), while domestic presence 
may also go together with lower risk. 
Apart from the empirical support it has received in studies on crime and victimization 
patterns, routine activity theory has elicited criticism on several points. The first relates to the 
rather broad definition of each of the four distinguished victimization risk factors, which 
makes it unclear what exactly is meant by them (Rovers 1997). A related point is that 
empirical tests of the theory have been conducted with indirect measures, such as 
sociodemographic characteristics of individuals (gender, age, marital status) or census 
indicators of areas (Miethe & Meier 1994). In response, several studies have included direct 
measures of routine activities and ownership of luxury goods (Mustaine & Tewksbury 1998; 
Miethe et al. 1987; Wittebrood & Van Wilsem 2000). From these studies, it appears that 
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direct measures of criminal opportunity are indeed related to crime and also account for some 
of the association between sociodemographic characteristics and victimization. 
 A second point of scientific debate relates to the policy implications of the routine 
activity perspective. Through the implementation of target-hardening devices, crime is 
assumed to be ‘designed out’ (Clarke & Mayhew 1980). Critics of such situational 
prevention, however, point towards the neglect of possible crime displacement, with 
pessimists taking the stance that displacement is inevitable as criminal motivations have to be 
exercised in one way or another. Routine activity theory recognizes the potential for crime 
displacement, but assumes that its occurrence is not inevitable (Cornish & Clarke 1987). In 
this view, situational prevention can lead to crime reduction, not by taking away the root 
causes of criminal dispositions, but by designing situations in such a way that offenders 
decide less often to commit crimes. In literature reviews on the subject, the leading conclusion 
is that crime displacement occurs only to a limited extent (Eck 1997; Hesseling 1994). 
However, it should be mentioned that there are numerous ways in which crime displacement 
can occur, which makes it difficult to assess through empirical research (Trasler 1986). 
Because most previous research has been in the form of small-scale evaluation studies, the 
occurrence of crime displacement has possibly been underestimated. 
 
1.2.2 Absence of Local Guardians: Social Disorganization Theory 
Apart from individual characteristics of targets, victimization is also assumed to be dependent 
on the extent to which informal surveillance is present at a specific place. Identifying the 
absence of local guardians as a potential source of crime implies that people are responsive to 
the presence of social control when deciding to commit criminal acts. One of the most 
prominent criminological theories on this matter is Hirschi’s (1969) social control theory, in 
which it is assumed that social bonds between individuals prevent them from committing 
crimes. This general idea certainly bears relevance for the relation between social context and 
crime. However, the central notion of social control theory is most suited to explain 
criminality and not criminal events (Hirschi 1986). Criminality refers to a (long-term) 
commitment to crime, which is a multi-stage process that develops over a considerable period 
of time (Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990). Causal factors of criminality include various 
biological, psychological and social conditions, such as neurological disorder, personality, 
and parental upbringing (Ferguson et al. 2000; Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990; Rowe 2002). On 
the other hand, criminal events refer to decisions made by offenders at a specific time and 
place, while converging with a target. Situational constraints are assumed to be important in 
understanding when and where criminality is translated into action through criminal events. 
To explain the commission of a criminal act against a target at a specific place, social 
disorganization theory introduces more detail (Shaw & McKay 1942). Like Hirschi (1969), 
Shaw and McKay (1942) – implicitly – proposed that people are responsive to social control 
exercised by others. They thus formulated conditions under which these controls are most 
likely to exist. They argued that the controls exercised by community members are dependent 
upon neighborhood structure, and in turn, that the absence or presence of these controls 
determines the local crime rate. Shaw and McKay’s (1942) ideas were grounded in the 
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ecological model of urban structure that was developed by Chicago School founders Park and 
Burgess (1924). In this model, community organization and the articulation of common norms 
was a central issue of concern, a phenomenon that needed to be explained within the 
dynamics of a large city (Chicago) and the heterogeneity of its inhabitants. Using large-scale 
crime data and census data for the city of Chicago (and several other cities as well), Shaw and 
McKay (1942) detected remarkable patterns between juvenile delinquency rates and the social 
conditions of neighborhoods. Decade after decade, despite changes in populations, the 
percentage of arrested juvenile offenders living in a neighborhood was related to community 
features like low socioeconomic status, high residential mobility and a high percentage of 
immigrants. To explain these patterns, Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that crime is a 
consequence of ‘social disorganization’, a situation in which a local community is unable to 
realize common values due to the instability and heterogeneity of its population. 
 One of the issues that has elicited discussion in scientific debates is whether social 
disorganization theory is designed to explain crime or rather criminality, considering the fact 
that Shaw and McKay (1942) included elements of strain, cultural conflict and control in their 
work (Kornhauser 1978). Did they try to explain in which neighborhoods most crimes were 
committed, or rather, in which neighborhoods most offenders live? Kornhauser (1978), Bursik 
(1988) and Sampson and Groves (1989) agree that a control-theoretic perspective best fits the 
arguments in social disorganization theory. In this perspective, neighborhood conditions do 
not so much determine the ability to reach shared norms on public order, but rather the 
capacity to effectuate these norms through the exercise of collective informal control (Bursik 
1988). In addition, since the social control exercised by community members is physically 
bounded (i.e., restricted to the neighborhood), social disorganization theory is treated in the 
present research as a perspective that explains variations in neighborhood crime rates, but not 
the general disposition of neighborhood members to commit crimes, because their delinquent 
acts may be performed in other neighborhoods as well (see also Sampson & Raudenbush 
1999: 313).  
Although some scholars have argued oppositely, that social disorganization theory is a 
theory of criminality (e.g. Miethe & Meier 1994), various empirical studies have shown that 
neighborhood conditions are hardly relevant to explain variations in general offending 
(Gottfredson et al. 1991; Rankin & Quane 2002; Rovers 1997; Wikström & Loeber 2000). 
Rather, the fact that high crime and victimization rates are found under conditions of 
neighborhood poverty, heterogeneity and instability (Miethe & McDowall 1993; Bursik & 
Webb 1982; Smith & Jarjoura 1988; Wittebrood 2000) should be understood as a 
consequence of the shared inability to monitor the actions of community members and people 
visiting the area. This inability especially appears under these conditions for two main 
reasons: (1) few resources are available for internal organization and (2) few informal ties 
exist between community members, both because mutual social differences are large and 
because informal ties take time to develop so they cannot emerge in a context of continuous 
population change (Bursik 1988; Kornhauser 1978). 
 Building on this reformulation of social disorganization theory, recent debate in this 
tradition relates to the types of social relations between community members that are 
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necessary to generate collective surveillance and thus to reduce crime (Bellair 1997; Bursik & 
Grasmick 1993; Sampson et al. 1997). Traditionally, social cohesion and strong social bonds 
have been considered most effective in reducing crime. However, several studies question this 
assumption. First, ethnographic research presents vivid descriptions of tight-knit, yet crime-
ridden neighborhoods (Suttles 1968; Whyte 1943). Strong ties between inhabitants of a 
neighborhood may in fact restrain public intervention where offenders are well-known 
members of the same community. Second, neighborhoods in which members have infrequent 
contact may succeed in keeping local crime at a low level. Therefore, Bellair (1997) 
suggested that collective social control is more dependent upon the existence of social bonds 
between neighborhood members than on the strength of those bonds. Putting Granovetter’s 
(1973) argument on the strength of weak ties into a criminological perspective, Bellair (1997) 
posited that weak ties among neighborhood members are as important as strong ties in 
generating effective informal surveillance. Finally, Sampson et al. (1997) found that 
collective levels of trust and willingness to intervene for the common good tend to coexist 
within neighborhoods, producing a social context they refer to as ‘collective efficacy’, which 
in turn reduces the likelihood of becoming victim of violent crime (see also Morenoff et al. 
2001).2 
 Social disorganization theory primarily focuses on explaining crime differences 
between neighborhoods. Yet it can also serve as a compositional explanation for the existence 
of crime differences between larger spatial units. Indeed, several researchers have used 
notions from social disorganization theory to explain empirically observed crime differences 
between cities (e.g., Land et al. 1990; Sampson 1986) and countries (Gartner 1990; Krahn et 
al. 1986). As such a compositional explanation, the theory suggests that large spatial units 
vary in their crime rates because they consist of different types of neighborhoods. However, 
as will be elaborated later, in section 1.3, the compositional explanation of city and country 
crime differences derived from social disorganization theory has not been tested appropriately 
by previous research. 
 
1.2.3 Motivated Offenders: Strain/Anomie Theory 
One of the main criminological theories for the explanation of structural crime differences is 
strain/anomie theory (Merton 1957). The core notion of this theory is that inequality breeds 
crime. Merton argued that delinquency is basically determined by two factors: (1) the 
distribution of material opportunities across a social structure and (2) the type of values that 
are considered important in a society. According to this theory, deviant behavior becomes 
more likely if material success is highly valued in society, and simultaneously, if the available 
opportunities are insufficient to let everybody fulfill this goal through legitimate means. At 
                                                 
2 The debate on how social ties between neighbors is related to crime has also put a neglected empirical issue on 
the agenda of social disorganization research: its lack of direct indicators for the operationalization of social 
disorganization conditions (Bursik & Grasmick 1993). Several studies have tried to incorporate direct measures 
of social disorganization by aggregating individual responses to questions of trust, social interaction and 
organizational participation (Bellair 1997; Sampson & Groves 1989; Sampson et al. 1997) or by paying attention 
to the presence of local organizations (Morenoff et al. 2001). Indeed, these direct measures of disorganization 
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the macro level, such a context is one of anomie, which induces strain at the individual level 
among the deprived (Rovers 1997). Among various adaptive strategies, Merton (1957) argued 
that some individuals may turn to the option of ‘innovation’: subscribing to the goal of 
material success while seeking alternative means to fulfill it. Within this line of reasoning, 
committing theft crimes is a clear example of ‘innovative’ adaptation to restrictive social 
circumstances, since it may rectify deprivation shaped by blocked opportunities. 
Merton’s initial formulation of strain/anomie theory was followed by much discussion 
within the scientific community. A major issue was whether the theory was solely suitable for 
explaining utilitarian crime, such as theft, as suggested by Cohen (1965). However, 
alternative versions of the theory assume that relative deprivation also leads to violent crime, 
because the frustration that is generated by the failure to succeed needs to expressed (Blau & 
Blau 1982; Messner 1989). An additional option may be that illegal behavior becomes a goal 
in itself to reach an alternative form of social status, for instance, by exercising violence 
towards others (Elliott et al. 1985). 
 Another point of sociological and criminological discussion centered around the 
assumption in strain/anomie theory that individuals develop a sense of injustice only in 
relation to others. At issue here is the nature of a meaningful frame of reference. In other 
words, on what type of social comparison do people base the evaluation of their material 
position? The initial lack of theoretical detail on this matter became clear in studies that 
performed empirical tests of hypotheses derived from strain/anomie theory using income 
inequality as a proxy measure for relative deprivation. These tests were done across a variety 
of spatial units, such as neighborhoods (Messner & Tardiff 1986), metropolitan areas (Blau & 
Blau 1982; Messner 1982a), states in the United States (Ehrlich 1973; Loftin & Hill 1974) 
and countries (Messner 1982b; Neapolitan 1998). Messner and Tardiff (1986) found homicide 
patterns among Manhattan neighborhoods to be unrelated to local levels of economic 
inequality. They concluded that the national level is the most likely frame of reference instead 
of large, subnational areas such as cities or regions (Messner & Tardiff 1986: 311). According 
to them, exposure to mass media is an important means of people’s comparisons with others 
and a tool for the assessment of both personal economic standing and shared norms on valued 
goals (i.e., material success). There seems to be merit in this suggestion, considering the 
inconclusive findings from various U.S. studies that examined effects of income inequality on 
crime between subnational units (Blau & Blau 1982; Ehrlich 1973; Loftin & Hill 1974; 
Messner 1982a; Williams 1984) and the fact that this relation has been firmly established in 
cross-national crime studies (Gartner 1990; Krahn et al. 1986; Neapolitan 1998). In 
conclusion, strain/anomie theory seems most suited to explain crime differences between 
national structures. 
 Although strain/anomie theory is an offender-oriented perspective that specifies social 
mechanisms that determine criminality, it can also be used as a contextual explanation for 
crime and victimization (Gartner 1990; Messner 1989). This latter strategy is chosen in the 
present research. Considering the assumption that the motivation to commit crimes is induced 
                                                                                                                                                        
not only predict the likelihood of victimization, but also account for a sizeable part of the relation between 
census indicators of disorganization and victimization (Bellair 1997; Sampson et al. 1997). 
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by the unequal distribution of material resources across a society, this study hypothesizes that 
these circumstances are accompanied by larger supplies of motivated offenders. In 
consequence, the chance of a target converging in space and time with an offender is higher, 
which increases the risk of victimization. 
 
1.2.4 Combinations of Risk Factors: Interactions Between the Basic Elements 
Theoretically integrated models to predict victimization must include each of the required 
elements of a crime (motivated offender, suitable target, absence of local guardianship). 
Regular, additive (‘main effect’) versions of such models suggest that the increase of one of 
the three elements is sufficient to cause higher levels of victimization, even if the other two 
elements remain constant. Moreover, the implication of regular additive modeling is that 
crime-inducing mechanisms operate the same in each area, regardless of the social context in 
which they occur. However, another type of theoretical integration can be reached by 
specifying relevant interactions between the elements of crime (Miethe & Meier 1994; Smith 
et al. 2000). In such cases, the operation of a specific risk factor on victimization (e.g., 
exposure to motivated offenders) is dependent on the presence of other risk factors, derived 
from other theoretical orientations (e.g., absence of local guardians). For instance, exposure to 
motivated offenders may be more risky in areas with poor informal surveillance. 
 Although integration of criminological theories has received ample attention (Miethe 
& Meier 1994; Cohen & Land 1987; Felson 1986; Messner et al. 1989; Rovers 1998), little 
research has evaluated the empirical merits of such efforts by specifying interaction terms 
between elements of the different theories. However, Miethe and McDowall (1993) and Smith 
et al. (2000) are two important exceptions to this rule. Both argued that routine activity theory 
and social disorganization theory can be integrated empirically by modeling interaction 
effects between indicators of individual target suitability and neighborhood disorganization. 
Thus, the extent to which target suitability increases victimization risk is considered to depend 
on the level of community cohesion. However, their arguments on the way these factors are 
interdependent are opposite to each other. Miethe and McDowall (1993) suggested that 
individual target characteristics may be less important for predicting victimization in 
disorganized neighborhoods, because in such areas the social context overwhelms the 
significance of individual target characteristics. Because these types of neighborhood are 
attractive places to commit crimes, everyone is at risk, regardless of personal attributes. In a 
similar fashion, Miethe and Meier (1994) suggested that where motivational pressures are 
very high, offenders may engage in less rational judgment during target selection. Based on 
victimization survey data from Seattle, Miethe and McDowall (1993) found that prevention 
measures are indeed less effective in reducing burglary risk in socially disorganized areas. 
However, significant results were found for only three of the 42 interaction variables tested.  
 In contrast, Smith et al. (2000) suggested that the presence of suitable targets in the 
absence of local guardians induces more crimes than would be predicted from an additive 
model. In other words, they argued that criminal opportunities lead in themselves to the 
exercise of crime, especially if the surrounding area is characterized by a lack of social 
control. Street-block data for a southeastern U.S. city support their hypothesis: street 
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robberies are more likely on blocks where single-parent households coincide with the 
presence of commercial land use (e.g., bars and vacant lots). Furthermore, Smith et al. (2000) 
suggested three main reasons why previous research has shown little significant interaction 
effects: (1) measurement error, which is compounded in interaction variables relative to that 
in individual variables; (2) multicollinearity, and when faced with this problem, a lack of 
statistical power to reveal interaction effects; and (3) spatial heterogeneity.  
The issue of spatial heterogeneity is particularly likely to be a problem within large 
spatial units (e.g., cities, countries), since social conditions usually vary considerably within 
such units (Smith et al. 2000). For instance, a city might have above-average levels of 
socioeconomic disadvantage if it consists of several disadvantaged neighborhoods but also, 
and for the majority, affluent neighborhoods. Despite the above-average level of disadvantage 
for the city as a whole, suitable targets may not encounter an absence of local guardians 
across the entire area, but rather, only within the disadvantaged neighborhoods. Thus, spatial 
heterogeneity within the area under study decreases the chance that at least two of a crime’s 
necessary elements (motivated offender, suitable target, absence of local guardians) meet at 
the same place and time. On the other hand, the smaller the area that meets these conditions, 
the more likely it is that a convergence in space and time will take place between offenders 
and targets, and thus, that they will interact to increase the chance of a criminal event. The 
findings of Smith et al. (2000), who documented several significant interactions between land 
use and social disorganization variables, indicate that this is a valuable suggestion for testing 
hypotheses derived from efforts to integrate criminological theories. 
 The present study empirically tests interaction hypotheses on combinations of 
motivated offenders, suitable targets and the absence of local guardianship. Overall, following 
Smith et al. (2000), it expects the simultaneous presence of these elements within a spatial 
area to produce additional crime-inducing effects, which increase victimization risk. 
However, since neighborhoods (consisting of several thousands of inhabitants on average) are 
the smallest spatial area analyzed in this study, it may be that spatial heterogeneity is present 
and attenuates interaction effects, as might also have been the case in Miethe and McDowall’s 
(1993) study. 
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Rich insights have been derived from the various sociological traditions within criminology, 
and much empirical research has been done to examine the tenability of these theories for 
different research questions. However, in most previous research, tests of hypotheses have 
either suffered from misspecification because of the omission of one of the three key 
dimensions of crime (offender motivation, absence of local guardians, target suitability) or 
have not been performed at the level at which the theory is specified. For instance, the 
emergence of routine activity theory led to the conclusion that contextual hypotheses from 
strain/anomie theory and social disorganization theory needed to be tested again in the 
presence of an alternative explanation that was based on individual-level mechanisms. If 
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criminal opportunities matter, and even more, if they are distributed in the same way as strain-
inducing circumstances or a lack of informal surveillance, explanatory models that do not take 
account of target suitability may come to fallacious conclusions. However, although empirical 
research has been done with theoretically integrated models, hypotheses have not been tested 
at the level at which the theory’s mechanism is specified. Therefore, these studies are also 
ultimately inconclusive. For instance, in cross-national crime studies, social disorganization 
theory and routine activity theory have been tested, but not with neighborhood-level and 
individual-level data, but rather, using country-level indicators instead (e.g., Gartner 1990; 
Krahn et al. 1986). 
 An exception to this rule is a recent strand of multilevel studies on victimization. With 
the introduction of multilevel modeling techniques (Goldstein 1987; Snijders & Bosker 1999), 
several studies have integrated the notions of target suitability and social disorganization and 
tested hypotheses at the appropriate levels (i.e., individual and neighborhood) within a 
multilevel framework (Lauritsen 2001; Rountree et al. 1994; Sampson et al. 1997; Wittebrood 
2000). Indeed, the results of these studies show that social disorganization independently 
affects victimization. Simultaneously, the varying distribution of suitable targets across 
neighborhoods is also important for explaining the spatial distribution of crime. For instance, 
according to Wittebrood (2000), the distribution of individual target characteristics accounts 
for 60% of the variance in assault risk between Dutch neighborhoods. 
Hence, a multilevel perspective offers enhanced opportunities for the interpretation of 
macro-level findings, because they can be disentangled into contextual and compositional 
influences. The multilevel perspective has brought new insights to various social sciences 
research fields, such as educational sociology (Dryler 1999; Garner & Raudenbush 1991), 
political science (Lubbers et al. 2002; Nieuwbeerta & Ultee 1999) and sociology of health 
(Duncan et al. 1998; Subramanian et al. 2001). Similarly, many criminological research 
questions can be answered with more conclusive empirical findings if multilevel models are 
used. For instance, an important issue in this field is how material context is related to crime 
rates. Across many types of spatial units, socioeconomic disadvantage has been found to be 
positively related to criminal activity (Land et al. 1990; Sampson et al. 1997). 
Simultaneously, it has been argued that high-income targets are attractive to offenders due to 
their ownership of luxury goods (Hindelang et al. 1978). This suggests that affluent areas 
should suffer from the highest rates of property crime. How should the available macro and 
micro perspectives be reconciled in this case? Does the available empirical evidence on the 
positive relation between disadvantage and crime falsify routine activity theory?  
This need not be the case. Deriving hypotheses from social disorganization theory and 
routine activity theory, it is expected that affluence and disadvantage both affect crime, but at 
different levels within the social context: at the neighborhood level (social disorganization 
theory) and at the individual or household level (routine activity theory). Thus, despite the 
relatively small number of attractive targets in disadvantaged areas, crime rates may be high, 
since socioeconomic disadvantage stimulates neighborhood disorganization (Bursik 1988; 
Sampson et al. 1997). On the other hand, affluent areas may attract more crime than would be 
expected based on their levels of disadvantage because these neighborhoods offer many 
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attractive crime targets. In conclusion, both perspectives need to be modeled at the 
appropriate levels in order to test their hypotheses satisfactory.  
The recent wave of multilevel crime studies represents a clear advance in the research 
field, since they allow for this disentanglement of context and composition. Nevertheless, 
these studies need to be extended in various ways. In the present research, hypotheses on 
victimization at the level of the individual, neighborhood, city and country are tested within a 
multilevel design. This offers two types of improvement over previous studies. First, it 
assesses whether social contexts larger than neighborhoods have an impact of their own on 
victimization. Using a cross-national sample, this is done by relating country-level strain-
inducing circumstances to individual victimization, while adjusting for compositional 
(individual and regional) differences. This study also tests, using a national Dutch sample, 
whether control- and opportunity-related city features have independent effects on 
victimization, after adjusting for compositional (individual and neighborhood) differences. 
Secondly, the present study examines the extent to which compositional differences shape 
macro-level crime outcomes. Previous multilevel crime studies have already done this for 
neighborhoods (Rountree et al. 1994; Wittebrood 2000). However, for crime differences 
between cities and countries, the compositional explanation as such, provided by routine 
activity theory and social disorganization theory, has not been tested before. 
There are a number of arguments why social contexts larger than neighborhoods may 
be relevant for predicting victimization. The first argument is that the distribution of material 
resources across a larger population determines the extent to which people are deprived and 
therefore motivated to commit crimes (Merton 1957). Thus, inequalities across a large scale 
may be important for predicting victimization, since the stimulation of offender motivation 
increases the likelihood that a target and an offender will converge in space and time.  
The second argument is that, apart from the informal control generated by 
neighborhood members, control to prevent illegal activities is also exercised by formal agents 
external to neighborhoods (local authorities, police). Thus, the functioning of these agents 
partly determines the likelihood of victimization (Bursik & Grasmick 1993; Vélez 2001).  
The third argument is that neighborhoods are interdependent. Jointly they constitute a 
network structure in which each neighborhood has a relative status position that determines its 
attractiveness as a place to live. Internal changes within the neighborhood as well as changes 
in other neighborhoods with respect to the type of housing available have consequences for 
the neighborhood’s status position and generate migration patterns into or out of the 
neighborhood. The social instability associated with the residential moves of inhabitants is a 
potentially important source of crime (Sampson et al. 1997) which cannot be reduced to a 
process generated within a single neighborhood (Quillian 1999; Wilson 1987).  
The fourth argument is that preventive action taken by some households may produce 
externalities, displacing risk to other areas (Miethe 1991). Taking into account that crime 
targets will try to protect themselves against victimization, offenders may respond by seeking 
alternative targets, possibly in the close vicinity of the initial target, but maybe also in other 
places at which they routinely commit crimes. A related – and fifth – argument is that crime-
inducing circumstances in nearby places may ‘spill over’ to other neighborhoods, because 
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offenders operating in those places may also be familiar with environments in close proximity 
and therefore decide to include them in their space of operation (Morenoff et al. 2001; Smith 
et al. 2000). 
The sixth argument is that crime-inducing circumstances in nearby areas may spill 
over in another way, through a process of social transmission. As such, neighborhood 
members may be influenced by the behavioral patterns prominent in nearby localities (Cohen 
& Tita 1999; Sampson et al. 1999).  
These six arguments underscore the large potential explanatory power of a model that 
includes multiple social contexts instead of solely the neighborhood. However, modeling 
social conditions external to neighborhoods is a relatively new procedure in the field of 
criminology (Morenoff et al. 2001; Smith et al. 2000; Vélez 2001). Considering its potential, 
the present research also employs this approach. In short, this study simultaneously examines 
the impact of individual, regional and country context in cross-national research and the 
impact of individual, neighborhood and city context in country-specific research. 
Summing up, in addressing the relation between social context and victimization, this 
study uses insights from three criminological theories which focus on different mechanisms, 
each operating at different levels within the spatial structure. The leading questions are 
“which types of context determine individual risk” and “why do spatial units differ in their 
amounts of crime”. These questions can be treated as complementary. The first deals with 
micro-level consequences of social context and individual characteristics, while the second 
deals with the macro-level consequences of context and the distribution of micro-level 
components. Both perspectives are employed in this book to explain victimization risk across 
countries, as well as across neighborhoods and cities in the Netherlands. 
 
1.3.1 Cross-National Differences 
While examining victimization differences between countries, several issues are addressed in 
this book. In most previous cross-national research, ‘crime’ has been narrowed down to 
homicide. This is due to the substantial comparability problems across countries of crime 
rates for offences other than homicide (Neapolitan 1997). These problems are present 
because, first of all, inhabitants of different countries vary in their propensity to report crimes 
to the police (Goudriaan et al. 2003; Van Kesteren et al. 2000), and secondly, because crime 
categories other than homicide suffer from definitional inconsistencies from country to 
country (Neapolitan 1997). Nevertheless, some cross-national studies have conducted 
analyses on theft as well as homicide (Bennett 1991a,b; Kick & LaFree 1985; LaFree & Kick 
1986). But it remains unclear how the findings for theft should be interpreted. Do they truly 
reflect how theft rates are related to national context? Or, are the differences due to the 
confounding effects of varying levels of non-reporting to the police? Therefore, it remains 
uncertain whether the structural correlates are similar for different types of crime. 
This short summary of the problems in cross-national crime research illustrates the 
difficulties in making cross-national comparisons due to several basic issues. This study 
overcomes previous comparative problems by using victimization survey data for theft, 
assault and vandalism from the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) combined with 
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World Health Organization (WHO) mortality statistics on homicide for 27 countries. On the 
descriptive side, an important aim is to examine how homicide rates relate to rates of other 
crimes. Do countries with high rates of homicide also have high rates of other crimes, such as 
theft, assault or vandalism? Since cross-national studies on crime have concentrated on 
homicide, it is relevant to explore whether this crime type accurately represents the level of 
victimization of other types of crime, or if its position in a nation’s crime profile is more 
peripheral. 
Furthermore, with a theoretical framework that integrates the basic elements of crime 
(motivated offenders, suitable targets, absence of local guardians), hypotheses derived from 
strain/anomie theory, social disorganization theory and routine activity theory are 
simultaneously tested across countries and across crimes. Few studies have done this 
previously (Bennett 1991a,b; Kick & LaFree 1985; LaFree & Kick 1986) and none have 
performed these tests with data that offer sufficient cross-national comparability for all types 
of crime. The current study’s combination of ICVS and WHO data allows for optimal 
empirical tests, since these sources provide the most comparable crime data across countries. 
Thus, it becomes possible to examine whether the national circumstances associated with 
homicide relate in the same way to other crimes and, if not, we may ask why this is the case. 
 Finally, by distinguishing between rates of self-reported victimization and police-
reported victimization, this study asks whether the structural correlates of crime are different 
if they are restricted to the criminal events that victims report to the police. Across countries, 
victims have different propensities for reporting the crimes they experience (Goudriaan et al. 
2003; Van Kesteren et al. 2000). Ultimately, these reporting differences may lead to crime 
rankings that are different from those based on the actual (victim-reported) number of crimes. 
Therefore, a comparison between self-reported and police-reported victimization rates reveals 
which aspects of national context are related to reporting crimes to the police and how this 
influences multivariate results. It also sheds light on how findings of previous cross-national 
studies on theft, which were based on official crime figures, should be interpreted. The first 
set of research questions is therefore as follows: 
- How do national homicide rates relate to victimization rates for other crimes? 
- To what extent are cross-national differences in victimization related to varying 
country levels of strain-inducing circumstances, social disorganization and criminal 
opportunities, and do these relations vary across crimes? 
- Are the structural correlates of victimization rates different for self-reported and 
police-reported victimization, and if so, why? 
 
The specification of a theoretical model of crime that includes insights from strain/anomie 
theory, social disorganization theory and routine activity theory is an important step in the 
conclusive testing of hypotheses. However, another way this study aims to improve upon 
existing cross-national research on crime is by performing empirical tests of hypotheses at the 
level at which they are specified.  
 Using disaggregated data from the ICVS on theft, (non-lethal) violent victimization 
and car vandalism, the aim of this part of the study is twofold. Firstly, country-level 
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hypotheses derived from strain/anomie theory are tested within a multilevel design. Thus, 
compositional heterogeneity is simultaneously taken into account by controlling for 
opportunity- and disorganization-related target and area characteristics. Therefore, 
strain/anomie theory is subjected to stronger tests than in previous, macro-level crime studies, 
which did not take compositional differences into account (Bennett 1991a; Gartner 1990; 
Krahn et al. 1986; Messner 1989). Furthermore, since the analyses are performed at the 
individual level as well, we can also examine whether country characteristics are in 
themselves relevant for predicting victimization (Lynch 1993). Previous multilevel crime 
studies have all concentrated on neighborhood conditions as contextual forces operating on 
the likelihood of being victimized (Rountree et al. 1994; Sampson et al. 1997; Wittebrood 
2000). The current analyses on cross-national data offer an opportunity to assess whether 
social contexts as large as countries also have a crime-inducing effect. 
 Secondly, within the strand of cross-national comparative research, social 
disorganization theory and routine activity theory are also tested more appropriately by using 
disaggregated data. Due to the absence of alternative data, previous tests of these theories 
were performed at the macro-level (e.g., Bennett 1991a; Gartner 1990), even though their 
predictions are based on mechanisms operating at lower levels (i.e., at the neighborhood and 
individual levels). Because it is problematic to infer lower-level mechanisms from macro-
level findings (Robinson 1950), it remains uncertain how the effects of (macro-level) 
population composition observed in previous studies should be interpreted. By treating social 
disorganization and criminal opportunities as individual- and regional-level phenomena, it 
becomes possible to examine the way in which their differential distribution across countries 
is related to macro-level crime outcomes. Therefore, compared to previous macro-level 
studies, the outcomes of the current analyses are more conclusive for assessing the 
consequences of social disorganization and criminal opportunity on country-level outcomes of 
crime. These issues result in a second set of research questions: 
- To what extent are strain-inducing circumstances at the country level related to 
victimization, after compositional heterogeneity is adjusted for? 
- To what extent do compositional differences between countries with respect to social 
disorganization and suitable targets explain cross-national differences in 
victimization? 
 
1.3.2 Within-Country Differences 
To better understand the impact of neighborhood and city conditions on victimization, this 
study also examines victimization patterns within a single society, the Netherlands. In looking 
at the spatial distribution of crime within this country, the present research follows a modest, 
but recently revived Dutch tradition on this topic. Studies by Nagel (1949) and Van Rooy 
(1949) on crime patterns across neighborhoods in the cities of Oss and Nijmegen (and 
surroundings) were among the first in this tradition. Later, after a period of little research (but 
see Fiselier 1971; Hesseling 1986), the 1990s saw renewed interest in Dutch environmental 
criminology, following the general revival of neighborhood-oriented research on crime 
(Bursik 1988; Reiss & Tonry 1986; Sampson & Groves 1989). Studies by Kleemans (1996), 
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Rovers (1997), Van der Leun et al. (1998), Wittebrood (2000) and Bernasco and Luijkx 
(2002) describe the spatial distribution of crime within a specific area, as well as attempt to 
explain these patterns. For instance, Kleemans (1996) found that in the city of Enschede 
burglary levels are higher in neighborhoods closest to burglar residential addresses, the town 
center and major roads. These results seem to support the argument that offenders usually 
commit crimes within their awareness space (Brantingham & Brantingham 1993).  
Furthermore, Rovers (1997) found that local juvenile delinquency rates in Rotterdam 
can largely be traced to compositional differences between neighborhoods and are hardly 
determined by neighborhood characteristics. Wittebrood (2000) concluded that variation in 
neighborhood levels of violent victimization across the Netherlands is a product of both 
compositional differences with respect to target suitability and neighborhood conditions that 
stimulate social disorganization (e.g., residential instability). Wittebrood’s study is the only of 
the Dutch studies mentioned to use victimization survey data, as does the present research. 
The others are based either on official police registrations (e.g., Bernasco & Luijkx 2002; 
Kleemans 1996) or also on offender survey data (Rovers 1997). 
Because  strain/anomie theory is most suited for explaining cross-national differences 
in victimization, hypotheses from this theory are not used in explaining within-country 
variations in crime rates. The argument for this (also formulated in section 1.2.3) is that 
differences in the supply of motivated offenders can be understood as a result of varying 
levels of national material inequality, which may induce feelings of relative deprivation. 
Thus, the social disorganization theory and routine activity theory are the leading perspectives 
in the part of this study that focuses on crime variation within one country. The general aim 
with this country-specific perspective is twofold. First, it attempts to expand on the social 
disorganization approach by identifying additional neighborhood conditions that increase the 
likelihood of victimization. Second, it builds upon previous neighborhood-oriented research 
by exploring whether conditions of control and opportunity that are present outside the 
neighborhood (i.e., at the city level) independently affect victimization. 
 Specifically, this study addresses the first general aim by examining the impact of 
neighborhood socioeconomic dynamics on victimization. The intention is to improve upon the 
usual treatment of neighborhoods as static entities in explanatory models of crime. Instead, 
neighborhoods are seen as dynamic systems that undergo internal changes or experience the 
effects of dynamics in the larger urban structure (Bursik & Grasmick 1993). By incorporating 
this notion into social disorganization theory, the crime-inducing impact of socioeconomic 
neighborhood structure is divided into a static and a dynamic component, enabling new 
predictions to be derived from this theory. Traditionally, social disorganization theory predicts 
that disadvantaged neighborhoods experience more crime, because its inhabitants have scarce 
resources with which to organize the area for the collective good (see, e.g., Sampson et al. 
1997). A common-sense argument would thus be that crime may be reduced by increasing 
neighborhood status, for instance, by improving local housing and stimulating the inflow of 
more affluent households. However, the hypothesis on the dynamics of socioeconomic 
composition takes into account the way in which social processes responsible for 
neighborhood improvement relate to victimization. In short, if neighborhood socioeconomic 
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improvement takes the form of stimulating the inflow of new (affluent) residents and 
increasing social heterogeneity, with the co-existence of low-income and high-income 
households, the result may be increased social disorganization and, ultimately, more local 
crime (Covington & Taylor 1989; Taylor & Covington 1988). This prediction is contrary to 
that derived from a more common-sense point of view.  
To examine whether the hypothesis on neighborhood socioeconomic dynamics holds, 
victimization patterns in improving neighborhoods are compared with those patterns found in 
stable and declining neighborhoods. The following research question is thus addressed: 
- To what extent is the socioeconomic improvement of neighborhoods related to 
victimization, and to what extent are conditions of social instability and heterogeneity 
responsible for this relation? 
 
The second general aim in the single-country part of the study – exploring whether conditions 
of control and opportunity that are present outside the neighborhood independently affect 
victimization – is addressed in two steps. The first step explores whether victimization is 
related to city-level indicators for the spatial proximity of social disorganization and formal 
control exercised by police. Simultaneously, compositional differences are adjusted for at the 
individual and neighborhood levels. In so doing, the study examines the impact of varying 
controls that are present in social contexts that overarch neighborhoods (the city) or are 
external to them (other neighborhoods). This builds upon the suggestion by Bursik and 
Grasmick (1993) that neighborhood order cannot be understood solely in terms of the internal 
capacity for organization, but that it also depends on the availability of external resources for 
social control. This aspect follows previous work done by Vélez (2001) and Sampson (1986), 
on the deterrent effect of police-initiated control, and by Morenoff et al. (2001) and Smith et 
al. (2000), on the interdependency of crime levels across neighborhoods.  
The present research is the first in empirical criminology to predict victimization 
based simultaneously on individual, neighborhood and city characteristics. The related 
research question that will be answered is as follows: 
- To what extent do control-related conditions that are external to neighborhoods 
predict victimization, in addition to neighborhood-level conditions of social 
disorganization? 
 
Finally, hypotheses from routine activity theory are tested by focusing on the relation between 
target-hardening prevention measures and burglary victimization. More specifically, while 
addressing the deterrent effect of prevention measures taken by households, the study also 
examines whether the precautionary measures taken by some households result in 
externalities in the form of target displacement. Critics of situational prevention argue that 
target-hardening measures displace crimes rather than reduce them, because their 
implementation does not remove the root causes of crime. Thus, according to this line of 
reasoning, situational prevention will not cause offenders to desist, but rather induce them to 
decide to commit crimes against alternative targets, use alternative modus operandi or commit 
other types of crime against the same targets, etcetera (Barr & Pease 1990). Nonetheless, 
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empirical studies on this issue have found little evidence for spatial displacement of offenders 
(Hesseling 1994; Miethe 1991; Allatt 1984). But these studies were mostly small in scale and 
concentrated on alternative targets in close proximity to the original target (e.g., neighbors).  
This study improves upon previous research on this issue by examining possible 
externalities of other targets’ prevention behavior across a larger scale: that of the city of 
residence. Assuming that burglary offenders displace their actions within the area that they 
are acquainted with through their daily activities, they are likely to choose alternative targets 
within the city, and not necessarily in the direct vicinity of the original target. Thus, the 
overall prevention behavior of potential targets within a city may be relevant for predicting 
individual burglary risk. In addition, another type of crime displacement is examined by 
addressing the relation between burglary prevention measures and victimization of other types 
of crime. Possibly, well-protected targets may suffer higher risk of victimization of other 
crimes, if offenders decide to shift to alternative delinquent activities against which the target 
is less well protected. Thus the final research questions are two: 
- To what extent does individual burglary risk depend upon the preventive actions taken 
by other targets within the same city (adjusting for the number of prevention measures 
taken by the target itself)? 
- To what extent are burglary prevention measures associated with higher victimization 
risk for crimes other than burglary? 
 
 
1.4 VICTIMIZATION DATA 
 
For the study of crime, multiple types of data sources are available. These can be grouped into 
two main categories: official registrations (police registers, arrest data, mortality statistics for 
homicide) and survey data (relating to victimization or offender experiences). Depending on 
the research question, each type of data source has its own drawbacks and advantages. 
Because for a long time official figures were the only type of crime data available, they were 
used in many classical studies (e.g., Guerry 1831; Shaw & McKay 1942). However, for 
assessing the relation between social context and crime these data have several drawbacks. 
First, they are incomplete. Police registration data such as the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) 
in the United States and arrest data such as the Dutch HKS (Herkenningsdienst-systeem), do 
not include crimes that are not reported to or not recorded by police officials. Yet many crime 
incidents do not come to the knowledge of the police (Wittebrood & Junger 2002). The 
number of these unrecorded crimes is often referred to as the ‘dark number’. In itself, such 
measurement error need not pose a problem for testing hypotheses. More problematic is that it 
is unclear whether the distribution of crimes unknown to the police varies across social 
contexts.3 If it does, and even more, if this selectivity is associated with crime-related social 
                                                 
3 This also poses potential problems to time-series analyses. As Wittebrood and Junger (2002) demonstrate, 
violent crime rates in the Netherlands rose during the past 20 years, according to police figures, but remained 
stable according to victimization survey data. They argue that one source of these diverging trends may be the 
increased propensity of police officials to record the crimes that are reported to them by victims of violence. 
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conditions (e.g., income inequality), then the outcomes of empirical tests based on these data 
become hard to interpret. For mortality statistics on homicide, reporting selectivity varies less 
across spatial areas. Official homicide statistics have therefore often been used in comparative 
research (e.g., Gartner 1990; Morenoff et al. 2001). Yet dealing with a single type of crime 
prohibits hypothesis-testing across various crime types.  
A second drawback of official crime data is that it usually provides no detailed 
background on the offender(s) and victim(s) involved and the situation in which the crime 
took place. Furthermore, there is no information on non-victims and non-offenders. Therefore, 
no assessment can be made of which individual characteristics are related to offending or 
victimization. As a result, the possibilities for statistical analyses are restricted to the 
examination of aggregate relations between crime and social context, which severely 
constrains the interpretation of results (Robinson 1950).  
A third drawback is that official crime data often suffer from definitional 
inconsistencies across social contexts (e.g., between jurisdictions or countries), which makes 
crime rates difficult to compare (Neapolitan 1997). Again, this poses a problem for research 
on the spatial distribution of crime. Areas with broad definitions of specific crime types are 
likely to have to higher crime rates, compared to those with more narrow definitions. Not only 
do such irregularities confuse comparisons of crime rates, if the broadness of crime 
definitions is associated with predictors of crime (e.g., GDP per capita), findings from 
explanatory models suffer from interpretative problems. Overall, various types of 
measurement problems limit the usefulness of official crime registrations for assessing the 
spatial distribution of crime. 
 These three drawbacks of official data were important reasons for the emergence of 
victimization surveys in the late 1960s (Ennis 1967). Victimization surveys ask respondents 
to report the crimes they suffered during a specified period. This includes victimizations they 
did not report to the police. Therefore, the problem of ‘dark numbers’, and their possible 
unequal distribution across social contexts, is much less evident than in police registration 
data. Furthermore, these surveys provide a great deal of information on the individual 
characteristics of victims and non-victims and on the incident (e.g., place of occurrence, 
whether it was reported to the police and if the offender was known). If place identifiers are 
available for each respondent (e.g., zip codes), census data can be matched to these data to 
examine whether victimization is more prominent in specific social contexts. Finally, in 
victimization surveys, identical questions on the crimes experienced lead to definitions of 
these crimes that are consistent for all respondents and, unlike police registrations, across 
spatial areas. Overall, these features of victimization surveys make them a very suitable data 
source for examining the relation between crime and social context.4 
 Nevertheless, victimization survey data do not allow generalizations to be made across 
all types of crime and across the entire population. Some crimes simply cannot be assessed 
                                                 
4 Offender surveys are another source of unofficial data. However, these surveys are most reliable when used 
among youth populations (e.g., Rankin & Quane 2002; Rovers 1997; Wikström & Loeber 2000). The answers 
that adults provide to such survey instruments tend not to be reliable. Offender surveys thus suffer in their own 
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with standard victimization surveys, such as ‘victimless’ crimes (e.g., white collar crime) or 
crimes of which businesses are victims, such as shoplifting (Wittebrood & Junger 2002). 
Furthermore, some crimes cannot be adequately assessed, either because they occur too rarely 
to be estimated with samples of several thousand respondents (e.g., kidnapping) or because 
victims refuse to report the crime in an interview setting due to its private nature (rape, 
domestic violence). Also, victimization survey data populations are usually limited to adults 
and adolescents; they exclude young children. For most victimization surveys, samples are 
collected that are representative for the population aged 15 or 16 years and older (Huys & 
Roodijn 1994; Mirrlees-Black et al. 1998; Van Kesteren et al. 2000). Considering these 
limitations, analyses based on victimization surveys are most suited for often-occurring, 
direct-contact crimes, such as burglary, stranger assault and vandalism. Furthermore, the 
findings from representative victimization surveys can be generalized across the adult and 
adolescent population. 
For the research questions brought forward in section 1.3, those relating to cross-
national comparisons are answered with data from the International Crime Victims Survey 
(ICVS). The research questions relating to the simultaneous estimation of neighborhood and 
city effects on victimization are answered with Dutch data from the Police Population 
Monitor. Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 offer more detail on these two data sources. Furthermore, 
their adequacy for answering the present research questions is evaluated. 
 
1.4.1 The International Crime Victims Survey  
The cross-national study of crime has not been without obstacles over the years. Researchers 
have concluded that official statistics contain several problems and errors that seriously 
constrain their use for comparative purposes (Lynch 1993; Mayhew & Van Dijk 1997; Van 
Dijk & Mayhew 1992). These data depend partly upon the willingness of citizens to report 
crimes to the police and partly upon the way that crime categories are defined within 
countries. It has therefore been argued that rather than indicating a nation’s crime level, crime 
rates give an estimate of its crime administration (Zvekic 1996). 
Although the first wave of victim surveys across several Western countries in the 
1970s offered an alternative for estimates of national victimization rates, they did not solve 
the problem of cross-national comparability. National surveys in different countries used 
differing research designs, fieldwork procedures and interviewing questions, limiting the 
comparability of victimization estimates across nations (Block 1993). Furthermore, compared 
to official data, the number of countries that conducted such victimization surveys was 
limited. To overcome these obstacles to cross-national comparison, the Dutch Ministry of 
Justice, along with the British Home Office, initiated the International Crime Victims Survey 
(ICVS) in 1989 in 14 Western countries. Additional survey waves were conducted in 1992, 
1996 and 2000 with the involvement of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice 
Institute (UNICRI). In these new waves, non-Western countries were also included.  
                                                                                                                                                        
way from ‘dark numbers’: incidents committed but not reported in the survey. To assess the relation between 
social context and crime, offender survey data are therefore not optimally suited.  
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Compared to official data, the ICVS data have two main advantages. Firstly, through 
identical questionnaires the ICVS uses standard victimization definitions. Secondly, it 
includes incidents not reported to the police. Consequently, the ICVS data mitigates the two 
main sources of measurement error across nations in cross-national police data. Since the 
ICVS contains questions on multiple types of victimization experiences, it has become an 
important data source for estimating country rates of (non-lethal) assault, car vandalism and 
several types of theft (Mayhew & Van Dijk 1997; Van Dijk & Mayhew 1992; Van Dijk et al. 
1990; Van Kesteren et al. 2000). In this sense, the ICVS “constitutes a quantum leap in 
international statistics on crime and justice issues” (Lynch 1993: 175). Since its start in 1989, 
a growing number of countries has joined the ICVS, increasing the possibilities for 
comparison over a wider variety of nations. Currently, 27 countries have conducted ICVS 
surveys with samples for the general (adult) population.5 
Although the use of victimization survey data offers new opportunities for cross-
national comparison, they also have several limitations that must be taken into account 
(Neapolitan 1997). Most important for the present study, however, is whether these ICVS 
limitations interfere with assessments of the relation between national context and 
victimization. The following paragraphs mention the four limitations most often mentioned 
with regard to ICVS data, along with arguments on why they do not present problems in the 
current study. 
Firstly, fieldwork procedures are not identical for each country participating in the 
ICVS. In Western countries, surveys were conducted through telephone interviewing, whereas 
in Eastern Europe, due to low levels of telephone ownership, face-to-face interviews were 
held. Nevertheless, the comparability of results from surveys with different interview modes 
has been acknowledged (Dillman & Tarnai 1988), especially when the same types of 
fieldwork are applied, as is the case in the ICVS (Van Kesteren et al. 2000).  
Secondly, unequal measurement error may be introduced by the differential response 
rates across nations, which vary from a minimum of 30% for the West-German survey to a 
maximum of 86% for the combined 1992 and 1996 surveys of Finland (average response rate 
for the selection of countries used in this research is 61%). Evidence from previous research 
indicates that those who are victimized are most likely to respond (Block 1993), which would 
result in an overestimation of crime rates in countries where response rates are low. On the 
other hand, low response rates may be associated with under-representation of victims, 
because victims might be away from home more often than non-victims. Van Dijk and 
Mayhew (1992) and Van Kesteren et al. (2000) could not substantiate this with empirical 
evidence, and they found no relation between ICVS response rates and victimization rates. 
Results from bivariate and multivariate analyses on the selection of countries used in the 
present study also lead to this conclusion, although due to the small size of the country sample 
care is required in interpreting these results (see Appendix A, Table A1).  
                                                 
5 ICVS surveys have also been conducted for an additional 31 countries, mainly developing ones. However, 
these surveys were restricted to the inhabitants of a large city in these countries. This restriction limits their 
comparability with country-level victimization estimates, and they are therefore not used in the present study. 
Chapter 1 
 24  
Thirdly, cross-cultural similarity in the interpretation of victimization experiences has 
been questioned (Neapolitan 1997). Thus, although interviewing questions may be identical, 
people from different cultures may define various types of victimization differently. Again, 
Van Dijk and Van Kesteren (1996) showed that the perceived seriousness of victimization 
types is remarkably similar across cultures. Between Western and Eastern European countries, 
this problem seems to be even smaller, since the greatest differences in ranking scores are 
found between survey participants from African cities and those in Western Europe.  
Fourthly, ICVS sample sizes are relatively small (mostly between 1,000 and 2,000 
respondents per survey). Considering that crime victimizations are rare events, a small 
amount of sample error can result in large effects on victimization rates. Several strategies 
were undertaken to deal with this problem. The ICVS data were weighted to ensure 
representativeness for the population aged 16 or older, in terms of gender, age, household 
composition and regional population distribution and corrected for sample error (Van 
Kesteren et al. 2000). Also, in countries where the ICVS has been conducted more than once, 
the data used in Chapter 2 were pooled to increase sample size and obtain more reliable 
victimization estimates (Lynch 1993). Furthermore, in multilevel models, which are used in 
Chapter 3, estimations of country victimization rates were treated as deviations from a ‘grand 
mean’, which is the average risk across all countries. These deviations, or in multilevel terms 
‘random intercepts’, were weighted as a function of the sample size. Thus, larger country 
samples have a larger influence on these estimates than the smaller groups. Finally, for crime 
types with similar properties, overarching categories were constructed. By doing so, the 
proportion of people who experienced an incident within a category becomes larger, which 
makes the victimization estimate less sensitive to sampling errors. In the present study, this 
was done by putting assault and robbery into a joint category for ‘non-lethal violent 
victimization’, while car theft and theft from a car were grouped in the category ‘car-related 
theft victimization’ (Chapters 2 and 3). 
 
1.4.2 The Police Population Monitor 
To estimate contextual effects on victimization, which are adjusted for compositional 
differences within spatial units, victimization surveys need to include both a sufficient number 
of contexts and a sufficient number of respondents within these contexts. Most victimization 
surveys do not meet these requirements, since they contain data for a sample representative of 
the general population. 
For the purpose of the present study – to assess the impact of individual, neighborhood 
and city features on victimization – a sample is needed that includes a sufficient number of 
observations at each of these levels. The Dutch Police Population Monitor (Politiemonitor 
Bevolking) suits this purpose best. Starting in 1993, the Police Population Monitor (PPM) has 
been conducted biannually under the authority of the Dutch ministries of justice and domestic 
affairs. The PPM includes standardized questions on victimization experiences, target 
characteristics, burglary prevention measures and satisfaction with the functioning of local 
police. This study uses PPM data collected for the 1999 edition. 
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Within each of the 25 police regions of the Netherlands, at least 1,000 interviews were 
collected, and substantially higher numbers were realized in most regions. The PPM sample 
used here totals more than 77,000 respondents. The survey includes neighborhood and city 
codes for each respondent, allowing for census data to be matched to the PPM data. As the 
survey’s scope is national, the PPM offers victimization data for most neighborhoods and 
cities across the Netherlands. Because of its large sample size, the mean number of 
respondents per neighborhood and city is well within standard rules of thumb to allow for 
multilevel modeling. In the analyses presented in this book, the number of respondents per 
neighborhood was 30 on average. The number of observations at the neighborhood level was 
more than 2,000, which indicates that more than half of all Dutch neighborhoods are included. 
At the city level, there were more than 500 observations, indicating that almost all Dutch 
cities are included. 
 Similar to the ICVS, PPM data have some properties that need to be taken into account 
when using them for comparative purposes. Again, differential response rates across areas are 
a point of potential concern, since these may influence victimization rates. PPM response 
rates vary across the 25 Dutch police regions, ranging from 39.3% for Amsterdam-
Amstelland to 54.6% for North Limburg. However, response rates were found to be unrelated 
to any of the victimization types examined in this book (see Appendix A, Table A2). This 
holds for bivariate correlations as well as for associations that are controlled for the predictors 
used in Chapters 4 and 5 (which are based on data from the PPM). Thus, in the data used, 
varying response rates do not seem to be of any consequence for the estimation of 
victimization rates. 
 Furthermore, the relatively modest sample sizes per spatial unit need to be dealt with 
carefully. Chapters 4 and 5 employ multilevel models to estimate individual, neighborhood 
and city effects on victimization. In these models, estimates of neighborhood and city levels 
of victimization partly depend on local sample size: the more observations within a specific 
spatial unit, the larger its effect on variance estimates of (aggregated) victimization. 
Furthermore, similar to Chapters 2 and 3, overarching categories were constructed for some 
crime types, which increases the proportion of victims for these offences. This reduces the 
impact of sampling error on the aggregated victimization estimates. In Chapters 4 and 5, 
assault, threats and violent robbery were combined in a category for ‘non-lethal violent 
victimization’, while car theft and theft from a car form the category ‘car-related theft 
victimization’. 
 
 
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
 
To finish this introductory chapter, a short overview is given of the remaining chapters. Table 
1.1 summarizes this study’s empirical chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on cross-national 
differences in victimization. Chapter 2 addresses the relation between victimization and 
strain-inducing circumstances, social disorganization and criminal opportunities across 
countries and across crimes. More specifically, victimization rates and their structural 
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correlates are examined for homicide, burglary, personal theft, car-related theft, non-lethal 
violence and car vandalism. Furthermore, these relations are compared for rates of self-
reported victimization and police-reported victimization, in order to ascertain whether they 
yield different results. Chapter 3 disentangles cross-national differences in victimization into 
the separate impact of context (country-level strain-inducing circumstances) and composition 
(varying distributions of socially disorganized communities and suitable targets). This is done 
for the same crime types as in Chapter 2, with the exception of homicide, for which no 
individual-level victimization data are available. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, the focus shifts from cross-national comparison to comparison 
within a single country, the Netherlands. This allows for a more detailed focus on how crime 
is related to social conditions at the neighborhood level and beyond. In both chapters, a major 
aim is to investigate whether social contexts beyond the neighborhood are important for 
predicting victimization. Chapter 4 examines the impact of city-level control-related features 
on victimization. Also, the relation between victimization and neighborhood socioeconomic 
dynamics is highlighted. This is done for victimization of burglary, car-related theft, violence, 
car vandalism and other vandalism. In order to explore patterns of target displacement, 
Chapter 5 focuses on the relation between prevention measures and burglary, and more 
specifically, on the question of whether targets’ prevention behavior partially determines 
other households’ burglary risk. Furthermore, the chapter explores indications of offence 
displacement by examining whether prevention measures are associated with higher risks of 
other types of crime. Chapter 6 summarizes answers to the research questions and discusses 
them in the context of previous findings in this research field. Finally, the book closes with 
suggestions for future research and a discussion of the implications of the research findings 
for crime-reduction strategies. 
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2. CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN CROSS-
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE* 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This chapter examines how resource deprivation, criminal opportunities and social disorganization affect 
national rates of homicide, non-lethal violence, theft and car vandalism. Previous cross-national research has 
concentrated on homicide rates only, due to the comparative problems associated with measuring the rates of 
other crimes. To avoid comparison problems, the present chapter uses International Crime Victims Survey 
(ICVS) data on various contact crimes and homicide figures from the World Health Organization (WHO) from 
27 Eastern European and Western countries. Three main conclusions can be drawn from the results. First, there 
are similarities between homicide levels and victimization rates for theft and non-lethal violence, which suggests 
that countries with high levels of homicide tend to have high levels of other violence and theft as well. Overall, 
burglary and non-lethal violence seem to be the most central offences in country crime profiles, being related to 
most other types of crime. Second, multivariate results show that income inequality and divorce rates are 
consistently positively related to multiple types of violence and theft within this selection of countries. Also, 
homicide, non-lethal violence and theft show an inverse relation to GDP per capita. This may indicate that 
economic development is associated with lower levels of exposure to likely homicide offenders (family, friends). 
However, the results provide no support for a crime-inducing impact of highly attractive targets, thereby 
challenging theft predictions derived from routine activity theory. Third, divorce rates and GDP per capita are 
unrelated to police-reported victimization rates. This suggests that countries differ in their population’s 
selectivity in reporting such crimes to the police. Therefore, the structural correlates of national crime rates are 
better assessed using self-reported victimization rates. 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Criminological theories have been tested across various types of ecological units (e.g., 
neighborhoods, cities) (Land et al. 1990; Miethe & Meier 1994). From these tests, it appears 
that the number of criminal events within spatial units depends not only upon the presence of 
negative social factors, such as income inequality and lack of informal control, but also upon 
constructive social conditions that exert perverse effects. According to routine activity theory, 
increasing affluence is related to higher levels of ownership of luxury goods and a shift in 
daily activities away from the home. Cohen and Felson (1979), the founders of this theory, 
argued that along with such conditions, people’s attractiveness as crime targets increases as 
well as their exposure to offenders through out-of-home activities. However, unlike 
                                                 
* This chapter is a revised version of an article accepted for publication in the European Journal of Criminology 
(Van Wilsem 2004). A Dutch version was published in Tijdschrift voor Criminologie (Van Wilsem 2001). As a 
conference paper, it was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association 2001 in 
Anaheim (USA), August 18-21 2001. 
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traditional criminological theories, such as strain/anomie theory and social disorganization 
theory, routine activity theory predicts crime-specific effects of levels of material possession: 
whereas theft crimes are assumed to become more likely due to higher target attractiveness, 
rates of violent crime are assumed to be unaffected by these conditions (Bennett 1991a; 
Miethe et al. 1987). 
 Although empirical tests of criminological theories have been performed at a cross-
national level, few studies have examined country-to-country variation in crime rates for 
multiple types of offences. Due to inconsistencies in legal codes and differences in people’s 
propensity to report crimes to the police, both across nations and within nations over time, 
most cross-national studies on crime have focused on homicide (Gartner 1990; Krahn et al. 
1986; Messner 1989; Neapolitan 1998). Because of its fundamental nature, homicide is less 
sensitive than other offences to definitional problems and reporting selectivity. National 
homicide rates are therefore considered to be the most reliable measure for cross-national 
studies of crime (Neapolitan 1997). However, this focus on homicide has narrowed the 
research field. The result is a situation in which it is uncertain whether the structural correlates 
of national homicide rates relate to other types of crime or, as expected for affluence, whether 
they operate differently for theft and violent crime.  
 Exceptions are studies performed by Bennett (1991a,b), Kick and LaFree (1985) and 
LaFree and Kick (1986), which compared the determinants of theft and violence using a 
cross-national perspective. Their findings suggest the structural correlates of theft and 
violence do differ. For instance, Bennett (1991a) found that theft rates are positively related to 
GDP per capita, while rates of violent crime are not.1 Nevertheless, due to comparison 
problems associated with official police statistics on theft (Neapolitan 1997), it remains 
uncertain whether these results do point to different determinants for different crime types, or 
rather if they are due to systematic measurement errors.  
 Since 1989, a potential solution to these comparative problems has come in the form 
of the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS), which includes standardized cross-
national victimization data on theft, violence and vandalism. Compared to cross-national 
police figures on non-homicide crimes, the ICVS data offer two main advantages. First, the 
survey uses identical questionnaires so that victimization definitions are uniform across 
countries. Second, it includes incidents that are not reported to the police. Consequently, the 
ICVS data mitigate the two main sources of unequal measurement error across nations that 
are found in cross-national police data. In addition, the ICVS data offer information on 
whether the victimization incident was reported to the police. Therefore, they enable 
comparisons to be made between national rates of self-reported victimization and police-
reported victimization. 
 Using a combination of ICVS data and homicide statistics from the World Health 
Organization (WHO) for 27 Eastern European and Western countries, the objective of this 
chapter is threefold. First, it explores whether country scores on specific types of 
victimization are related. In this way, it examines whether countries tend to have high 
                                                 
1 In addition, Bennett (1991a) found a negative squared effect, which indicated that at very high GDP levels, 
theft rates declined. 
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victimization rates for a multitude of crime types, or if there is a tendency for ‘specialization’. 
Since most previous cross-national studies on crime have focused on homicide, it is important 
to learn whether this crime type accurately represents the overall level of victimization, or if 
its position in a nation’s crime profile is more peripheral. Second, the chapter examines the 
extent to which country victimization rates for different types of crime (homicide, theft, non-
lethal violence, vandalism) can be ‘explained’ by varying levels of resource deprivation, 
suitable targets and social disorganization. Again, this procedure enables comparisons to be 
made across crime types, this time of whether structural correlates are similar for different 
types of crime. Third, the chapter compares the determinants of self-reported victimization to 
those of police-reported victimization, to learn whether they are the same. This will show 
whether cross-national differences in crimes reported the police (Goudriaan et al. 2003; Van 
Kesteren et al. 2000) are different from those for self-reported victimization. This may shed 
light on how to interpret findings from previous cross-national studies on theft, which were 
based on police data, which may have been ill-suited for the purpose. 
 
 
2.2 THEORY AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
The basic premise in this chapter is that country victimization rates are higher, the more 
motivated offenders and suitable targets converge in space and time in the absence of local 
guardians (Cohen & Felson 1979; Miethe & Meier 1994). In order to model these 
assumptions, insights from strain/anomie theory, routine activity theory and social 
disorganization theory are used. 
 With respect to the supply of motivated offenders, sociological theories on crime have 
concentrated on the social conditions that constrain people’s ability to mobilize material 
resources. Taking relative deprivation as the driving force behind offender motivation, 
strain/anomie theorists argue that deviant behavior becomes more likely when material 
success is a commonly shared and valued goal, while simultaneously, there are too few 
opportunities across the population to achieve this goal through legitimate means (Merton 
1957). In such a situation, the deprived are more likely to turn to ‘innovation’, which Merton 
defines as subscription to society’s goals while simultaneously resigning from its rules on 
how to achieve these goals. In alternative versions of the theory, other researchers have 
suggested that the blocked access to material resources can result in the impulsive expression 
of frustration, and thus lead to higher rates of violent crime (Blau & Blau 1982; Messner 
1989). The present study therefore expects that country rates of theft, violence and car 
damage are higher the more the distribution of income induces feelings of relative 
deprivation. Empirical support for the relation between relative deprivation and violence is 
provided by several cross-national studies that document a positive relation between income 
inequality and national homicide rates (e.g. Gartner 1990; Krahn et al. 1986; Neapolitan 
1998). For theft crimes however, the few cross-national studies that have been done show no 
positive relation between income inequality and theft (LaFree & Kick 1986; Messner 1986). 
 The supply of suitable targets depends both on the value of personal goods and the 
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extent to which people and their possessions are routinely exposed to offenders through their 
daily activities (Cohen & Felson 1979; Miethe et al. 1987). According to routine activity 
theory, societal development brings changes in material ownership and the structuring of 
routine activities and is therefore related to crime. In conditions of affluence, criminal 
opportunities are shaped by a high volume of property worth stealing and by a minimization 
of home guardianship because of people’s enhanced geographic mobility and out-of-home 
work requirements (Kick & LaFree 1985). However, these conditions may operate differently 
on theft and violent crimes. Some argue that criminal opportunities are suitable explicators of 
instrumental crimes, such as theft, but that the expressive nature of most violent crimes is 
beyond the realm of prediction through rational choice assumptions (Bennett 1991a; Miethe et 
al. 1987). Using GDP per capita as a proxy measure for a country’s level of economic 
development, several studies have found support for routine activity theory’s hypothesis on 
theft, considering the positive relation found between GDP per capita and theft rates (Bennett 
1991a,b; LaFree & Kick 1986; Messner 1986). For homicide, however, research findings are 
more ambiguous. Krahn et al. (1986) and LaFree and Kick (1986) reported higher homicide 
rates for countries with low GDP per capita, while others found no association between 
homicide and GDP per capita (Bennett 1991a,b; Pampel & Gartner 1995). The present study’s 
hypothesis is that country rates of theft victimization are higher with higher levels of GDP per 
capita (since this indicates the presence of many attractive targets), and that violence and 
vandalism are not related to GDP per capita. 
 Finally, the number of situations that allow for the expression of criminal intentions 
partly depends on the amount of social control that is exercised in local communities within 
countries. Population turnover and heterogeneity within communities are associated with high 
crime rates because they foster social disorganization by limiting interactions among 
community members (Shaw & McKay 1942; Sampson et al. 1997). In addition, it has been 
suggested that a high rate of family dissolution severs social ties and restricts the collective 
ability to supervise youngsters within communities (Gartner 1990; Sampson & Groves 1989). 
Indeed, Sampson and Groves (1989) found neighborhoods with high divorce rates to be 
characterized by more unsupervised peer groups and higher levels of local victimization. 
Cross-national crime studies also document a positive relation between divorce and homicide 
rates (Gartner 1990; Krahn et al. 1986; Pampel & Gartner 1995). Considering theory and 
empirical findings on this matter, this study’s hypothesis is that national rates of theft, 
violence and vandalism rise with an increasing divorce rate within a country. 
 
 
2.3 DATA 
 
2.3.1 Victimization Rates 
This study examines country victimization rates for multiple crime types. These rates were 
obtained from two sources. First, homicide figures based on death rates due to injury 
purposively inflicted by others were taken from the World Health Statistics Annual, reported 
by the World Health Organization (WHO). These rates concern the number of violent deaths 
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per 100,000 persons. Unlike homicide data provided by the United Nations and Interpol, the 
WHO data are consistent in their exclusion of homicide attempts and are therefore considered 
to be the best source of homicide information (Kalish 1988). Nevertheless, Bennett and Lynch 
(1990) concluded that, regardless of the type of data source used, statistically similar relations 
are found between homicide and GDP per capita. The WHO data have the additional 
advantage of being most complete for the current selection of countries and years. Homicide 
rates were averaged to five-year means to correct for yearly fluctuations in some nations due 
to the small number of observations. This is a common procedure in cross-national research 
on homicide (see, e.g., Gartner 1990; Krahn et al. 1986). Furthermore, the scores were 
subjected to natural log transformation to reduce the skewness of its distribution.  
 Second, victimization rates were calculated with ICVS data for burglary, personal 
theft, car-related theft, non-lethal violence and car damage. Crimes were thus distinguished 
between those committed against households (burglary, car-related theft, car damage) versus 
crimes against individuals (homicide, non-lethal violence, personal theft), and between crimes 
involving cars (car damage, car-related theft) and other crimes. For each of these five crime 
types, one-year prevalence rates were computed, indicating the percentage of people or 
households that were victimized in the year prior to the survey.2 Burglary rates include both 
attempts and completed offences. Rates for car-related theft were based on household 
victimization experiences with car theft and theft from a car. Rates of non-lethal violence 
indicate the percentage of people that were the victim of either a robbery or an assault. 
Furthermore, rates for incidents recorded by the police (according to the victim) were 
calculated for non-lethal violence, the various types of theft and car damage. Thus, these rates 
relate to the number of people/households who reported a victimization incident to the police. 
The current analyses include data for 27 countries. Of these countries, 19 are Western, 
one is Asian (Japan) and seven are Eastern European. Some of the countries participated in 
multiple waves of the ICVS. In order to increase the size of the sample on which 
victimization estimates were based, these data were pooled (Lynch 1993). However, to 
minimize over-time variations in victimization within countries, the data were pooled only if 
they did not cover a period of more than four years. For instance, France participated in the 
1989, 1996 and 2000 editions of the ICVS. For the present study, its victimization estimate 
was based on the pooled data from 1996 and 2000. Sample sizes vary from 506 for Slovenia 
to 8,759 for Poland. Overall, the average sample size per country was 2,835. 
                                                 
2 Non-homicide victimization rates for the United Kingdom had to be computed indirectly, because ICVS data 
were available only separately for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Since the victimization 
percentages for Northern Ireland and Scotland are based on a much smaller general population than for England 
and Wales, rates for the United Kingdom were computed by weighting the data for these three samples relative 
to the average size of their general population (in millions) in the survey years 1996 and 2000 (England & 
Wales: 52.02, Scotland: 5.13, Northern Ireland: 1.66). 
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2.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
Consistent with previous research (Gartner 1990; Krahn et al. 1986; Messner 1989; 
Neapolitan 1998), economic strain caused by the uneven distribution of material resources 
was measured by the gini index of household income inequality (World Bank, various years). 
The data for this variable are for the early or mid 1990s. Although for some countries these 
years are not in complete accordance with the ICVS survey years, this does not present severe 
measurement problems, since income inequality is a relatively stable feature of societies 
(Muller 1988). GDP per capita (converted at purchasing power parity) was included as a 
proxy measure for a nation’s level of affluence. The data were drawn from the World Bank’s 
World Development Report (various years).  
 To measure country levels of social disorganization, data were used on the number of 
final divorce decrees issued under civil law per 1,000 mid-year population (United Nations, 
various years). As a predictor for victimization rates involving cars (theft, damage), the mean 
number of cars per household was derived from the ICVS data. Scores on divorce rate and 
GDP per capita generally refer to the year preceding the ICVS since this reflects the 
respondents’ reference period. Countries with victimization estimates based on multiple ICVS 
surveys were assigned a mean score over these years on these explanatory variables. For 
countries participating in the 2000 wave of the ICVS, the most recent data available on 
divorce rates dated from 1997. For Malta, mean value substitution was done for income 
inequality and divorce rate to fill in for missing data, while Georgia received a mean value 
substitution for income inequality. 
 
 
2.4 RESULTS 
 
2.4.1 Descriptive Analyses 
Table 2.1 depicts the victimization rates for the 27 countries for homicide, theft, non-lethal 
violence and car vandalism, with separate estimates for self-reported victimization and police-
reported victimization for the crimes other than homicide. Overall, of the crimes examined, 
car damage and car-related theft are the ones most people reported being victim of, with more 
than six percent on average on a yearly basis. Homicide is the rarest crime event, with 
approximately three victims per 100,000 of the population on average across the selection of 
countries. However, most countries had homicide rates well below this mean score. In 
contrast, Estonia (23.14), Lithuania (10.87) and the United States (9.64) display very high 
rates of homicide. Japan has very low rates of victimization, not only for homicide but also 
for non-lethal violence and the various types of theft. Overall, Eastern European countries 
have significantly higher victimization rates for several types of crime compared to Western 
countries: homicide (p<.01), personal theft (p<.01), non-lethal violence (p<.10) and burglary 
(p<.10). The reverse is found for car damage, with higher rates in Western countries (p<.05). 
 However, if we turn to police-reported victimization, the average rates for theft and 
non-lethal violence are similar for Eastern European and Western countries, which suggests 
that in Eastern European countries, fewer victims notify the police after an incident. For 
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instance, the proportion of personal theft victims who claimed they had reported an incident 
to the police is 41% in the Western countries and 26% in the Eastern European countries. For 
non-lethal violence, these percentages are 33% versus 28%, and for car damage 34% versus 
22%. 
 In order to detect patterns of co-occurrence of victimization types, Pearson 
correlations were calculated for the types of victimization analyzed here. In this way we can 
ascertain whether crimes of homicide, non-lethal violence, theft and car vandalism co-occur 
in the same nation. More specifically, the position of homicide in national crime profiles was 
examined. This is an important issue, since previous cross-national studies concentrated 
narrowly on this type of crime. Table 2.2 presents the results of this analysis.  
 
Table 2.2 Pearson Correlations between Victimization Rates for 27 Countries 
 
1. Homicide 
1. 
- 
         
 
2. Self-reported non-lethal violence 
 
.56** 
2. 
- 
        
 
3. Self-reported burglary 
 
.56** 
 
.69** 
3. 
- 
       
 
4. Self-reported personal theft  
 
 .25 
 
.47* 
 
.54** 
4. 
- 
      
 
5. Self-reported car-related theft  
 
 .27 
 
.58** 
 
.58** 
 
 .45* 
5. 
- 
     
 
6. Self-reported car vandalism  
 
-.14 
 
.08 
 
 .03 
 
-.14 
 
.40* 
6. 
- 
    
 
7. Police-reported non-lethal violence  
 
 .16 
 
.75** 
 
.56** 
 
 .30 
 
.55** 
 
.42* 
7. 
- 
   
 
8. Police-reported burglary 
 
 .15 
 
.43* 
 
.79** 
 
 .47* 
 
.41* 
 
.21 
 
.68** 
8. 
- 
  
 
9. Police-reported personal theft 
 
-.33 
 
.07 
 
 .07 
 
.62** 
 
.20 
 
.15 
 
.25 
 
.37 
9. 
- 
 
 
10. Police-reported car-related theft  
 
-.08 
 
.33 
 
 .37 
 
 .28 
 
.77** 
 
.66** 
 
.66** 
 
.58** 
 
.39* 
10. 
- 
 
11. Police-reported car vandalism 
 
-.25 
 
.10 
 
-.09 
 
-.16 
 
.08 
 
.75** 
 
.44* 
 
.20 
 
.22 
 
.54** 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-tailed) 
 
Across the 27 countries examined, homicide rates are positively related to self-reported 
burglary and non-lethal violence. Thus, countries with high homicide rates also tend to have 
high rates of burglary and other violence as well, indicating that the position of homicide in 
country victimization profiles is not an atypical one. However, country rates of police-
reported victimization are unrelated to national levels of homicide. The impression given by 
these latter correlations is that homicide rates are not representative of levels of other types of 
crime, while the correlations with self-reported victimization suggest the contrary. 
Furthermore, rates of (self-reported) burglary and non-lethal violence are positively related to 
all (other) types of theft and violence. This suggests that there is no specialization for these 
crimes within countries, but instead, their rates tend to be high or low collectively. However, 
the prevalence of car damage is quite distinct from other crimes, considering its lack of 
association with other types of victimization (except for car-related theft). Thus, high rates of 
car vandalism are found in other countries than those with high rates of violence or theft. The 
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results from Table 2.1 also illustrate this finding: whereas most of the highest rankings on 
victimization of theft and violent crime are located either in the Eastern European countries or 
countries from the ‘New World’ (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), for car damage the 
highest rankings are for European countries (Netherlands and Malta). 
 
2.4.2 Multivariate Analyses 
For the multivariate analyses, weighted least squares analyses were performed. Since 
countries with larger ICVS samples are assumed to have more accurate estimations of 
victimization rates, the error terms in ordinary least squares are likely to become smaller with 
increasing sample size. To correct for the resulting heteroscedasticity, observations were 
weighted by the square root of their sample size (Hanusheck & Jackson 1977). Another 
potential concern for multivariate analysis is multicollinearity, which occurs when predictor 
variables are strongly related, especially with small sample sizes. Land et al. (1990) argued 
that inconsistent findings in previous ecological research on crime may have been the result of 
insufficient attention paid to collinearity problems. However, for the current models an 
examination of variance inflation factor (VIF) scores and condition indices indicate no 
problems of collinearity. All VIF scores are less than 1.5, while the condition indices are less 
than 3.0, indicating that the simultaneous inclusion of these predictors did not seriously affect 
the parameter estimates (Belsley et al. 1980).  
 Table 2.3 reports the results of the multivariate analyses for victimization of homicide, 
non-lethal violence, burglary, personal theft, car-related theft and car vandalism, both self-
reported and police-reported. First, the results of the models for homicide and self-reported 
victimization are discussed. Then, these results are compared to the findings for the models on 
police-reported victimization. 
 The results in Table 2.3 show a positive relation between income inequality and 
victimization for four crime types (non-lethal violence, burglary, car-related theft, car 
damage) of the six. These findings support strain/anomie theory. Unexpectedly, income 
inequality is not significantly related to (logged) homicide. Furthermore, a positive 
association with divorce rate is found for homicide, non-lethal violence, burglary and personal 
theft, which is in line with predictions derived from social disorganization theory. Also, all 
crime types except for car damage are inversely related to GDP per capita. For theft, this 
finding is contrary to hypotheses derived from routine activity theory and contrasts with 
previous findings by Bennett (1991a,b), Messner (1986) and LaFree and Kick (1986). 
Possibly, this is due to differences in the type of data used: unlike the current study, previous 
cross-national theft research was based on Interpol police figures rather than on victimization 
survey data.  
 For homicide and non-lethal violence, the inverse relation with GDP per capita refutes 
suggestions by Miethe et al. (1987) and Bennett (1991a), who argued that opportunity-related 
conditions are not applicable to the prediction of violent crime. Instead, the findings support 
Kick and LaFree’s (1985) routine activity hypothesis on violent crime, in which economic 
development is assumed to be accompanied by less contact between the group members most 
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likely to kill each other (i.e., family and friends). Furthermore, rates of car-related theft and 
car damage are found to be higher the more cars are owned on average by households. 
 
Table 2.3 WLS-Regression of Homicide, Self-Reported and Police Reported 
Victimization on Income Inequality, Divorce Rate, GDP per Capita and 
Number of Cars per Household (Standardized Coefficients) 
   
SELF-REPORTED VICTIMIZATION 
 Homicide 
(ln)a,b 
Non-lethal 
violence 
 
Burglary 
Personal 
theft 
Car-related 
theft 
Car 
vandalism 
 
Income inequalityc 
 
 
.17 
 
  .36** 
 
   .54*** 
 
.06 
 
     .47*** 
 
  .31* 
Divorce ratec 
 
     .56***    .44***   .31**     .39** .07 -.08 
GDP per capitad 
 
    -.54***    -.49***  -.35**    -.55***     -.59*** -.14 
No. of cars per householdc - - - -   .29*    .42* 
 
R2 
 
.60 
 
.50 
 
.53 
 
.33 
 
.55 
 
  .28 
 
 
Table 2.3 Continued 
 
 
  
POLICE-REPORTED VICTIMIZATION 
  Non-lethal 
violence 
 
Burglary 
Personal 
theft 
Car-related 
theft 
Car 
vandalism 
 
Income inequalityc 
 
  
      .50*** 
 
    .42** 
 
-.14 
 
     .38** 
 
 .19 
Divorce ratec 
 
  .22  .22  .16  .06  .05 
GDP per capitad 
 
 -.14 -.09 -.04 -.32  .22 
No. of cars per householdc  - - -  .27 -.01 
 
R2 
  
 .35 
 
 .27 
 
 .03 
 
 .30 
 
 .09 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
a OLS-regression estimates  
b N=26 (no homicide rate available for Georgia) 
c one-tailed test 
d two-tailed test 
 
Next, the results discussed above were compared to the results of the analyses on police-
reported victimization. As police-reported victimization rates are subject to the reporting 
selectivity of crime victims, it is interesting to examine whether the differences between 
countries in this selectivity affects the relations with crime-inducing circumstances. As can be 
seen in the right half of Table 2.3, most of the correlations that were found with self-reported 
victimization become non-significant for police-reported victimization rates. Divorce rates, 
GDP per capita and the number of cars per household are unrelated to police-reported rates 
for all of the crime types examined here. Only for income inequality do positive associations 
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remain, with income inequality being related to police-reported non-lethal violence, burglary 
and car-related theft.  
Overall, these findings suggest that cross-national differences in the reporting of 
crimes to the police are strongly related to predictor variables of crime rates. For instance, in 
countries with low GDP per capita, crime victims are less likely to report offences they 
suffered to the police compared to victims in more affluent countries. Thus, using self-
reported victimization data, countries with low GDP per capita appear to have higher crime 
rates. However, using data on police-reported victimization, differential reporting selectivity 
across countries leads to the erroneous suggestion that crime differences between countries 
with high and low GDP per capita are negligible. 
 
 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this chapter was to test hypotheses derived from various criminological theories 
for theft, violence and car vandalism in a cross-national context. Previous cross-national 
research on crime has focused on homicide, due to comparability problems of data for other 
types of crime. A problematic aspect of this homicide focus is that it remained unclear how 
well homicide rates represent overall crime patterns in countries, and if the structural 
correlates of homicide also apply to other crime types. Some studies have suggested that the 
predictors of theft and homicide rates differ. However, these studies have suffered from 
measurement error due to their (forced) reliance on police figures for theft rates, since 
victims’ selectivity in reporting offenses to the police varies from country to country. Thus, 
empirical tests based on these data have not been optimal.  
 The initiation of the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) offers new 
opportunities for the cross-national study of crime. Unlike official international figures, the 
ICVS data do not suffer from differential crime definitions and the varying propensities of the 
general public to report crimes to the police. The present research is among the first to 
combine ICVS data and cross-national data on homicide to examine patterns of co-occurrence 
across countries and explore the sources of cross-national variation for multiple crime types. 
This was done for the 27 Western and Eastern European countries that participated in the 
ICVS with surveys representative for the general (adult) population. 
 The results show that national homicide rates are positively related to both rates of 
theft and of non-lethal violence, indicating that the position of homicide in country 
victimization patterns is not peripheral. Overall, it seems that high levels of victimization 
within nations co-occur for different crime types, with the exception of car damage, which has 
high rates in a distinct group of countries.  
 The multivariate results suggest that several structural factors have a crime-inducing 
impact. First, as expected, hypotheses derived from strain/anomie theory and social 
disorganization theory are corroborated across crime types. For burglary, non-lethal violence, 
car-related theft and car damage, victimization rates were higher in countries with high levels 
of income inequality. This is in line with the strain theoretic prediction that structural 
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constraints on access to material resources lead to more criminal activity, as the deprived 
attempt to obtain these resources illegally or express frustration about blocked material 
opportunities. Furthermore, rates of theft and violent victimization were found to be positively 
related to national divorce rates. This could suggest that high rates of victimization may be a 
macro-level consequence of a large proportion of places with ineffective surveillance. 
 Second, GDP per capita is inversely related to both theft and homicide. This result 
counters suggestions by Miethe et al. (1987) and Bennett (1991a) that the prediction of 
violence is beyond the realm of a opportunity-oriented theory. Rather, it is in line with Kick 
and LaFree’s (1985) hypothesis that a higher level of national economic development is 
associated with declining opportunities for homicide. According to this line of reasoning, 
economic development brings with it labor and educational requirements, as well as an 
increased potential for geographic mobility, thus lessening interpersonal contact among 
intimates. Since the people who are most likely to be involved with each other in homicides 
(family members, friends) interact less frequently, the opportunity for this crime is reduced 
(Kick & LaFree 1985). However, the inverse relation between GDP per capita and theft 
contradicts the routine activity hypothesis, which predicts that theft will be most frequent in 
countries with large numbers of attractive targets. This result also contrasts with previous 
findings by LaFree and Kick (1986). Yet, it should be noted that LaFree and Kick’s study was 
based on Interpol police data and that reporting selectivity of theft across countries may have 
resulted in biased findings.  
 To examine the validity of this claim, additional multivariate analyses were carried out 
using rates of police-reported victimization. These analyses show that many relations between 
victimization rates and national crime-inducing circumstances become non-significant when 
using the official police figures, including the relation between various types of theft and 
GDP per capita. In fact, this does not show that theft rates are equal across countries at 
varying stages of economic development. Rather, it indicates that victims in developing 
countries are less likely to report the crimes they experience to the police than victims in the 
more developed nations. Ultimately, the use of police-reported victimization rates, therefore, 
seems to result in misguided findings. 
 Two explanations may be offered for the inverse relation between theft victimization 
and GDP per capita. The first is that, rather than indicating a small number of attractive 
targets, low GDP per capita may reveal high levels of absolute deprivation, as suggested by 
Krahn et al. (1986). The second explanation is offered by Bennett (1991a), who found the 
relation between the number of attractive targets (GDP per capita) and Interpol data on theft 
to be curvilinear, with a positive effect for the majority of countries but a negative effect for 
the group of most developed countries. Considering that the current selection of countries is 
mainly composed of highly developed countries, the need emerges for further ICVS-based 
research that includes countries at the lower end of the economic development range, in order 
to subject this hypothesis to additional empirical tests. 
 More generally, including countries from different parts of the world may demonstrate 
the broader applicability of the explanatory model used here, or rather, identify the need to 
expand the array of predictive factors to include such factors as the impact of national 
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involvement in wars (Gartner 1990) or the deterrent effect of religious controls on crime. 
Furthermore, an interesting direction for future research may be to examine conditional 
effects; that is, those in which the crime-inducing effects of certain conditions depend upon 
the presence of other structural factors (Miethe & Meier 1994; Pampel & Gartner 1995). 
 
 
 
3. CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN 
VICTIMIZATION: DISENTANGLING THE 
IMPACT OF COMPOSITION AND 
CONTEXT* 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Cross-national variations in criminal victimization are assumed to be the outcome of country-level structural 
constraints that determine the supply of motivated offenders, as well as countries’ differential composition of 
suitable targets and local guardians. However, previous empirical tests of these ‘compositional’ and 
‘contextual’ explanations of victimization differences have been performed using macro-level crime data, due to 
the unavailability of comparable individual-level data across countries. This limitation has constrained cross-
national crime research in two important ways. First, micro- and meso-level mechanisms underlying cross-
national differences cannot be truly inferred from macro-level data. Second, effects of contextual measures (e.g., 
income inequality) on crime are uncontrolled for compositional heterogeneity. The analyses presented in this 
chapter overcome these constraints by using individual-level victimization data from 18 countries from the 
International Crime Victims Survey. Results from multilevel analyses of victimization of theft, violence and car 
vandalism indicate that the national level of income inequality is positively related to victimization risk, 
independent of compositional (i.e., micro- and meso-level) differences. Furthermore, cross-national variation in 
victimization rates is shaped not only by differences in national context but also by varying composition. More 
specifically, countries that consist of more urban residents and regions with low average social cohesion have 
higher rates of crime. 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Studying the spatial distribution of crime and victimization is of great interest to both 
criminologists and sociologists. At various levels of aggregation (street blocks, 
neighborhoods, cities, countries), studies have documented the fact that some areas are more 
crime-ridden than others (e.g., Gartner 1990; Land et al. 1990; Morenoff et al. 2001; 
Wittebrood 2000). Unlike American sociologists, European sociologists have paid little 
attention to the way crime is distributed across places – despite sociology’s engagement with 
diverse social conditions relevant to understanding this phenomenon (e.g., material inequality, 
social cohesion, people’s lifestyles). This chapter, like Chapter 2, focuses on differences 
                                                 
* This chapter is a revised version of an article that appeared in the European Sociological Review (Van Wilsem 
et al. 2003). An earlier version was presented at the Workshop of Cross-National Comparative Crime 
Victimization Research at the Netherlands Institute for the Study of Criminality and Law Enforcement, Leiden, 
The Netherlands, June 22-24 2001. 
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between countries in victimization rates and asks why countries vary in their capacity to 
maintain social order. 
Similar to studies examining the distribution of victimization at other levels of 
aggregation, researchers have offered contextual as well as compositional explanations for 
cross-national differences in victimization. Contextual explanations concentrate on the crime-
inducing aspects of a country’s social structure, which determines the supply of motivated 
offenders. In this respect, strain/anomie theorists argue that inequalities in the distribution of 
material resources induce offender motivation among the deprived. Therefore, crime rates will 
be higher with increasing inequality (Merton 1957; Blau & Blau 1982). Previous cross-
national studies have supported this assumption by reporting a positive relation between 
levels of income inequality and homicide rates within a country (Gartner 1990; Krahn et al. 
1986; Neapolitan 1998). Also, Chapter 2 of this book found consistent relations between 
income inequality and national rates of victimization for several types of crime. 
On the other hand, in compositional explanations of cross-national differences in 
victimization, countries are said to vary systematically in the composition of the lower level 
units (e.g., individuals, communities) that are associated with victimization risk. Cohen and 
Felson’s (1979) routine activity theory offers an example of a compositional explanation for 
victimization. To explain temporal changes in U.S. crime rates since World War II, Cohen 
and Felson argued that the displacement of daily activities from the home to the public 
domain (e.g., through women’s increased participation in the labor force) combined with 
increased possession of portable luxury goods, led to increased criminal activity and 
victimization because of the greater criminal opportunities associated with these shifts. Thus, 
they used individual-level mechanisms to account for aggregate crime differences over time.  
However, varying crime rates between countries may result not only from the 
differential composition of micro-level components (individuals), but also from differing 
meso-level components (e.g., communities, regions). In this respect, social disorganization 
theory (Shaw & McKay 1942) offers an additive compositional explanation for cross-national 
crime research. This theory posits that the absence of social ties among community members 
stimulates criminal activity, due to communities’ resultant incapacity to enforce collective 
norms. Thus, in compositional terms, countries may have higher victimization rates because 
they consist of more socially disorganized communities.1  
Summarizing, strain/anomie theory offers a macro-level (country) explanation for 
cross-national differences in victimization (through differing national levels of material 
inequality). Social disorganization theory is concerned with meso-level (neighborhood/city) 
compositional differences and routine activity theory is concerned with micro-level 
(individual) compositional differences. Although contextual and compositional explanations 
have been offered to account for cross-national differences in victimization (Gartner 1990; 
Krahn et al. 1986; Messner & Rosenfeld 1997; Neapolitan 1998), a serious drawback is that 
                                                 
1 Informal control is a community-level phenomenon. In neighborhood research on crime (e.g., Sampson et al. 
1997), social disorganization theory serves as a contextual explanation, since the neighborhood is the highest 
level of analysis in these studies. However, in cross-national research, neighborhoods are units within countries. 
Therefore, in this study the theory is appropriate as a compositional explanation. 
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the empirical tests performed have used country-level data, due to the absence of comparable 
individual-level crime data across countries. Because it is problematic to infer micro-level 
mechanisms from macro-level findings, it remains uncertain how the observed effects of 
population composition in these studies should be interpreted. In addition, effects of national 
context on crime can be called into question, whether they indicate the crime-inducing impact 
of social structure, or rather, if they are the outcome of unmeasured, systematic lower-level 
heterogeneity. For instance, does a relation between income inequality and homicide indicate 
that the country’s material context stimulates the activity of offenders? Or, is the relation 
found because countries with high income inequality systematically consist of more people 
prone to victimization due to their characteristics as a target? The sole availability of macro-
level crime data has made it difficult to answer two basic, yet important questions for the 
cross-national study of victimization: (1) To what extent does cross-national variation in 
victimization result from compositional differences? 2) To what extent do country 
characteristics predict victimization rates, after compositional differences are taken into 
account? 
 The analyses presented in this chapter overcome constraints that faced previous cross-
national studies to answer these two questions, using individual-level data from the 
International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) on theft and violent victimization. For 18 
countries, individual-level information on target characteristics, neighborhood cohesion and 
city size was combined with country-level data on the social and material context. In this way 
it becomes possible to estimate the extent to which cross-national variation in victimization 
results from compositional differences. Also, the hierarchical data structure allows for 
stronger tests of country-level hypotheses derived from strain/anomie theory, since 
individual-level heterogeneity can be controlled for in estimating these effects on 
victimization. As an additional way to prevent putting too much confidence in country-level 
effects due to a neglect of within-country differences, statistical controls were introduced for 
structural features of the respondents’ region of residence within a country. Therefore, models 
including three levels were used to perform the analyses, in which separate error terms were 
estimated at each level (individual, region and country). This procedure builds upon the 
findings from Chapter 2 of this book. Criminological hypotheses were again tested for 
multiple types of crime, but now, with the use of disaggregated data, they were appropriately 
tested as compositional or contextual hypotheses, depending on the level at which the theory 
is specified.  
Furthermore, this chapter distinguishes between victimization of theft, violent crime 
and car vandalism, and whether the victimization incident occurred in the target’s own 
neighborhood or elsewhere. These distinctions are made for two reasons. First, some risk 
factors do not operate in a general manner, but instead have restricted impact in specific 
settings or for specific crimes. For instance, social disorganization theory emphasizes that the 
degree of local community cohesion determines victimization risk. Therefore, its explanatory 
power would not extend to victimization incidents that occur outside that area. Thus, 
community cohesion may be a relevant compositional factor for explaining cross-national 
victimization differences, but only for the types of crime it intends to explain. Second, some 
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risk factors can be assumed to have similar effects across crime types, but due to different 
underlying mechanisms. For instance, living in a large city is expected to increase people’s 
victimization risk, both within and outside their neighborhood. However, the risk outside the 
neighborhood may be increased because urban residents’ physical mobility through routine 
activities may bring them into disorganized areas more often than rural targets. On the other 
hand, risk within the neighborhood may be higher for urban residents because the physical 
mobility of potential offenders may increase the residents’ chance of being at the same place 
and time with a potential offender. This is especially true for those living in close proximity to 
disorganized areas. Therefore, for a more detailed interpretation of empirical findings, 
distinction of victimization incidents by place of occurrence is necessary (Lauritsen 2001). 
 
 
3.2 THEORY AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
This book assumes throughout that victimization rates within a country are higher, the more 
motivated offenders and suitable targets converge in space and time in the absence of local 
guardians (Cohen & Felson 1979). Moreover, the increase of one of these elements 
(motivated offenders, suitable targets, absence of local guardians) is expected to be sufficient 
to result in higher rates of victimization, provided the other two remain constant. The 
compositional explanation of cross-national variations in victimization predicts that countries 
will have higher victimization rates if they consist of more suitable targets with fewer local 
guardians present. Drawing from strain/anomie theory (Merton 1957; Blau & Blau 1982), the 
contextual explanation predicts that the distribution of material resources within a country 
determines the supply of motivated offenders. In short, the more uneven the distribution of 
material resources across the population, the more motivated offenders are assumed to be 
present as a consequence of relative deprivation and, ultimately, the higher the rate of 
victimization will be. 
 
3.2.1 The Compositional Explanation: Suitable Targets and Local Guardians 
In order to explain what determines target suitability and guardianship, a short overview is 
needed of factors that underlie target selection by offenders. In accordance with a rational 
choice theory of criminal action (Cornish & Clarke 1986), offenders are assumed to select a 
victim based on an evaluation of costs and benefits associated with specific targets; that is, 
targets that provide the greatest yield are seen as most likely to become victimized. In order to 
minimize costs, offenders are also most likely to select targets that are poorly protected and 
routinely exposed to them (e.g., by similarity in their daily activities or by being in close 
proximity to the offender’s home). In addition, to maximize benefits, theft offenders are more 
likely to select targets that hold valuable possessions. Incorporating these assumptions into a 
compositional explanation of cross-national victimization differences leads to the expectation 
that some countries have higher victimization rates than others because they are composed of 
targets who expose themselves more often, are more attractive to offenders, are less protected 
and who live in closer proximity to offenders. Thus, according to this explanation, micro- and 
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meso-level mechanisms that determine target selection are responsible for shaping cross-
national differences in victimization rates. Compared to previous research, which relied on 
macro-level data to test compositional explanations, this study offers a better test of this 
hypothesis by using micro- and meso-level data available in multiple countries. These micro- 
and meso-level mechanisms are outlined in more detail below. 
Many empirical results support the tenability of rational target selection. In this 
respect, the study by Hindelang et al. (1978) stands out as the first attempt to give a 
theoretical account of the social stratification of victimization. Similar to Cohen and Felson’s 
(1979) routine activity theory, this study looked into how people’s everyday activities provide 
criminal opportunities. However, rather than explaining temporal variation in aggregate crime 
patterns, Hindelang et al. (1978) specified individual-level mechanisms to explain why some 
sociodemographic categories have higher victimization risk than others. They argued that 
specific groups, such as males, youngsters and singles, run higher risks than others, because 
they are more engaged in routine daily activities that bring them into contact with potential 
offenders (see also Cohen et al. 1981; Wittebrood & Nieuwbeerta 2000). More generally, 
these social categories are more likely to meet offenders, because delinquents are 
overrepresented in their own group and social interactions tend to be demographically 
segregated (e.g., young people tend to interact with other youngsters). Also, these groups are 
more vulnerable to burglary victimization because their frequent absence from home leaves 
them with less capacity to guard their domestic property (Cohen & Cantor 1981). Indeed, 
researchers using direct measures of routine activities found that activities performed in 
public domains (e.g., eating out) are positively related to victimization (Miethe et al. 1987; 
Mustaine & Tewksbury 1998). In sum, empirical studies testing routine activity theory 
suggest that exposure of person or property is an important determinant of victimization. 
Therefore, this chapter hypothesizes that individual exposure to offenders may offer a 
compositional explanation for cross-national differences in victimization rates to the extent 
that such exposure varies systematically across countries. 
Furthermore, offenders are assumed to prefer unguarded targets over well-protected 
ones (Cohen et al. 1981; Cornish & Clarke 1986). In this respect, many studies have found 
that victimization risk is partly determined by the amount of social control exercised among 
community members. Building on Shaw and McKay’s (1942) social disorganization theory, 
several multilevel victimization studies have reported that structural constraints within 
communities, such as low economic status of a neighborhood, serve as barriers for the 
realization of collective social control and ultimately lead to crime, independent of individual 
target characteristics (Lauritsen 2001; Sampson et al. 1997; Wittebrood 2000). Analyzing 
ICVS data from 15 countries, Lee (2000) reported that community cohesion is an important 
means of victimization prevention across social contexts.2 Residents of neighborhoods in 
which people ‘help each other’ were at lower risk than those living in neighborhoods where 
people ‘go their own way’. 
                                                 
2 Lee (2000) also replicated his findings with ICVS data from 12 city surveys across the world (e.g., Moscow, 
Buenos Aires and Beijing). 
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Finally, living in close proximity to motivated offenders increases risk, independent of 
the internal social structure of the neighborhood (Cohen et al. 1981; Morenoff et al. 2001; 
Smith et al. 2000). Crime-inducing circumstances nearby may be associated with high 
victimization risk for two reasons. First, offenders active in specific places may tend to visit 
nearby areas to commit crimes because they are part of the same ‘awareness space’ 
(Brantingham & Brantingham 1984; Smith et al. 2000). Thus, due to offender mobility, 
targets living close to such awareness space will be at higher risk in their own neighborhood 
(due to a spill-over effect). Second, targets that live closer to high-crime areas will be more 
likely to visit these areas in performing routine activities. Thus, due to target mobility, 
proximity to crime-inducing circumstances may increase victimization risk outside the 
target’s own neighborhood.  
The current study argues that individuals living near socially disorganized areas, such 
as large city residents (Cohen et al. 1981; Sampson & Groves 1989), are in closer proximity 
to crime-inducing circumstances. It therefore tests social disorganization theory as a 
compositional explanation for cross-national differences in victimization in two ways: 
countries may have different victimization rates because they vary in their composition of 
cohesive communities (in which people are guarded against offenders) or because they vary in 
the extent to which people live close to socially disorganized areas. 
 
3.2.2 Victimization Risk Factors: General or Restricted Impact? 
Several of the risk factors mentioned above are assumed to have a general impact. In other 
words, they affect all the types of victimization distinguished here, and do so both within and 
outside the target’s neighborhood. For instance, males, young people, singles and urban 
residents are expected to run an overall higher risk. Moreover, the differential composition of 
countries with respect to these populations is assumed to be responsible for shaping cross-
national differences in victimization rates. However, several other risk factors are not 
expected to determine victimization in the same way under all circumstances. Rather, their 
expected impact is differentiated depending on type of crime and place of incident. 
Accordingly, as compositional factors accounting for cross-national differences, they are only 
potentially relevant for the types of victimization they are related to at the individual level. A 
specification of these risk factors is therefore necessary, not only to predict individual risk, 
but also to predict cross-national differences. This specification is outlined below. 
First, target attractiveness, which is often measured by household income or 
educational level, is suited to explain differential risk for theft crimes but not for violent crime 
and car vandalism. The reward for an offender’s act of violence or vandalism is not assumed 
to be related to the target’s possession of material resources. Higher levels of income and 
education are therefore expected to be positively related only to a higher chance of theft 
victimization. To explain differences in victimization between countries, income and 
education are assumed to be compositional factors only for theft. Thus, countries that have 
more high-income and higher educated people are expected only to have higher theft rates 
than others, and not higher rates of violence and car vandalism. 
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 Second, exposure to offenders is often measured by targets’ tendency to carry out 
routine activities in the public domain, for instance, having a paid job or taking part in 
entertainment outside the home (Miethe et al. 1987; Mustaine & Tewksbury 1998). Usually, 
these activities are performed outside the target’s neighborhood, for instance, in a city center. 
Therefore, the amount of time spent within the neighborhood is less for most targets who 
perform public activities, while time spent elsewhere is increased. As a result, violent 
victimization becomes more likely outside the target’s neighborhood due to increased 
exposure in these places, whereas an encounter with a violent offender within the target’s own 
neighborhood becomes less likely (Lauritsen 2001). For theft crimes, the picture is somewhat 
different. The property that the target carries is exposed to offenders outside the neighborhood 
through the target’s public activities; at the same time, personal guardianship over domestic 
property is less due to the target’s absence from home. A similar argument holds for car 
vandalism: the more a car owner leaves the house for entertainment purposes taking the car, 
the more the car is exposed to offenders. On the other hand, the more the car-owner leaves the 
house without taking the car, the less personal guardianship can be exercised over this 
property. Therefore, leaving the house increases the chance of theft victimization and car 
vandalism, regardless of whether the incident takes place within or outside the neighborhood. 
Accordingly, as a compositional explanation for cross-national differences, it is expected that 
the more countries consist of people who perform non-domestic activities in public places, the 
higher their rates of violent victimization outside the neighborhood, as well as of theft 
victimization and car vandalism (within and outside the neighborhood). Furthermore, under 
these conditions, rates of violent victimization within the neighborhood are expected to be 
lower.   
Third, the impact of social disorganization within the target’s living area is assumed to 
be spatially bounded. The amount of community cohesion only determines theft and violent 
victimization risk within the neighborhood. Logically, the amount of social cohesion in the 
target’s own neighborhood would not determine risk once the target has left that 
neighborhood and is somewhere else. Therefore, with respect to cross-national victimization 
differences, community cohesion is assumed to be a compositional factor solely for theft, 
violent victimization and car vandalism within the target’s own neighborhood. Countries with 
high rates of victimization for these crime types are expected to consist of relatively more 
targets in disorganized communities. Finally, for crimes involving cars, risk of victimization 
is expected to be higher the more cars are in possession of a household. Therefore, country 
rates of car-related theft and car vandalism are assumed to be higher the more cars are owned 
by the average household. 
 
3.2.3 The Contextual Explanation: Motivated Offenders 
Apart from the supply of suitable targets and the absence of local guardians, a country’s 
victimization rate is assumed to depend upon structural constraints that determine the supply 
of motivated offenders. Following insights from strain/anomie theory (Blau & Blau 1982; 
Merton 1957), it is argued that criminal activity increases with increasingly unequal 
distribution of material resources in a society. Theft, violence and vandalism become more 
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probable under such circumstances, since they are directed to reducing relative deprivation 
(by theft) and expressing frustration caused by the inaccessibility of material resources (by 
violence, vandalism). Indeed, many cross-national studies have found a positive association 
between the amount of income inequality and national homicide rates (e.g., Gartner 1990; 
Krahn et al. 1986). For theft rates, there is no empirical support for such a relation (LaFree & 
Kick 1986; Messner 1986). However, these studies were based on official crime statistics, 
which, to a larger extent than homicide figures, are sensitive to measurement problems 
associated with definition differences of theft and different reporting behavior of victims to 
the police across nations (Zvekic 1996). Therefore, they may provide little indication of actual 
cross-national crime differences.  
In sum, this study hypothesizes that victimization rates will be higher the more uneven 
the distribution of material resources is within a country, as such circumstances stimulate the 
translation of deprivation into criminal action. Through its multilevel design, this study tests 
the contextual explanation of cross-national crime variation more thoroughly than previous 
macro-level crime research, which did not control for compositional differences. Moreover, 
by simultaneously adjusting for regional levels of educational inequality, this study tests the 
assumption that national inequalities in resource distribution are more important for inducing 
offender motivation than subnational levels of inequality, as suggested by Messner and 
Tardiff (1986) and in section 1.2.3 of this book. 
 The potential for improved theory testing within this multilevel design calls for an 
additional elaboration of macro-level hypotheses on crime. Chapter 2 found national 
victimization rates to be positively related to divorce rates and negatively related to GDP per 
capita, which is in accordance with previous cross-national crime studies (Gartner 1990; 
Krahn et al. 1986). However, these indicators are assumed to reflect aggregated individual 
routine activities and target attractiveness (GDP per capita) and community-level social 
disorganization (divorce rate). Therefore, the current question to be addressed is whether 
these country-level conditions still affect victimization after the differential composition of 
countries with respect to these dimensions is taken into account. The expectation is that this 
will not be the case. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that country levels of divorce and 
GDP per capita are unrelated to national victimization rates after the compositional 
heterogeneity of countries is adjusted for. 
 Finally, the study explores whether dimensions of target suitability and absence of 
local guardians operate differently in different national contexts. More specifically, exposure 
to offenders and (proximity of) social disorganization may increase victimization risk most 
profoundly where country-level circumstances induce a large supply of motivated offenders, 
since this increases the likelihood of a spatial convergence of an offender and target. Such 
combinations of risk factors may produce additional crime-inducing effects. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that exposure to offenders through non-domestic activities, as well as the 
absence of local guardians due to lack of social cohesion increase victimization risk most in 
countries with high levels of income inequality. However, it should be mentioned that the 
potential for finding significant conditional effects may be limited, because one of the 
elements in these interaction terms (income inequality) concerns the social context within a 
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large spatial unit (a country). Such large units may exhibit spatial heterogeneity (Smith et al. 
2000). For instance, in countries with high levels of income inequality, deprived individuals 
(who are assumed to be the most motivated to commit offences) may be spatially 
concentrated in a specific part of the country, while suitable targets and the absence of local 
guardians may be clustered in different areas. Therefore, spatial heterogeneity would decrease 
the chance that a combination of risk factors would converge in space and time, and therefore 
reduce the likelihood of their exerting additional crime-inducing effects (see also section 
1.2.4). Table 3.1 presents an overview of the hypotheses tested in this chapter. 
 
Table 3.1  Overview of Hypotheses on Individual Victimization Risk and Cross-
National Differences in Victimization  
  
Inside or Outside Neighborhood 
 
 THEFT  VIOLENCE  CAR VANDALISM 
 In Out  In Out  In Out 
COMPOSITIONAL EXPLANATION OF 
CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
 
       
A) Routine Activity Theory         
- Exposure to offenders: sharing 
sociodemographic characteristics 
with offenders (male, young, 
single) 
 
+ 
 
+ 
  
+ 
 
+ 
  
+ 
 
+ 
- Exposure to offenders: 
performing out-of-home 
activities 
+ +  – +  + + 
- Target attractiveness: educational 
level, income 
+ +  0 0  0 0 
- Number of cars owned 
 
+ 
(only car-
related) 
+ 
(only car-
related) 
 not 
relevant 
not 
relevant 
 + + 
 
B) Social Disorganization Theory 
        
- Lack of local guardians: living in 
a disorganized area 
+ 0  + 0  + 0 
- Lack of local guardians: close 
proximity to disorganized areas 
 
+ +  + +  + + 
CONTEXTUAL EXPLANATION OF 
CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
 
       
C) Strain/Anomie Theory         
- Offender motivation: national 
levels of income inequality 
+ +  + +  + + 
+: higher individual risk and country rate, –: lower individual risk and country rate, 0: no relation 
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3.3 DATA AND METHODS 
 
3.3.1 Data 
In order to test the hypotheses, data were employed from the International Crime Victims 
Survey (ICVS) collected between 1992 and 1997. The ICVS is coordinated by the Dutch 
Ministry of Justice, the British Home Office and the United Nations Interregional Crime and 
Justice Institute (UNICRI). The major advantage of the ICVS data is that the wording of 
questions and response categories is identical in all participating countries, thereby optimizing 
cross-national comparability. As mentioned in Chapter 1, traditional data from police reports 
suffer from major definitional inconsistencies. For detailed documentation on these 
inconsistencies, see Van Dijk et al. (1990), Van Dijk and Mayhew (1992), Mayhew and Van 
Dijk (1997) and Van Kesteren et al. (2000). 
In most countries, national survey companies collected the ICVS data by means of 
computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI). In Eastern Europe, face-to-face interviews 
were done because fewer households there own a telephone. For each household, a random 
household member over 15 years of age was selected for the interview. The reference period 
for victimization was the year preceding the interview. The total sample was 28,250 
respondents from 18 countries. Thus, the average sample size per country was 1,569 (see 
Table 3.2 for a list of the countries, sample years and sample sizes). ICVS data was available 
for more than these 18 countries. However, the 18-country sample was selected based on 
availability of data on respondents’ estimation of local community cohesion (i.e., the question 
do ‘neighbors help each other’) and, simultaneously, on region of residence within the 
country. Both pieces of information were viewed as of central importance for a rigid test of 
both contextual and compositional explanations of cross-national victimization differences. 
 
Table 3.2 List of Countries,  Survey Years and Sample Sizes 
 
COUNTRY 
 
SAMPLE 
YEAR 
 
SAMPLE 
SIZE 
  
COUNTRY 
 
SAMPLE 
YEAR 
 
SAMPLE 
SIZE 
 
Australia 
 
1992 
 
2,006 
  
Lithuania 
 
1997 
 
1,176 
Austria 1996 1,507  Malta 1997   999 
Belgium 1992 1,485  Netherlands 1992 2,000 
Canada 1992 2,152  New Zealand 1992 2,048 
Czech Republic 1992 1,262  Poland 1992 2,020 
England & Wales 1992 2,001  Slovakia 1992    508 
Estonia 1995 1,173  Slovenia 1997 2,053 
Georgia 1996 1,137  Sweden 1992 1,707 
Italy 1992 2,024  Switzerland 1996   992 
 
 
Within each country, respondents were categorized according to their region of residence. 
These are so-called ‘Nielsen-regions’, named after the marketing company that devised this 
spatial categorization. In the data, 104 regions were distinguished. Thus, the mean number of 
respondents per region was 272 and the mean number of regions per country was almost six. 
Though less detailed than alternative spatial categorizations (such as city codes), this regional 
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code is the only within-country spatial identifier available in the ICVS data. Nevertheless, it is 
suitable for this study’s primary aim to test country-level hypotheses while simultaneously 
controlling for compositional heterogeneity. By taking account not only of individual 
differences but also of regional differences, variance within a country cannot be wrongfully 
attributed to the country level. Therefore, the strategy of incorporating the regional level into 
the analyses is preferable over the option of ignoring this level and considering the country as 
the level-2 unit (see section 3.3.3 below). 
The average response rate for the countries with a telephone survey was 61%. 
Countries with known response rates for face-to-face interviews are Lithuania, Slovenia and 
Poland (54, 56 and 96%, respectively). In several Eastern European countries (Estonia, 
Georgia and Slovakia) in which face-to-face interviews were conducted, no response rates 
were calculated. Methodological studies have confirmed the comparability of studies with 
telephone and face-to-face interviews (Dillman & Tarnai 1988), as long as the same fieldwork 
standards are applied, as was the case for the ICVS (Van Kesteren et al. 2000). 
 
3.3.2 Operationalizations 
Victimization measures were used for five types of crime: burglary, personal theft, car-related 
theft, violence and car vandalism. The respondents were considered victims of car-related 
theft if someone in their household had experienced a car theft or theft from a car in the year 
preceding the interview. Violent victimization was constructed from respondents’ reports of 
assault and robbery in the past year. Burglary victimization includes completed as well as 
attempted offences experienced by the household. To test whether certain risk factors operate 
in specific locations, victimization was distinguished according to the place of incident: 
within the respondent’s neighborhood or elsewhere.3 Thus, nine dependent variables were 
constructed: burglary and the other four crime types distinguished by victimization that 
occurred in the neighborhood and that experienced elsewhere. These nine variables are 
dichotomous, with victims coded as 1, and non-victims as 0.  
Table 3.3 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables. From this table, we can conclude that the average victimization risk for the crimes 
examined here ranges from approximately 1% to 5%, with personal theft in the neighborhood 
being the most rare victimization event (1.1%) and burglary the most common (4.9%). 
 In accordance with previous victimization studies (Hindelang et al. 1978; Miethe et al. 
1987), proxies for exposure to offenders in this study are gender, age, marital status and two 
direct measures of routine activities. With respect to age, respondents were categorized in one 
of twelve five-year age groups. These run from ‘15–19 years’ to ‘older than 70’. Whether 
respondents were single or cohabiting was determined with a question about marital status. 
Respondents reporting not being married or living together were considered single.4  
 
                                                 
3 Though respondents reporting criminal incidents that occurred abroad were not considered victims in the 
analyses. 
4 In Estonia, this question was not included. For this country, marital status was determined through household 
size. Respondents living in a one-person household were considered single, others non-single. 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables  
  (N = 28,250) 
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. 
Victimization  
(1-year prevalence rates) 
    
Burglary 0.049 0.215 0  1 
Personal theft in neighborhood 0.011 0.105 0  1 
Personal theft elsewhere 0.037 0.189 0  1 
Car-related theft in neighborhood 0.030 0.172 0  1 
Car-related theft elsewhere 0.028 0.165 0  1 
Violence in neighborhood 0.020 0.141 0  1 
Violence elsewhere 0.023 0.150 0  1 
Car damage in neighborhood 0.035 0.184 0  1 
Car damage elsewhere 0.033 0.179 0  1 
 
Individual characteristics 
    
Male 0.472 0.499 0  1 
Age 6.412 3.301 1 12 
Single 0.366 0.482 0  1 
Age finished education 5.760 3.120 0  1 
High perceived income 0.490 0.500 0  1 
Main activity: paid job/student 0.611 0.488 0  1 
Going out in the evening 3.061 1.287 1  5 
Neighbors help each other 2.108 0.911 1  3 
Urbanization of residence 2.692 1.595 1  6 
Number of cars owned by 
household 
1.154 0.920 0  5 
 
Regional characteristics (N=104) 
    
Educational inequality 27.804 4.462 18.9 42.4 
Proportion of respondents who 
report neighbors help each other 
 0.476 0.176    0.09     0.90 
 
Country characteristics (N=18) 
    
Income inequality 30.644 5.656 19.5 43.9 
Divorce rate  2.118 0.913    0.48     3.74 
GDP per capita (in $1,000) 13.007 7.095   1.47   25.86 
 
Direct measures of routine activities that determine exposure include a respondent’s daytime 
and night-time lifestyle patterns. First, respondents were asked to describe their main 
occupation. With this information, a dichotomous variable was computed that divides 
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respondents’ major daily activity in home-centered (e.g., keeping home, retired) and non-
home-centered (working at a paid job, student). Second, a routine activity variable was 
computed that indicates how often respondents went out in the evening for entertainment. 
Response categories for this variable range from ‘never’ (1) to ‘almost every day’ (5). 
To indicate target attractiveness, data was used on educational level and income 
(Cohen et al. 1981; Miethe et al. 1987). To determine level of education, a measure was taken 
of the age at which respondents finished their educational career. This measure consists of 
twelve categories ranging from ‘under age 15’ to ‘older than age 25’.5 For income, no 
objective measures were available, so information was used on the respondents’ perception of 
whether their household’s monthly income was above average (1) or not (0). Nine percent of 
respondents did not answer this question. To prevent a large loss in sample size, where the 
value was missing estimates were made of perceived income. This was done by performing 
logistic regression analyses to predict perceived income as a function of gender, age (linear 
and quadratic) and educational level. Respondents with predicted odds above 1 of having a 
higher income were assigned a perceived income above mean, others were assigned an 
income not above mean.  
 Respondents provided information on their living environment, which is therefore 
represented in the analyses by individual-level predictors. Though living area characteristics 
may actually reflect meso-level characteristics in this research (e.g., neighborhood or city), 
the data are not nested within such levels. To determine social cohesion within the local 
community, respondents were asked whether the people in the area where they reside mostly 
‘go their own way’, whether there is a ‘mixture’, or if people ‘help each other’ (coded as 1, 2, 
and 3, respectively). Interestingly, Eastern European countries appear to have significantly 
lower levels of average neighborhood cohesion than Western countries (p<.001). 
Furthermore, to capture the target’s proximity to socially disorganized areas, respondents 
were asked to estimate the size of their town or city. Response categories varied from ‘less 
than 10,000’ (1) to ‘more than 1 million’ (6). Nine percent of respondents did not answer this 
question. For these respondents, country mean scores on urbanization were imputed. To 
determine car ownership, the number of cars possessed by the household was used. Possible 
responses to this variable ranged from ‘zero’ (0) to ‘five or more’ (5). 
 At the regional level, an aggregated measure of neighborhood cohesion was used. For 
each region, the proportion of respondents who reported that their neighbors ‘help each other’ 
was calculated. Thus, higher values on this variable indicate many people living in cohesive 
communities within a region and therefore lower average proximity to disorganized areas for 
the region’s general population. Since fewer offenders are assumed to be active in cohesive 
regions, targets are less likely to converge with them, both within and outside their own 
neighborhood. From the data used, significant variation was found between regions within 
                                                 
5 In seven of the eighteen countries, this measure on education was not available but another was. The answers to 
these alternative questions were recoded into the measure of age at which the educational career was finished. 
For Poland, this concerned a question on the respondent’s level of education. For Switzerland, Austria, Malta, 
Georgia, Slovenia and Lithuania, a measure on the number of years of education was recoded. 
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countries with respect to neighborhood cohesion (p<.001), with values ranging from 9% to 
90%. Furthermore, to test whether victimization is better predicted by the uneven distribution 
of resources at the regional level as compared to the national level, a regional gini coefficient 
of educational inequality was calculated. Following the suggestion of Milanovic (1997), this 
coefficient was defined as G = (1/√3)*(σx/X)*ρ(x,ry). In this equation, σx stands for the 
standard deviation of education within the region, X for the region’s mean value of education, 
and ρ(x,ry) for the correlation between an individual’s educational level and its rank score 
within the region. 
 To account for the country-level supply of motivated offenders through relative income 
deprivation, the gini index for income inequality between households was used (World Bank, 
various years). Due to availability restrictions, these data refer to a year in the early or mid-
1990s. For Georgia and Malta, no data were obtained for this measure, and therefore mean 
values were imputed for these countries. As in Chapter 2, national levels of criminal 
opportunity and social disorganization were measured by country scores on GDP per capita 
converted at purchasing power parity (World Bank, various years) and the number of divorces 
per 1,000 mid-year population (United Nations, various years). Scores on divorce rate and 
GDP per capita were for the year preceding the ICVS since this reflects the respondents’ 
reference period. Because of missing data, Malta was assigned a mean value for divorce rate. 
 
3.3.3 Methods 
Since the ICVS data involve individuals clustered in 18 countries and 104 regions, multilevel 
modeling techniques were used (Snijders & Bosker 1999). By employing MLWin software, a 
three-level model was specified, in which separate coefficients were estimated at the 
individual level (level 1), the regional level (level 2) and the country level (level 3).6 Thus, 
unlike traditional regression techniques, the multilevel model takes into account the layered 
character of the data by separately employing three sub-models. It adjusts for the correlation 
between the error components of the separate levels that results from the hierarchical data 
structure. Since the dependent variables are dichotomous (victim/no victim), logistic 
multilevel models are appropriate. In these models, the log odds of victimization for 
individual I in region J and country K are defined as logit (victimizationijk) = log (pijk/(1–pijk)). 
 At the individual level (level 1), the model was specified in the following form: 
  Yijk = β0jk + Σβp(Xijk) + εijk ,       (1) 
where β0jk is the model’s individual-level intercept, Σβp(Xijk) are the logistic regression 
coefficients for the individual-level explanatory variables and εijk is the level-1 error term. In 
the logistic multilevel model, individual errors are assumed to be distributed as a binomial 
variable. Therefore, this term was set to 1. Additional analyses (not shown) that allow for 
                                                 
6 These models were estimated using second order Penalized Quasi-Likelihood (PQL) estimation methods, 
which is also the case for the other multilevel analyses reported in this research. Compared to first-order 
estimates, they provide less downward bias, but a higher mean squared error. Furthermore, PQL estimates 
provide approximations around the fixed plus the random part, in contrast to MQL methods, which offer 
approximations around the fixed part (Snijders & Bosker 1999). Throughout this book, empirical outcomes for 
parameters on the fixed and random part of the models were compared across different estimation methods, and 
were found to yield similar results. 
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extra-binomial error suggest that this is a plausible assumption for the models specified here, 
considering that the values of this parameter do not substantively diverge from 1. 
The level-2 (region) and level-3 (country) models read as follows: 
  β0jk = γ0k + Σβq(Xjk) + µ0jk       (2) 
  γ0k = δ00 + Σβr(Xk) + υ0k       (3) 
Equation (2) includes a region-specific intercept γ0k, regression weights βq for the regional 
variables Xjk (proportion of respondents reporting that neighbors help each other and 
educational inequality) and an error component µ0jk. Equation (3) includes a grand mean (δ00), 
which indicates the average log-odds of victimization for the entire sample, regression 
coefficients βr for the explanatory country-level variables Xk (income inequality, divorce rate 
and GDP per capita) and a macro-level error component υ0k, which indicates the magnitude of 
cross-national differences in victimization. The error components µ0jk and υ0k are assumed to 
follow a normal distribution (Snijders & Bosker 1999). 
 The analytic strategy for testing the compositional and contextual explanations for 
cross-national differences was twofold. First, to test whether associations between country 
characteristics and victimization rates truly reflect national contextual effects, the analysis 
evaluated whether these effects still hold after heterogeneity within countries is controlled for. 
Second, to test the compositional explanation, the analysis examined whether the country-
level variance term (υ0k) decreases once compositional differences are accounted for. In that 
case, countries with high levels of victimization must consist of more suitable targets and 
fewer local guardians than countries with low victimization rates. 
 
 
3.4 RESULTS 
 
First, a short description of country victimization rates is offered: In general, high 
victimization rates are found in Estonia, especially for violent victimization (3.9% and 3.3%, 
respectively, within and outside the target’s neighborhood). The highest burglary rate is also 
found in Estonia, along with New Zealand and Australia (7.3%). Lithuania has the highest 
rates of two types of crime: personal theft in the neighborhood (2.4%) and car-related 
offences in the neighborhood (5.1%). In contrast, Austria has the lowest rates for five of the 
nine crime types examined here. For example, violent victimization rates are only 0.7%, both 
within and outside the neighborhood, Overall, the results indicate that Eastern European 
countries have significantly higher victimization rates for violence in the neighborhood 
(p<.01) and for personal theft outside the neighborhood (p<.01). For car damage outside the 
neighborhood, victimization rates are higher in Western countries (p<.01). 
 
3.4.1 Testing the Contextual Explanation for Cross-National Victimization Differences 
The first major aim was to test country-level hypotheses while simultaneously taking 
compositional differences into account. Table 3.4 shows the results of multilevel logistic 
analyses predicting the likelihood of victimization. For each of the nine types of 
victimization, two separate equations were modeled. First, to explore whether there is any 
Chapter 3 
 58 
association at all between victimization and national context (income inequality, divorce rate, 
and GDP per capita), the results in model 1 refer to analyses that include only these country 
characteristics. Then, to examine whether associations between country-level characteristics 
and victimization still hold after compositional heterogeneity is controlled for, the results are 
reported for analyses that include not only country characteristics but also individual and 
regional characteristics (model 2). 
 The results in model 1 (Table 3.4) suggest that income inequality is indeed positively 
related to four of the five types of theft victimization, to one of the two types of violent 
victimization (that within the target’s neighborhood) and to both types of car vandalism. 
Furthermore, though national divorce rates are positively related to several types of 
victimization, income inequality is related to more victimization types: burglary and personal 
theft and violence within the neighborhood. Finally, model 1 shows that GDP per capita is 
inversely related to all types of theft victimization (except for car-related theft outside the 
neighborhood) and violence within the neighborhood. A positive relation is found for both 
types of car vandalism. 
 Model 2 clearly shows that a strong positive relation remains between income 
inequality and victimization (except for car vandalism in the neighborhood), notwithstanding 
extensive controls for compositional differences in individual and regional characteristics, and 
despite the introduction of a control variable for inequality in the distribution of (educational) 
resources at the regional level.7 This finding supports the assumption that the supply of 
motivated offenders is affected more by national levels of resource inequality than by 
subnational levels of inequality. In some cases, controlling for compositional differences 
weakens the relation between national income inequality and victimization. To give an 
indication of the magnitude of the association, let us examine the results for burglary. For this 
type of crime, the log-odds of victimization increase with a factor 1.05 (=exp(.049)) for each 
unit increase in the gini index of income inequality. For example, the Netherlands have an 
income inequality score of 32.6, which yields a predicted burglary risk of 3.78%. According 
to model 2 for burglary, if the gini index was one unit lower (31.6), the predicted risk would 
be 3.60%.8 For violence outside the neighborhood, the expected victimization risks in these 
cases are 1.03% and 0.95%, respectively. 
 A weakened relation is also found for the association between divorce and burglary, 
which becomes less strong after adjusting for micro- and meso-level heterogeneity. For 
personal theft and violence within the neighborhood, which were also related to divorce rates 
in model 1, the positive association does not weaken, which is contrary to expectations. The 
other types of crime remain unrelated to divorce. In model 2, for most of the crime types that 
were related to GDP per capita, the association is less strong compared to model 1, in some 
cases turning to non-significance. Unexpectedly, for car-related theft outside the 
                                                 
7 In all cases, this relation also remains if, at the regional level, a control variable is added to the model for the 
proportion of people who perceive themselves to have a high income. 
8 The likelihood of victimization p for individual i can be calculated here as follows: pi = Exp(Xk+βk(Xk-xk,i)).  
Here, Xk is the mean value of the country-level variable, xk,i the score on this variable for the country of 
individual i, and βk the regression weight associated with this variable. All non-dichotomous variables were 
centred around the mean value. 
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neighborhood and car vandalism outside the neighborhood, the relation between GDP per 
capita and victimization becomes stronger after controlling for compositional differences. 
 
3.4.2 Individual and Regional-Level Predictors of Risk 
This section discusses the effects of individual and regional structural features on 
victimization risk. From the results in Table 3.4, we can conclude that there are several 
similarities and differences in the predictors of risk for the various types of victimization. 
First, the finding that age is inversely related to victimization risk for all the types of crime 
studied here (except for burglary) is in line with Hindelang et al.’s (1978) prediction that 
social groups containing the largest shares of the offender population run higher victimization 
risk. This is because sociodemographic categories tend to interact with members of their own 
group, so they have more chance of encountering offenders. Possibly, young people are more 
likely to come into contact with delinquents, since they interact mostly with other youngsters, 
who make up a disproportionate share of the offender population. However, according to 
Hindelang et al.’s (1978) proposition, consistently higher victimization risks are also expected 
for males and singles, since these groups also contain relatively many offenders. However, 
higher risk for males is found only for violent victimization outside the neighborhood. 
Females run higher risk for personal theft (within and outside the neighborhood) and car 
damage within the neighborhood. Singles run higher risk only for violent victimization 
(within and outside the neighborhood) and for personal theft outside the neighborhood. 
 With respect to target attractiveness, for three of the five types of theft crime studied 
here, the likelihood of victimization is positively related to the target’s educational level. 
Moreover, for two types of theft crime, risk is higher if the household income is perceived to 
be above mean. For violent victimization this is not the case. This supports the argument that 
for violent victimization, income and education are seldom offender considerations in 
discriminating between targets in terms of expected gain, unlike for theft. Contrary to 
expectations, car vandalism is more prominent among the higher educated and (for incidents 
outside the neighborhood) those who perceive themselves to have a higher income. This 
suggests that the property of high-status targets may be more attractive to damage than objects 
owned by less affluent households. 
 Directly measured routine activities tap the dimensions of exposure to offenders and 
(for burglary) personal guardianship over domestic property. Going out in the evening for 
entertainment and performing non-domestic activities (such as a paid job, school) are found to 
be differentially associated with the nine types of victimization. The associations with the 
target’s performing a paid job, following a full-time education and going out in the evening 
are especially strong for car-related theft, violent victimization and car vandalism. People 
with a paid job, full-time students and people who often take part in night-time activities run 
the highest risk for car-related theft and car vandalism. Possibly, if owners take their cars with 
them when performing these activities, car exposure to motivated offenders might be higher, 
which in most instances, increases the chance of victimization outside the neighborhood. If 
owners do not take their car and leave their vehicle(s) unattended at home, personal 
guardianship over this property may be lower, increasing the likelihood of victimization
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within the neighborhood. For violence, the increased risk of victimization outside the 
neighborhood for individuals performing non-domestic activities points toward the crime-
inducing effect of exposure to offenders. For violence, non-domestic routine activities reduce 
the respondent’s time spent in the neighborhood (assuming these activities are performed 
elsewhere) and are therefore expected to reduce risk within the neighborhood due to the 
target’s lower exposure to offenders in the neighborhood. This is found to be the case for 
people with a paid job and students, but not for frequent visitors of night-time entertainment. 
Furthermore, in line with the hypotheses, for each of the four types of car-related crime (car 
damage and car-related theft, within and outside the neighborhood) firm positive relations are 
found with the number of cars owned by the household. 
 Furthermore, for all types of victimization considered here, the risk of becoming a 
victim within the neighborhood is systematically smaller for targets who report living in an 
area where neighbors ‘help each other’. This finding supports the assumption that residents of 
cohesive communities enjoy higher levels of protection through collective social control 
compared to residents living in disorganized communities (Lee 2000; Sampson et al. 1997). 
For most crime types, victimization outside the neighborhood is not affected by social 
cohesion within the target’s local community. This finding is in line with the prediction that 
community cohesion offers no protection against offenders beyond the confines of the 
neighborhood. Unexpectedly, however, personal theft risk outside the neighborhood appears 
to be slightly smaller for inhabitants of cohesive communities. 
 Furthermore, for many types of victimization, risks are higher for urban residents and 
inhabitants of regions with low average community cohesion. This finding supports the 
hypothesis on proximity to crime-inducing circumstances. Residents of large cities and 
inhabitants of regions with many socially disorganized areas may run higher risks of 
victimization outside their neighborhood, because they are the most likely to enter socially 
disorganized areas once they leave their own neighborhood. In addition, for victimization 
within the neighborhood, the results suggest that individual risk is not only determined by 
neighborhood characteristics, but also by aspects of the larger social context (i.e., the city and 
region of residence). Possibly, due to their closer proximity to motivated offenders, urban 
residents and inhabitants of disorganized regions may be most likely to cross paths with 
criminals, independent of their neighborhood’s own control structure (Morenoff et al. 2001). 
Also, at the regional level, inequalities in the distribution of educational resources are found 
not to be significantly related to victimization, except for car-related theft outside the 
neighborhood. This supports the assumption that mainly national levels of status inequality 
increase the likelihood of victimization, through the large supplies of motivated offenders that 
result. 
 Finally, to examine whether the impacts of exposure to offenders and social 
disorganization are conditioned by the supply of motivated offenders, interaction hypotheses 
were tested. Table 3.5 summarizes the results of these analyses. The effects of non-domestic 
activities (a paid job, going out in the evening) on victimization vary little among the present 
selection of countries. The same holds true for the lack of local guardians, caused by lack of 
neighborhood cohesion or large city size. Of the 36 random slopes tested in these models, 
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four are found to have t-values larger than 1.96, of which two concern personal theft outside 
the neighborhood. With respect to the interaction effects between income inequality and 
indicators of exposure and social disorganization, only two are significant. For personal theft 
in the neighborhood, town size is less strongly related to victimization the higher the national 
level of income inequality. But the reverse is true for car damage outside the neighborhood.9 
 
Table 3.5 Random Slopes for Indicators of Target Suitability and Lack of Capable 
  Guardianship (Varying between Countries), and Interaction Effects 
  
BURGLARY 
 
PERSONAL THEFT 
 
CAR-RELATED THEFT 
  In 
neighbor-
hood 
Outside 
neighbor-
hood 
In 
neighbor-
hood 
Outside 
neighbor-
hood 
 
Random slopes 
     
Main activity: paid labor/education  .00  .06      .31**  .02 .21 
Going out in the evening  .01  .01      .02**  .00 .01 
Neighbors help each other  .00  .01  .00  .00 .01 
Town size  .00  .00  .01    .02* .00 
 
Interaction effects 
     
Income inequality* 
Working for paid labor 
 .01  .02  .02 -.01 .00 
Income inequality* 
Going out in the evening 
 .01  .01  .00  .01 .01 
Income inequality* 
Neighbors help each other 
 .00 -.01 -.00  .00 .01 
Income inequality*Town size -.01     -.01** -.00 -.01 .00 
* p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed) 
 
   
VIOLENCE 
 
CAR VANDALISM 
  In 
neighbor-
hood 
Outside 
neighbor-
hood 
In 
neighbor-
hood 
Outside 
neighbor-
hood 
 
Random slopes 
     
Main activity: paid labor/education   .06  .00  .07  .08 
Going out in the evening   .01  .00  .00  .02 
Neighbors help each other   .02  .01  .04  .01 
Town size   .00  .00     .02*  .00 
 
Interaction effects 
     
Income inequality* 
Working for paid labor 
  .03 -.00  .01  .00 
Income inequality* 
Going out in the evening 
  .00  .00 -.01 -.00 
Income inequality* 
Neighbors help each other 
 -.00  .01  .01 -.01 
Income inequality*Town size   .00 -.01 -.00      .01** 
* p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed) 
                                                 
9 In both cases, original main effects remain as they were. 
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3.4.3 Determining the Separate Impact of Compositional and Contextual Differences 
The next aim was to disentangle the separate contribution of compositional and contextual 
differences on cross-national variance in victimization. To achieve this, country-level 
victimization scores were estimated along three multilevel models having increasing sets of 
explanatory variables. First, an ‘empty’ multilevel model was fitted, in which a grand mean 
(representing the average risk for all respondents) was estimated as well as a country-level 
and region-level variance component. The country-level variance component represents 
‘uncontrolled’ cross-national victimization differences. Second, in the subsequent model, 
statistical controls were added for individual and regional characteristics (e.g., gender, age, 
regional proportion of respondents reporting that neighbors ‘help each other’). Here, changes 
in unexplained country-level variance compared to the ‘empty’ model represent the extent to 
which compositional differences can explain differences between countries in victimization 
rates. Third, country characteristics were added to estimate effects of national context (income 
inequality, divorce rate, GDP per capita), and their ability to explain cross-national 
victimization differences was assessed. Note that this latter group of variance parameters are 
the residual components for model 2 in Table 3.4. 
 Table 3.6 gives an overview of the country-level variance components for the three 
multilevel models across the nine types of victimization. For all types of victimization except 
for car vandalism in the neighborhood, cross-national differences in average victimization risk 
decreased after compositional differences were taken into account. This decline ranged from 
20% (for car-related theft outside the neighborhood) to 85% (for personal theft outside the 
neighborhood). In sum, for most types of victimization examined here, the compositional 
explanation seems to have considerable merit. 
 
Table 3.6 Country-Level Intercept Variance  
  (Region-Level Variance between Brackets) 
  
BURGLARY 
 
PERSONAL THEFT 
 
CAR-RELATED THEFT 
  In 
neighborhood 
Outside 
neighborhood 
In 
neighborhood 
Outside 
neighborhood 
 
Empty model 
 
 
.251 
[.112] 
 
 .247 
[.095] 
 
.086 
 [.149] 
 
.191 
 [.314] 
 
.218 
[.210] 
 
Controlled for compositional 
differences 
 
.161 
[.083] 
 
 .171 
[.025] 
 
   .013 
   [.100] 
 
.149 
 [.154] 
 
.175 
 [.119] 
 
Controlled for compositional 
and contextual differences 
 
.049 
 [.081] 
 
.026 
[.025] 
 
.000 
 [.098] 
 
.100 
 [.154] 
 
.056 
 [.123] 
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Table 3.6 Continued 
   
VIOLENCE 
 
CAR VANDALISM 
  In 
neighborhood 
Outside 
neighborhood 
In 
neighborhood 
Outside 
neighborhood 
 
Empty model 
 
  
.146 
[.102] 
 
.244 
[.114] 
 
.227 
 [.195] 
 
.270 
[.056] 
 
Controlled for compositional 
differences 
  
.075 
[.083] 
 
.180 
[.071] 
 
.288 
 [.050] 
 
 .107 
[.022] 
 
Controlled for compositional 
and contextual differences 
  
.008 
 [.079] 
 
.037 
 [.078] 
 
.150 
[.060] 
 
.057 
[.020] 
 
In comparison however, the impact of national context on cross-national differences in 
victimization rates seems larger. For all nine types of victimization, the variance between 
countries declined substantially after contextual differences were controlled for. In some 
cases, hardly any cross-national variance remains. For most crimes, cross-national variation 
decreases by more than half when country levels of income inequality, divorce rate and GDP 
per capita are taken into account. Only for car-related theft within the target’s neighborhood is 
the observed decrease in country variance more modest, at 33%. 
 To offer more detail on which specific individual and regional characteristics are 
relevant compositional factors, additional analyses were carried out. Table 3.7 presents the 
results of these analyses. The first row of the table indicates the country-level intercept 
variance (υ0k) for the model including individual and regional characteristics (also Table 3.6, 
second row). The underlying rows show this variance for the same model, but in each row a 
different variable is excluded from the analyses. That way, it is possible to evaluate whether a 
specific individual or regional variable is important in bringing about cross-national 
differences in victimization. If the variance term increases compared to the ‘full’ model after a 
particular individual or regional indicator is excluded, then that indicator is responsible for a 
portion of the cross-national variation in victimization. In that case, part of the reason why 
some countries have higher victimization rates than others lies in the fact that they are 
composed of relatively more people/regions with that crime-inducing trait. On the other hand, 
if υ0k remains constant compared to the full model, then the excluded indicator is not a 
relevant compositional factor, either because it does not exert any influence at the individual 
level or because countries do not vary systematically in their composition with respect to that 
indicator. Furthermore, if the unexplained variance between countries is reduced by excluding 
a specific variable, then the compositional explanation may operate contrary to expectations; 
that is, countries with high victimization risk are composed of less people or regions with that 
crime-inducing characteristic than low-risk countries. 
 Table 3.7 shows that most variables are unimportant as compositional factors, since 
their exclusion hardly affects the proportion of unexplained variance between countries. In 
this table, major changes compared to the full model are shown in bold. Most importantly, 
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compositional differences in the number of urban residents are key to understanding cross-
national differences for violence and all the types of theft distinguished here. For three types 
of theft (burglary, personal theft outside the neighborhood and car-related theft within the 
neighborhood), the regional proportion of respondents reporting that neighbors help each 
other is a relevant compositional factor. Thus, for these crimes, the more countries are 
composed of urban residents and of regions with low average social cohesion, the higher their 
victimization rates. These results indicate that the major compositional factor that 
distinguishes high-risk countries from low-risk countries is proximity to crime-inducing 
circumstances. For three of the four types of car-related crime, country rates are higher the 
more cars are owned by households. Most notably for car damage outside the neighborhood, 
car ownership is a major compositional factor, explaining almost 60% of the observed cross-
national differences. 
 
 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results reported in this chapter indicate that cross-national differences in victimization 
risk can be partly understood as a product of varying material context. Income inequality, in 
particular, was found to be highly related to victimization rates of theft, violence and car 
vandalism. These findings are in accordance with Merton’s (1957) and Blau and Blau’s 
(1982) versions of strain/anomie theory, which posits that offenders are most motivated to 
commit crimes in a context of uneven distribution of material resources. In such 
circumstances, high rates of victimization result from the greater likelihood that deprived 
individuals will try to overcome blocked opportunities through theft, or they will express their 
frustration about the inaccessibility of resources through violence or vandalism. Although 
Chapter 2, as well as previous cross-national studies, reported a positive relation between 
income inequality and crime (Gartner 1990; Krahn et al. 1986; Neapolitan 1998), the country-
level results found here are the first that are simultaneously adjusted for compositional 
heterogeneity between countries by use of a multilevel design. As such, hypotheses from 
strain/anomie theory are hereby subjected to stronger tests than previous cross-national 
studies, which were of necessity based on country-level data due to the lack of alternatives. In 
future studies, the use of longitudinal cross-national data should provide an additional way to 
evaluate strain/anomie theory, by examining whether changes in inequality are followed by 
the expected changes in victimization rates. This would allow an even more rigorous causal 
interpretation of the relationship (Messner et al. 2002). 
 Two other macro-level findings from the multilevel analyses should be mentioned. 
First, divorce rates are positively related to three of the nine victimization types considered 
here, and controlling for compositional differences reduces this relation for only one of them 
(burglary). This offers limited support for the assumption that national divorce rates reflect 
community-level compositional differences in social disorganization. In addition, the positive 
association found between violence in the neighborhood and divorce rate may suggest a 
higher potential for conflict between former spouses. Second, although GDP per capita is 
Chapter 3 
 68 
inversely related to theft and violence, controlling for individual and regional characteristics 
reduced this association in several instances. To some extent, this country-level indicator 
therefore seems to reflect compositional differences with respect to target suitability and 
social disorganization. 
 Because previous cross-national studies were based on macro-level data, inferences 
about the impact of differential population composition on crime have been difficult to draw 
in the past. Another innovation offered by this study’s combination of individual, regional and 
country-level data is the possibility to disentangle the impact of national context and 
composition in shaping victimization rates. For that matter, both of them were found to be 
important, although the impact of country context (especially income inequality) was larger in 
most instances. Nevertheless, for six of the nine types of victimization, cross-national 
differences dropped by one-third or more after compositional heterogeneity was taken into 
account. More specifically, with respect to composition, it appears that systematic cross-
national differences in the extent to which people live close to disorganized areas partly 
explains varying victimization risk. Higher victimization rates are found especially in 
countries that consist of a larger proportion of urban residents and, in some cases, in countries 
consisting of many regions with low average social cohesion. Furthermore, though related to 
victimization at the individual level, non-domestic activities (a paid job, going out for 
entertainment) did not play a role as compositional factors explaining cross-national 
differences. This is in contrast with Cohen and Felson’s (1979) prediction that a country will 
have higher crime rates, the more the routine activities of its population lead them to spend 
less time at home and thus offer increased criminal opportunities. On the other hand, their 
hypothesis that crime rates will increase as households own more removable, luxury goods 
(which increases their attractiveness as crime targets), is corroborated for car-related theft and 
vandalism: victimization rates for these offences are higher, the more cars are owned by 
households. 
 Evaluation of these results would not be complete without mention of this study’s 
limitations. First, the current selection of countries is small and was motivated by availability 
of data on a range of basic indicators. It is difficult to predict whether a different or broader 
selection of countries might yield other results. Also, the average sample size in participating 
countries was relatively small considering that victimization is a rare event. Furthermore, 
meso-level variance within countries was modeled by distinguishing regions. It may be that 
incorporating more detailed spatial identifiers (e.g., city codes) in this level may produce 
different results, although there is no direct motive to suspect so. Nevertheless, to assess the 
robustness of the current results, future studies might engage in analyses using a larger 
selection of countries, larger sample sizes per country and alternative spatial categorizations 
within countries. Finally, adding more detailed measures for theoretical concepts like 
exposure through routine activities and neighborhood cohesion, may improve the prediction 
of victimization.  
 Despite these limitations, the results underscore the relevance of studying micro-, 
meso- and macro-level mechanisms for explaining victimization, be it individual risk or 
cross-national differences. Individual victimization risk seems to be determined by multiple 
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social contexts, while the composition of lower-level units are partly responsible for bringing 
about cross-national differences. One way to enhance our understanding of these relations 
would be by further specifying the possible interplay between individual and higher-level 
mechanisms (e.g., at the neighborhood level), for instance by examining whether being an 
attractive target by owning luxury goods is more risky in specific contexts. Although the 
analyses in this chapter did not yield many significant results for interactions between 
national levels of income inequality and individual characteristics related to target suitability 
and social disorganization, it may well be that, following suggestions of Smith et al. (2000), 
the use of data from small spatial units would provide the best opportunities for testing the 
presence of such conditional effects. 
  
 
  
 
4. NEIGHBORHOOD DYNAMICS AND 
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION* 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Changes in neighborhood status result primarily from the selective migration of income groups into and out of 
areas. These changes, in turn, are related to the chance of becoming the victim of a crime in a locality. Drawing 
on Shaw and McKay’s (1942) social disorganization theory, this chapter argues that victimization is more likely 
not only in disadvantaged neighborhoods, but also in neighborhoods where improvements are taking place. 
These neighborhoods suffer from social instability caused by the strong influx of new residents and from social 
heterogeneity, which is caused by the simultaneous presence of high-income and low-income groups. To test 
these hypotheses, analyses are performed using Dutch victimization survey data among 70,000 respondents, 
distributed across 2,500 neighborhoods within 500 municipalities in the Netherlands. The results show that, 
controlling for individual characteristics, intensive socioeconomic improvement of neighborhoods is related to 
higher victimization risk for theft, violence and vandalism. Also, municipal characteristics are associated with 
victimization, independent of individual and neighborhood traits. Therefore, this chapter expands on social 
disorganization theory in two ways: (1) It sees social disorganization as dependent not only upon the 
socioeconomic composition of neighborhoods, but also upon socioeconomic dynamics. (2) It suggests that, apart 
from social conditions within neighborhoods, the larger social context is important for explaining differences in 
victimization risk. 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A central finding in ecological crime studies is that disadvantaged neighborhoods are 
confronted with a relatively large amount of crime. Research from the United States (Bellair 
1997; Lauritsen 2001; Sampson et al. 1997) as well as other countries (Lee 2000; Markowitz 
et al. 2001; Wittebrood 2000) has found that the more concentrated low income groups are 
within an area, the higher the risk its inhabitants run of becoming the victim of a crime. 
According to social disorganization theory (Shaw & McKay 1942), the small amount of 
material and political resources held by the inhabitants of disadvantaged neighborhoods leads 
to a collective inability for internal organization. Indeed, in low-status neighborhoods social 
contacts between community members are relatively few (Bellair 1997), participation in local 
organizations is rare (Sampson & Groves 1989) and trust in other people is low (Ross et al 
2001). In such a context, collective social control is hard to realize, which in turn increases the 
attractiveness of the area as a place to commit crimes (Kornhauser 1978; Sampson et al. 
                                                          
* This chapter is a revised version of an article published (in Dutch) in Mens & Maatschappij (Van Wilsem et al. 
2003). An earlier version was presented at the Sociaal-Wetenschappelijke Studiedagen, Amsterdam, May 30–31, 
2002. 
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1997). Furthermore, it has been argued that because members of disadvantaged 
neighborhoods have few connections with local government officials, they lack the ability to 
secure the external resources necessary for local crime control (Bursik & Grasmick 1993; 
Vélez 2001). Logically, it would therefore appear that efforts to reduce crime in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods should aim at increasing local socioeconomic status, for 
example, by renovation and renewal of the housing stock, which might lead to the inflow of 
more affluent inhabitants. 
 However, social disorganization theory predicts community cohesion to be low not 
only in disadvantaged neighborhoods, but also in areas characterized by strong social 
heterogeneity and instability (Bursik 1988; Kornhauser 1978; Shaw & McKay 1942). Social 
ties between community members decline with increasing mutual social differences and 
decreasing average length of residence due to strong migration flows into and out of a 
neighborhood. The result of this lack of social ties, low levels of collective efficacy, is 
assumed to be one of the prime determinants of local crime (Sampson et al. 1997). Since the 
socioeconomic upgrading of neighborhoods is often accompanied by increased social 
heterogeneity and instability (Atkinson 2000; Covington & Taylor 1989; McDonald 1986), it 
may be argued that such processes of change stimulate crime rather than decrease it. Few 
studies have systematically addressed the relation between ‘gentrification’ and crime, yet it 
seems that crime is indeed more prominent in improving neighborhoods, compared to stable 
ones (Covington & Taylor 1989; Taylor & Covington 1988). Furthermore, socioeconomic 
decline of neighborhoods is also associated with high crime rates, because the concentration 
of low-income groups stimulates social disorganization (Bursik & Webb 1982; Skogan 1990). 
This chapter evaluates how socioeconomic change relates to community victimization risk for 
theft, violence and vandalism. Unlike previous studies, which were restricted to one city (e.g., 
Bursik & Webb 1982; Covington & Taylor 1989), the analyses in this chapter were performed 
on a country-wide scale for more than 2,500 Dutch neighborhoods between 1994 and 1998. 
Because gentrification of Dutch neighborhoods was more common in urban than in 
rural areas during this period, controls were included for crime-inducing influences present in 
the wider spatial context (i.e., the city). The city context may determine victimization risk 
because the allocation of government resources for crime reduction differs across cities 
(Bursik & Grasmick 1993; Skogan 1990). Also, the physical proximity of crime-inducing 
circumstances in nearby neighborhoods increases risk due to offender mobility and, possibly, 
because behavior that is prominent in surrounding neighborhoods is imitated by community 
members (Cohen & Tita 1999; Morenoff et al. 2001). By considering structural factors 
external to neighborhoods, this study expands on previous studies in which crime-inducing 
conditions in the wider context were taken into account (Heitgerd & Bursik 1987; Morenoff et 
al. 2001; Smith et al. 2001). 
 More generally, this chapter uses insights from social disorganization theory and 
routine activity theory to explain victimization patterns across Dutch neighborhoods. Chapter 
1 argued that strain/anomie theory is suited to explain cross-national victimization 
differences, but not within-country differences. Chapter 3 corroborated this argument with 
empirical results. Because the present chapter (and Chapter 5 as well) deals with victimization 
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patterns within one country, strain/anomie theory is not considered applicable and is therefore 
not used here. 
 
 
4.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Every neighborhood is characterized by a certain amount of social change over time, due to 
households settling in and moving out. Between neighborhoods, not only do the sizes of 
migration flows differ, but migration patterns differ as well. These patterns are selective and 
driven mainly by developments in the extra-local housing market (OECD 1998). In areas 
where old housing stock is renovated and rental homes are replaced by owner-occupied 
dwellings, the supply of housing for higher income groups increases. Thus, the settlement of 
these groups can reduce concentrations of socioeconomic disadvantage. Such ‘gentrifying’ 
neighborhoods often experience a strong inflow of affluent households (Atkinson 2000; 
Covington & Taylor 1989; Taylor & Covington 1988). Conversely, socioeconomic decline 
prevails in neighborhoods where investments in maintenance and improvement of the local 
housing stock are low. These areas have low competitiveness on the housing market because 
the local real estate offers little space and luxury (Skogan 1986). In such neighborhoods, the 
outflow of residents is selective, with affluent residents usually moving out first in search of 
better housing (Quillian 1999; Skogan 1986; South & Crowder 1997). Simultaneously, there 
are few incoming residents, and the new residents who do come are often disadvantaged 
households whose low incomes match the local housing prices, such as youngsters, ethnic 
minorities and single-parent households (Skogan 1986). The result is a spatial concentration 
of low-income households. On the whole, selectivity in migration patterns can be seen as the 
main source of change in neighborhood socioeconomic status (OECD 1998; Quillian 1999). 
The consequences of such status changes for neighborhood crime are ambiguous. On 
the one hand, gentrifying neighborhoods become less disadvantaged due to the inflow of 
high-income households. The accompanying increase in collective resources boosts the 
community’s potential for internal organization and therefore decreases the risk of 
victimization (McDonald 1986). On the other hand, due to the strong inflow of new (affluent) 
residents, social cohesion is low compared to socioeconomically more stable neighborhoods, 
where the proportion of new residents is smaller and most inhabitants have known one 
another for longer periods of time. Furthermore, social differences between members are 
often more pronounced in gentrifying neighborhoods. The inflow of affluent residents means 
that income differences between old and new residents are often large (Atkinson 2000; 
Covington & Taylor 1989). This heterogeneity undermines the forming of social contacts 
between residents and, consequentially, decreases the collective ability to achieve common 
goals, such as local safety. Although empirical tests of social disorganization theory have 
emphasized the crime-inducing effects of ethnic heterogeneity (Sampson et al. 1997; Shaw & 
McKay 1942), income heterogeneity is another form of social diversity that may lead to an 
incapacity to exercise social control.  
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One of the reasons for the few contacts between new and old residents in gentrifying 
neighborhoods is that newcomers are sometimes held responsible for ‘buying out’ previous 
residents with whom older neighborhood members maintained social contact (Atkinson 2000; 
McDonald 1986). The inflow of affluent residents in disadvantaged neighborhoods can 
furthermore stimulate discontent among long-term residents, because for them the 
attractiveness of the neighborhood decreases as many local facilities (e.g., shops) become 
specialized to the material wishes of the new residents (Atkinson 2000). Blau and Blau (1982) 
as well as Taylor and Covington (1988) point out that income inequality between community 
members may not only result in social disorganization but may also stimulate feelings of 
relative deprivation among the least affluent. This induces tendencies towards criminal 
offending, although this behavior may be exercised elsewhere. 
In deteriorating neighborhoods, income heterogeneity between neighbors is reduced. 
The process of decline results from the selective outflow of affluent residents, with low-
income groups remaining alongside a limited inflow of low-income households (Quillian 
1999; Skogan 1986; Wilson 1987). Residents of deteriorating neighborhoods run a high risk 
of victimization due to the concentration of socioeconomic disadvantage around them and the 
low levels of social control that results from this (Bellair 1997; Sampson et al. 1997). 
Traditionally, social disorganization has been assumed to be most likely to occur in 
disadvantaged and deteriorating neighborhoods (Kornhauser 1978; Shaw & McKay [1942] 
1969; Skogan 1990). By arguing that positive socioeconomic neighborhood change is also 
accompanied by social disorganization, this chapter offers an explanation for variations in 
crime between seemingly well-off neighborhoods.  
In sum, although gentrifying neighborhoods are not among the most disadvantaged, 
their inhabitants run higher risk of victimization because the process of socioeconomic 
improvement brings with it social instability and heterogeneity. Furthermore, taking the 
specific properties of gentrification processes into account, this chapter hypothesizes that 
affluent households may suffer higher victimization risk especially in improving 
neighborhoods. Apart from the fact that they are attractive targets for theft and vandalism, due 
to their ownership of luxury goods (which increases their risk in any neighborhood), in 
improving neighborhoods they may live in proximity to motivated offenders, with many low-
income households still living in the same neighborhood. Also, they may be faced with the 
resentment of the original inhabitants, because of recent profound neighborhood changes. 
 
 
4.3 THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
 
Despite the fact that social disorganization theory anticipates a positive relation between 
neighborhood improvement and crime, little attention has been devoted to testing this 
assumption empirically. Ethnographic research on gentrified neighborhoods has pointed out 
the unintended side-effect of increased crime (e.g., Atkinson 2000). Taylor and Covington 
systematically examined crime problems of gentrified neighborhoods in Baltimore 
(Covington & Taylor 1989; Taylor & Covington 1988); and Bursik and Webb (1982) 
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addressed the relation between socioeconomic community changes and shifts in delinquency 
among Chicago neighborhoods. Although these studies offer interesting insight into the 
relation between socioeconomic dynamics and neighborhood crime, their focus on a single 
city raises the question of the extent to which their results can be generalized on a larger scale. 
 This chapter expands on earlier work by analyzing the crime-inducing impact of 
neighborhood dynamics on a country-wide scale in the Netherlands. In doing so, it takes into 
account that during the period between 1994 and 1998 – this study’s period of interest – 
neighborhood improvement in the Netherlands was most prominent in large cities. A large 
increase in the share of owner-occupied properties and a general improvement of housing 
quality in the four largest Dutch cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) led 
to an increased inflow of affluent residents to these cities (Van der Wouden & De Bruijne 
2001). In contrast, socioeconomic decline occurred most frequently in rural neighborhoods 
(Van Wilsem & Oudhof 2001). Because neighborhood improvement has taken place mainly 
in the large cities, omitting city size from a model to predict victimization would probably 
lead to an overestimation of the effect of neighborhood improvement on crime. Central to this 
argument is the assumption that city context is relevant for predicting victimization, while 
simultaneously, it is systematically related to the current major subject of study, neighborhood 
improvement. Therefore, this study argues that it is vital to include city traits in the 
explanatory model of victimization. 
The city context is related to crime for two main reasons. First, large cities have high 
crime rates not only because of their disproportionately large number of disorganized 
neighborhoods, but also because the spatial proximity of that disorganization has an 
independent, additional effect on crime. A possible reason for this is that offenders operating 
in certain places may, through their daily activities, routinely move about in areas nearby 
(Brantingham & Brantingham 1984; Smith et al. 2000). Also, community members might 
imitate dominant patterns of behavior in surrounding neighborhoods (Cohen & Tita 1999; 
Sampson et al. 1999). Morenoff et al. (2001) as well as Smith et al. (2000) offered support for 
these assumptions with their findings that, independent of the internal social structure, 
neighborhood levels of crime are higher the more that nearby neighborhoods suffer from 
crime. Second, apart from spatial dependency effects, hierarchical policy measures are 
another potential source of contextual influence that goes beyond neighborhood effects on 
crime. Following Bursik and Grasmick (1993), there are differences in the extent to which 
people can apply for external resources beneficial to the maintenance of local public safety. 
Vélez (2001) found lower victimization risk in areas with high levels of public social control 
(i.e., many contacts between neighborhood inhabitants and local police and government 
officials). In this study, city-level public social control is included as an indicator of access to 
external resources, which is expected to reduce the chance of residents becoming the victim of 
a crime. 
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4.4 DATA AND METHODS 
 
To test the hypotheses, victimization survey data were combined with census data on the 
structural characteristics of neighborhoods (four-digit zip codes) and cities. The data for 
victimization and individual target characteristics were drawn from the Dutch Police 
Population Monitor (PPM) 1999. The PPM survey was conducted under the authority of the 
Dutch ministries of justice and domestic affairs. Within each of the Netherlands’ 25 police 
regions, at least 1,000 interviews were collected, and in most regions substantially higher 
numbers were realized. The overall sample consisted of 77,539 respondents aged 15 years or 
older. Complete data were available for 69,819 respondents from 2,526 neighborhoods in 527 
municipalities, thereby covering some 65% of all Dutch neighborhoods and 98% of Dutch 
municipalities. 
 
4.4.1 Operationalizations 
Respondents were asked whether they had been the victim of a crime during the past 12 
months. Five different types of victimization were distinguished: burglary, car-related theft, 
violence, car vandalism and other vandalism. For each of these, dichotomous variables were 
constructed that indicate whether the respondent had experienced this crime (1) or not (0). 
Respondents who reported a car theft or theft from a car were considered victims of car-
related theft. Respondents reporting threats, assault or violent robbery were considered 
victims of violence. Because this part of the study focuses on the impact of local social 
conditions on victimization, incidents were selected that occurred within the respondent’s 
neighborhood of residence (Miethe & Meier 1994). Of all victims of car-related theft, 59% 
reported at least one incident in their own neighborhood. For victims of violence, this 
amounted to 46%, while of all victims of car vandalism 72% reported at least one 
neighborhood incident. For other vandalism, 82% of all victims experienced an incident in 
their own neighborhood.  
 To control for compositional differences between neighborhoods, several individual 
target characteristics were included in the analyses. If these individual characteristics were 
related to victimization, and were differentially distributed across neighborhoods, they would 
offer an alternative explanation for neighborhood-level crime differences. Thus, by 
controlling for compositional differences, the hypotheses on the relation between social 
context and victimization could be tested more optimally (Sampson et al. 1997). Many studies 
(e.g. Hindelang et al. 1978) have found gender, age, marital status and ethnicity to be 
correlates of victimization. These were thus introduced as control variables in the analyses. 
The measure for marital status shows whether the respondent was single (1) or 
married/cohabiting (0). Ethnic status was measured as a dichotomy, with respondents 
reporting to be Surinam, Turkish, Moroccan or Antillean receiving a score of 1, and all others 
0.1 Respondents’ educational level indicates their attractiveness as a crime target due to their 
                                                          
1 A small number of other ethnic categories could not be disaggregated. These include both Western and non-
Western foreigners and are coded as 0 (not an ethnic minority). 
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presumed possession of luxury goods. This variable has seven categories, ranging from 
‘primary education’ (1) to ‘university’ (7).  
 
Table 4.1 Description of Dependent and Independent Variables 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
Individual Characteristics (N=69,937)     
Victim Burglary         .06     .26   0  1 
Victim Car-Related Theft in Neighborhood         .04     .24  0   1 
Victim Violence in Neighborhood         .02     .15   0  1 
Victim Car Vandalism in Neighborhood        .13     .33   0  1 
Victim Other Vandalism in Neighborhood         .07     .25   0   1 
Male        .44     .50   0   1 
Age    45.12 16.71 15 98 
Single         .20     .40   0   1 
Ethnic Minority          .01     .10   0   1 
Educational Level        4.08    1.75   1   7 
Working for Paid Labor          .58     .49   0   1 
Frequency Nobody Home        3.85    1.51   1   6 
Missing Value Frequency Nobody Home          .04     .20   0   1 
Home Owner         .64     .48   0   1 
Detached House        .16     .36   0   1 
Number of Cars      1.14     .72   0   7 
 
Neighborhood Characteristics (N=2,526) 
    
Socioeconomic Change 1994-1998:     
- Strong Decline          .02    .12   0   1 
- Moderate Decline          .10    .31   0   1 
- Stability          .76    .43   0   1 
- Moderate Improvement          .08    .28   0   1 
- Strong Improvement          .03    .18   0   1 
Socioeconomic Disadvantage 1998        -.03    .97       -6.36        3.40 
Percentage Ethnic Minorities       6.48  9.26   0 82 
Percentage Youngsters Aged 15-24      11.79  2.86   5 40 
Income Heterogeneity     20.14  6.30   5 38 
Residential Mobility       3.98  2.27         .82   50.9 
 
City Characteristics (N=527) 
    
Total Number of Inhabitants (natural log)       9.83    .86       6.91     13.50 
Mean Income (* 1000 Dutch guilders)     32.86  2.76   27.8   47.2 
Public Social Control        .00    .08       -.34        .45 
 
Two variables on the respondent’s housing conditions provided additional measures of target 
attractiveness with respect to theft. First, a distinction was made between home owners (1) 
and renters (0). Second, respondents were categorized as living in a detached house (1) or not 
(0). Furthermore, two lifestyle indicators measured the exposure to potential offenders as well 
as the level of personal guardianship over domestic property (Miethe et al. 1987). First, the 
respondent’s main occupation was dichotomized into ‘working at a paid job’ (1) versus 
‘otherwise’ (0). Second, for the average number of hours one’s home is left unoccupied six 
categories were available, ranging from ‘0 to 1 hour’ (1) to ‘more than 40 hours’ (6). No valid 
score on this variable was available for 2,983 respondents. They were therefore assigned a 
missing value. A dummy-variable indicating whether respondents had a missing value for this 
question enabled identification of whether this group differed from the assigned mean value in 
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its relation to victimization. Finally, for car-related crimes, the number of cars owned by the 
household was seen as a relevant indicator of the criminal opportunities provided by the 
target. 
 At the neighborhood level, information was taken from Dutch census data (Kerncijfers 
Viercijferige Postcodegebieden 1999) published by the Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 
unless stated otherwise. First, a summary index of socioeconomic neighborhood disadvantage 
was computed, based on the results of a factor analysis including mean income per income 
recipient, percentage income recipients with a low income (below the 40% line of the national 
income distribution) and percentage income recipients between 15 and 64 years of age living 
on public benefit. In the index on socioeconomic disadvantage, these indicators were 
weighted by their factor loadings (–0.85, 0.95 and 0.81, respectively). Residential mobility 
was calculated as the ratio of residential moves into the neighborhood (inflow) to the total 
number of neighborhood inhabitants. This indicator was based on data from the Dutch postal 
services (PTT). The level of ethnic heterogeneity was indicated by the percentage of non-
Western ethnic minorities.2 Data availability restrictions constrained the calculation of income 
heterogeneity to a rather rough measure. From two income groups (income recipients above 
the 80% line of the national income distribution and income recipients below the 40% line of 
the national distribution) the lowest prevalence rate was taken. Thus, the greater the relative 
size of the smallest income group, the more high and low income groups coexist within the 
same neighborhood. Finally, the percentage of youngsters aged 15 to 24 was included to 
control for the proximity of potential offenders. 
 To determine socioeconomic neighborhood dynamics between 1994 and 1998, 
residual change scores were used. These scores equal the residual of a regression analysis in 
which the initial levels of an indicator are used to predict levels at a later point in time 
(Bohrnstedt 1969). They thus give an indication of changes within the dynamics of the social 
system as a whole (in this case the Netherlands). If an increase of a certain feature occurs in 
all neighborhoods, then this increase is ‘predicted’. Therefore, residual change scores that 
diverge from zero do not necessarily imply absolute change, but rather deviations from the 
general pattern of change. Unlike relative change scores and raw differences, residual change 
scores are independent of the feature’s initial level. This is an important advantage over the 
other types of change scores, because due to identification problems, regression models 
cannot include the neighborhood’s position of origin and destination as well as the amount of 
change between the two. Thus, change scores that are independent of the neighborhood’s 
status position of origin (in this case 1994) are the most likely ones to yield regression 
estimates that reflect the independent effect of neighborhood change on victimization (and not 
the effect of position of origin). Residual change scores have been used in many studies on 
neighborhood change (e.g., Bursik & Webb 1982; Covington & Taylor 1989; Schuerman & 
Kobrin 1986; Taylor & Covington 1988). To validate the results of the current regression 
models that include neighborhood status position of destination (1998) and residual 
                                                          
2 These are people who have at least one parent born in a non-Western country. This includes Turkey and 
countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia, except for Japan and Indonesia (with this last country, the 
Netherlands had colonial relations in the past). 
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neighborhood status change (between 1994 and 1998), additional analyses were performed in 
which the first term was replaced by the mean status position of origin and destination. As 
such, it was ascertained whether the effect of neighborhood change on victimization is 
dependent on the inclusion of neighborhood status position of origin. 
 A summary index of socioeconomic neighborhood change was computed based on 
residual change scores on mean income per income recipient, percentage income recipients 
with a low income (below the 40% line of the national income distribution) and percentage 
income recipients between 15 and 64 years of age living on public benefit. Again, each 
indicator in this index was weighted proportional to its factor loadings (–0.83, 0.89 and 0.54, 
respectively). High values on this index indicate neighborhood decline, while low values 
point towards neighborhood improvement. Neighborhoods were categorized into five groups 
according to their value on the socioeconomic change index. If this value was at least two 
standard deviations higher than the mean, neighborhoods were assumed to be experiencing 
strong decline; neighborhoods with values at least two standard deviations lower than average 
were assumed to be experiencing strong improvement. If the change index value was between 
one and two standard deviations higher than the mean, neighborhoods were categorized as 
undergoing moderate decline; if this value was between one and two standard deviations 
lower than the mean, neighborhoods were assumed to be experiencing moderate 
improvement. Neighborhoods that differed less than one standard deviation from the mean on 
the socioeconomic change index were considered to be stable.  
 At the city level, three variables were controlled for. First, the total number of 
inhabitants was included in the explanatory model. Values for this variable were subjected to 
natural log transformation to induce normality of its distribution. Second, because competing 
hypotheses can be formulated with regard to the city’s mean income (per income recipient), it 
was introduced as a control variable. On the one hand, high levels of affluence may be an 
indication to offenders that the city accommodates many attractive targets, while on the other 
hand, it may offer local authorities a larger pool of resources to spend on law enforcement 
(Reiss 1986). Third, the public social control variable was operationalized as city-level 
performance of local police officials. This indicator was measured with PPM responses to 
four items: (1) ‘the police offers protection around here’, (2) ‘the police reacts to local 
problems’, (3) ‘the police tries hard in this neighborhood’ and (4) ‘the police handles matters 
efficiently in this neighborhood’ (1 = disagree, 2 = do not agree or disagree, 3 = agree). These 
questions offer insight into the availability of external resources for the benefit of 
neighborhood safety (Vélez 2001). In order to construct a city-level measure of public social 
control, ecometric analyses were conducted (Raudenbush & Sampson 1999). The internal 
consistency of an ecometric measure not only depends upon the correlation between the 
items, the number of items and the difficulty of the items (as is the case with an individual-
level scale), but also upon rater agreement and sample size within the ecological setting of 
interest (in this case, the city). The reliability of an ecometric scale is defined as 
∑(τ00/(τ00+σ2/Nj))/J, with τ00 being the variance between cities, σ2 the variance between 
individuals within the city, N the sample size in the city, and J the total number of cities 
(Sampson et al. 1999). The present measure for public social control has a reliability 
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coefficient of 0.83. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the intra-class correlation equals 
0.033 (0.016/(0.016+0.471)), which means that almost 97% of the scale variance is between 
individuals within cities.3 Appendix B elucidates the construction of the ecometric measure 
for city-level public social control. Although this measure was based on subjective 
assessments, various individual characteristics were controlled for (explained in more detail in 
the appendix). This measure may therefore have better comparative quality than ‘objective’ 
indicators of police performance, such as clearance rates and number of personnel, which 
often suffer from registration inconsistencies between areas. Table 4.1 offers a description of 
the variables used in this chapter. 
 
4.4.2 Analytic Strategy 
When using nested data (individuals within neighborhoods within cities) to test the 
hypotheses, it is important to take into account that measurement errors at the different levels 
are correlated. Multilevel models were therefore employed, which estimate separate error 
terms at each analytical level (Snijders & Bosker 1999). Because the dependent variables are 
dichotomous (victim/not victim), logistic models are appropriate here. In hierarchical logistic 
models, the distribution of measurement errors at the individual level is assumed to be 
binomial. This parameter therefore has a fixed value of 1. Additional analyses (not shown) 
indicated that this is a valid assumption for the current models. The errors at the neighborhood 
and city levels were assumed to follow a normal distribution (Snijders & Bosker 1999). 
Furthermore, the potential for multicollinearity was explored by examining variance inflation 
factor (VIF) scores and condition indices. Low values for VIF scores (below 4) and condition 
indices (below 9) in the present analyses indicate that multicollinearity did not seriously affect 
parameter estimates (Belsley et al. 1980). 
 
 
4.5 RESULTS 
 
Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2 describe several features of Dutch neighborhoods, distinguished by 
the kind of socioeconomic change they underwent between 1994 and 1998. Figure 4.1 
displays two types of socioeconomic changes for the different types of neighborhood: 
absolute change in the percentage of residents with a low income and a similar measure for 
high-income residents. Again, low income refers to those under the 40% line of the national 
income distribution, while high income refers to those above the 80% line.4 It should be 
emphasized that these data do not refer to inflow or outflow of specific income groups, but 
rather to changes in their relative size within neighborhoods. In many of the neighborhoods 
that underwent strong improvements, the percentage of low-income recipients decreased 
considerably, while the percentage high-income recipients increased. However, several 
                                                          
3 However, Duncan and Raudenbush (1999) demonstrated that small contextual variance in individual-level 
measures does not rule out large contextual effects. 
4 These specific measures are used due to their availability across a large number of Dutch neighborhoods. 
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exceptions to this pattern were observed. Also, among the other types of neighborhoods, there 
is also differentiation in the specific socioeconomic changes they underwent. 
 
Figure 4.1 Change in Percentage Low-Income and High-Income Recipients among 
  Neighborhoods that Have Experienced Substantial Socioeconomic  
  Dynamics 
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Table 4.2 Characteristics of Neighborhoods, Distinguished by Type of 
Socioeconomic Change, 1994-1998 
   
Socioeconomic Change 1994-1998a 
  
Total 
 
Strong 
Decline 
 
Moderate 
Decline 
 
Stability 
Moderate 
Improve-
ment 
Strong 
Improve-
ment 
 
Total Number 
 
2526 
 
38 
 
264 
 
1926 
 
214 
 
84 
 
Residential Mobility (Mean) 
 
        4.0 
 
    3.1 
 
       3.7 
 
         3.8 
 
       5.1 
 
     7.5 
 
Income Heterogeneity (Mean) 
 
      20.1 
 
  15.6 
 
     16.6 
 
       20.2 
 
     23.3 
 
   23.2 
 
City Size 
      
% Less than 50.000 Inhabitants      63.3   89.5      64.0        65.8      48.1    28.6 
% 50.000-200.000 Inhabitants      28.5     5.3      27.7        27.6      36.9    40.5 
% Four Largest Cities (Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht) 
       8.3     5.3        8.3          6.6      15.0    31.0 
a Neighborhoods that experienced strong decline or strong improvement deviated at least two standard 
deviations from the mean on the residual change index, while neighborhoods undergoing moderate decline or 
improvement deviated between one and two standard deviations from the index mean. The remaining 
neighborhoods are characterized as stable. 
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From Table 4.2, several other differences are evident between improving, stable and declining 
neighborhoods. First, residential mobility in terms of inflow of new residents is substantially 
higher among improving neighborhoods, especially among those that have undergone drastic 
change. Thus, these neighborhoods are dealing with high levels of social instability. With 
respect to income heterogeneity, lower levels are observed among declining and stable 
neighborhoods, compared to improving neighborhoods. Finally, socioeconomic dynamics are 
unevenly distributed between cities of varying size. Improving neighborhoods are over-
represented among the largest cities in the Netherlands, while declining neighborhoods are 
most frequently located in small towns (Van Wilsem & Oudhof 2001). 
Table 4.3 depicts the results of logistic multilevel models for the prediction of 
victimization for burglary, car-related theft, violence, car vandalism and other vandalism. For 
each crime type, three separate models were estimated. In model 1, victimization risk is 
predicted using individual-, neighborhood- and city-level predictors. Model 2 introduces 
neighborhood-level income heterogeneity into the equation. In model 3, residential mobility is 
added to the model. In discussing the models, let us first turn to the individual-level effects, 
then to the neighborhood-level effects and finally the city-level effects. 
At the individual level, the analysis found various characteristics to be related to the 
different types of victimization. One of them, age, is consistently related to each of the five 
types of crime. Young people run a higher risk of theft, violence and vandalism than older 
people, possibly because their daily routine brings them into contact with other youngsters, 
who are over-represented among offender populations (Hindelang et al. 1978). To give an 
impression of the magnitude of the association, the following examples are offered. The 
predicted risk of burglary victimization for a thirty-year old respondent was 4.56% (according 
to the results of Table 4.3), while for a sixty-year old, it was 3.70%. Furthermore, for violence 
in the neighborhood, these expected risks are 2.47% and 1.10%, respectively. For car 
vandalism in the neighborhood, the expected victimization risk for a person thirty years of age 
is 13.01%, and 10.55% for a sixty-year old. 
Males are more often the victim of violent crime within the neighborhood than 
females (approximately 1.7 times more often) and, unexpectedly, men also report more 
burglaries. Compared to married and cohabiting individuals, single-person households are less 
apt to be victims of car-related crimes, but suffer more from violent crime within the 
neighborhood. People working at a paid job and persons who are part of a household where 
frequently nobody is at home, are more likely to be victims of burglary, car-related theft and 
car vandalism within the neighborhood. This is in line with the hypothesis derived from 
routine activity theory that activities away from home decrease people’s ability to guard over 
their domestic property and therefore increase victimization risk (Hindelang et al. 1978; 
Cohen & Cantor 1981). Higher educated people run higher risks of burglary, violence, car 
vandalism and other vandalism compared to those with lower education. For burglary and 
vandalism, the results support the assumption that higher education reflects higher target 
attractiveness. For violence, however, this result was unexpected. Burglaries are committed 
more often in detached houses than in other types of housing.  
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 Furthermore, people in detached houses and home owners experience less car-related 
theft and car vandalism than residents of other housing types and renters. Although these 
categories score high on target attractiveness, the lower risks may be explained by the greater 
possibilities for indoor car storage and thus higher levels of guardianship. Finally, the number 
of cars owned by a household is positively related to the risk of car-related theft and car 
vandalism. For the first crime type, possessing an additional car increases victimization log 
odds by a factor of 2.18 (Exp(0.078)). 
At the neighborhood level, it appears that for all five types of crime considered here 
the risk of victimization is higher in places where a process of socioeconomic improvement 
has taken place (model 1). Inhabitants of declining neighborhoods do not run higher risk of 
victimization, once higher levels of socioeconomic disadvantage are controlled for. Therefore, 
neighborhood decline is associated with victimization only insofar that these neighborhoods 
have a higher concentration of disadvantaged residents. In turn, increases in this variable are 
found to be associated with a higher risk of burglary, violence and car vandalism. For car-
related theft and vandalism, victimization is less likely in neighborhoods experiencing 
moderate decline, compared to stable neighborhoods. 
Turning to the results of model 2, this model found the measure of income 
heterogeneity to be unrelated to victimization, and therefore, hardly any substantial changes 
appear in the association between socioeconomic improvement and victimization. This refutes 
the hypothesis that improving neighborhoods are confronted with more crime due to their 
high levels of income heterogeneity. After controlling for residential mobility (model 3), the 
relation between neighborhood improvement and victimization decreases considerably, 
turning to non-significance for violence, car vandalism and other vandalism. Strong inflow of 
new residents increases victimization risk for all the types of crime examined here. In turn, 
such residential mobility is higher in improving neighborhoods compared to stable and 
declining neighborhoods (see Table 4.2). In order to further demonstrate the validity of the 
findings on neighborhood dynamics and victimization, additional analyses were performed in 
which the neighborhood level of socioeconomic disadvantage was averaged between 1994 
and 1998. This procedure ensures that both the neighborhood’s position of origin (1994) and 
destination (1998) are included in the regression equations. Appendix C displays the results of 
these analyses. These additional results differ little from those presented in Table 4.3, which 
include only the neighborhood’s destination position.  
Furthermore, across most models, victimization of theft, violence and vandalism 
becomes more likely with higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity. The percentage of youngsters 
is also positively associated with risk for most crimes, except violence. 
At the city level, the findings shown in Table 4.3 indicate that victimization and city 
size are positively related, net of individual and neighborhood characteristics. The single 
exception to this is other vandalism. These findings suggest that crime and urbanism are 
associated not only because of compositional differences between large cities and small 
towns, but that city size also has an independent crime-inducing effect. The following 
examples offer an indication of the effect size of this predictor. For instance, the predicted 
burglary risk (adjusted for the other covariates in model 3) for an inhabitant of a city with
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a population size of ten thousand was 3.59%, while for a city with hundred thousand 
inhabitants, it was 5.92%. For car-related theft in the neighborhood, these predicted 
victimization risks are 1.35% and 3.25%, respectively. Finally, for violent victimization in the 
neighborhood, the inhabitant of a city with ten thousand inhabitants runs a predicted risk of 
1.45%, while it is 2.30% for a resident of a city with one hundred thousand residents.  
Furthermore, the relation between victimization and city-level mean income is 
significantly positive for three crime types (burglary, car-related theft and car vandalism) and 
negative for one crime type (other vandalism). Finally, public social control and victimization 
risk are inversely related to burglary and car-related theft, but they are not significantly related 
to neighborhood violence and vandalism. For burglary, the predicted victimization risk was 
found to be 4.10% for a city with the local police performing averagely. In comparison, for a 
city where the satisfaction with local police performance was better than in 95% of the other 
cities in the Netherlands, this predicted risk was 3.81%. For car-related theft in the 
neighborhood, the predicted risks for these two types of cities are 1.50% and 1.71%. On the 
whole, these findings underline the relevance of city-level characteristics for the prediction of 
victimization. 
To illustrate in more detail how neighborhood-level socioeconomic composition and 
dynamics are related to victimization, the predicted risk of victimization was plotted as a 
function of these features (Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4). The predicted victimization risks were 
derived from the regression results in Table 4.3 (model 1) and held constant for values of the 
other predictors in the model. The figures show that victimization becomes more likely with 
higher levels of socioeconomic disadvantage. Also, declining neighborhoods are more likely 
to suffer from the concentration of socioeconomic disadvantage than improving 
neighborhoods. However, high risks of victimization are not found in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods only; high risks are also found in non-disadvantaged neighborhoods that are 
undergoing strong socioeconomic improvement. If, despite this process, socioeconomic 
disadvantage remains above average, the chance of victimization is especially high, most 
notably for theft and vandalism. For instance, the highest predicted risks for burglary 
victimization (more than 5%) are found among inhabitants of improving neighborhoods that 
still have a moderately disadvantageous socioeconomic position, and among inhabitants of 
severely disadvantaged neighborhoods, which have declined the past four years, or remained 
stable. Similar conclusions can be drawn for victimization of violence (Figure 4.3) and car 
vandalism (Figure 4.4). These results show that victimization is not only more likely in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods, but there are also pronounced crime differences between 
affluent neighborhoods, depending on their socioeconomic dynamics. For neighborhoods at 
the same level of socioeconomic disadvantage in 1998, highest risks are found for improving 
neighborhoods. For instance, at the average level of neighborhood disadvantage (a value 0 on 
the index for this measure), the risk of burglary victimization is approximately 4.7% to 5% for 
improving neighborhoods, while for stable and declining neighborhoods, these risks vary 
between 3.5% to 4.2%. 
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Figure 4.2 Predicted Risk of Burglary Victimization, by Level of Neighborhood  
  Disadvantage in 1998 and Socioeconomic Neighborhood Dynamics  
  between 1994 and 1998 
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Figure 4.3 Predicted Risk of Violent Victimization, by Level of Neighborhood  
  Disadvantage in 1998 and Socioeconomic Neighborhood Dynamics  
  between 1994 and 1998 
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Figure 4.4 Predicted Risk of Car Vandalism, by Level of Neighborhood Disadvantage 
  in 1998 and Socioeconomic Neighborhood Dynamics between 1994 and 
  1998 
0
0,02
0,04
0,06
0,08
0,1
0,12
0,14
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Socioeconomic disadvantage 1998
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
ris
k 
of
 c
ar
 v
an
da
lis
m
strong decline
moderate decline
stability
moderate improvement
strong improvement
 
Table 4.4 presents results from multilevel analyses that include interaction effects between 
neighborhood socioeconomic dynamics and indicators of target attractiveness. Section 4.2 
hypothesized that attractive targets – higher educated, home owners and/or residents of a 
detached house – are most at risk in improving neighborhoods, since they possibly find 
themselves in close proximity to potentially motivated offenders, with many low-income 
households still living in the same neighborhood. Also, they may face resentment from long-
time inhabitants who hold them responsible for the profound changes affecting their living 
environment. Table 4.4 offers some support for these conditional effects. Home owners do 
run higher risk of car-related crimes in strongly improving neighborhoods, while residents of 
detached houses in improving neighborhoods run a higher risk of violence and other 
vandalism (which is not the case for residents of detached houses in other types of 
neighborhoods). 
Finally, how successful are the models presented in Table 4.3 in explaining 
neighborhood and city differences in victimization? Table 4.5 presents multilevel variance 
components that show the remaining differences in average victimization risk between 
neighborhoods and cities after controlling for individual, neighborhood and city 
characteristics. For both types of spatial unit, four variance components are presented: (1) an 
empty model reflecting uncontrolled (observed) victimization differences, (2) a model that 
controls for individual/household characteristics, (3) a model that controls for individual and 
neighborhood characteristics and (4) a model that controls for individual, neighborhood and 
city characteristics (i.e. the models 3 reported in Table 4.3). This procedure enables us to 
assess which types of characteristics are most important in bringing about crime differences
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between spatial units. The results are first discussed for neighborhood variation and 
subsequently for city variation.  
Comparing the variance between the empty model and the model that includes 
characteristics of individuals, it seems that for most types of victimization examined here, 
compositional differences between neighborhoods with respect to the type of inhabitants and 
households explain little of the differences in neighborhood victimization rates. For car-
related theft and car vandalism, neighborhood variation increases after controlling for 
compositional differences, which suggests that victimization rates for these crimes may be 
higher in neighborhoods with relatively few suitable targets. On the other hand, for violent 
victimization in the neighborhood, the original differences between neighborhoods decrease 
substantially after controlling for individual characteristics, indicating empirical support for a 
compositional explanation for this type of crime. In turn, neighborhood victimization 
differences decrease considerably, especially for car-related theft, after adjusting for 
neighborhood characteristics. Thus, contextual mechanisms seem important for understanding 
why neighborhoods have varying rates of victimization. To a lesser extent, controlling for city 
characteristics reduces neighborhood differences even further. 
Similar patterns were found with respect to city differences in victimization. Except 
for violence, variation in victimization between cities was not reduced much by controlling 
for individual characteristics. Yet controlling for neighborhood characteristics reduces these 
differences considerably across all five types of crime considered. Thus, a compositional 
explanation for city victimization rates receives empirical support: to some extent, cities have 
different levels of crime because they vary in their composition of neighborhood types. 
Finally, adjusting for city characteristics reduces the variance even further, which suggests 
that these factors are also important in understanding why cities have different rates of 
victimization. 
 
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
From the present study of Dutch neighborhoods, we can conclude that the chance of 
becoming the victim of a crime is higher not only in disadvantaged neighborhoods, but also in 
neighborhoods that are undergoing strong socioeconomic improvement, at least over the four-
year period covered by this study (1994–98). The finding regarding the relation between 
disadvantaged areas and crime is consistent with many previous neighborhood studies on 
crime (e.g., Markowitz et al. 2001; Sampson et al. 1997; Wittebrood 2000). The finding on 
improving neighborhoods sheds new light on the way in which a neighborhood’s 
socioeconomic structure affects local crime. Improving neighborhoods are not usually among 
the most disadvantaged, yet they do attract much crime. This finding was verified for five 
different types of victimization: burglary, car-related theft, violence, car vandalism and other 
vandalism. 
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Table 4.5 Neighborhood- and City-Level Intercept Variance Components 
  
BUR-
GLARY 
CAR-
RELATED 
THEFT 
 
VIO-
LENCE 
 
CAR VAN-
DALISM 
OTHER 
VAN-
DALISM 
 
Neighborhood 
 
     
Empty model 
 
.142 .211 .193 .095 .099 
Controlled for individual characteristics 
 
.134 .250 .128 .109 .084 
Controlled for individual and 
neighborhood characteristics 
.119 .156 .077 .090 .061 
Controlled for for individual, 
neighborhood and city characteristics 
.106 .133 .074 .082 .059 
 
City 
 
     
Empty model 
 
.121 .333 .242 .170 .050 
Controlled for individual characteristics 
 
.130 .355 .180 .156 .041 
Controlled for individual and 
neighborhood characteristics 
.065 .188 .087 .099 .030 
Controlled for for individual, 
neighborhood and city characteristics 
.037 .110 .050 .062 .029 
 
 
These results suggest that expectations should be modest for policy measures to reduce crime 
through socioeconomic neighborhood improvement. The strong inflow of new (affluent) 
residents, which is often the source of this improvement, seems to be one of the causes of 
high victimization risk in these neighborhoods. A central assumption in social disorganization 
theory is that residential instability reduces the potential for collective social control, because 
unstable neighborhoods yield few social contacts between inhabitants. However, for theft, the 
relation between neighborhood improvement and victimization is not fully ‘explained’ by 
adjusting for neighborhood differences in residential mobility. Three additional explanations 
can thus be formulated. First, it may be that, especially in improving neighborhoods, 
attractive crime targets (high-income households) are located in close proximity to motivated 
offenders (deprived individuals), which increases the risk of theft. Indeed, some interaction 
results suggest that attractive targets are especially at risk in improving neighborhoods. 
Second, the simultaneous local presence of high- and low-income groups (which is often 
found in improving neighborhoods) may decrease social control, due to the lack of social 
contacts within heterogeneous populations. Although this hypothesis was tested and not 
supported, the measure of income heterogeneity used was rather crude. Therefore, future 
empirical tests should use improved measures of neighborhood material inequality. Third, 
rapid development towards spatially concentrated income heterogeneity may induce feelings 
of relative deprivation among the least affluent and induce a tendency to rectify differences in 
material ownership through theft (Covington & Taylor 1989; Taylor & Covington 1988). 
 In neighborhoods where improvements are taking place, decreases in victimization can 
be expected only after stabilization and, possibly, homogenization of the local community. It 
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should also be noted that if low-income groups relocate elsewhere, crime problems may be 
displaced rather than solved. On the other hand, affluent households may move out of the 
improved neighborhood in response to the high level of criminal activity (Morenoff & 
Sampson 1997). The neighborhood would then fall back into a process of socioeconomic 
decline, which in turn, would keep local victimization rates high. It would be interesting to 
investigate neighborhood developments over longer periods of time, in order to examine 
whether local crime itself influences selectivity of migration patterns. Furthermore, on the 
methodological side, diagonal reference models (Sobel 1981) may prove to be a useful tool 
for further assessing the impact of neighborhood change on crime. In such models, local 
crime rates of changing neighborhoods are modeled in such a way that they are a weighted 
average of the crime rates of the stable neighborhoods in their status position of origin, as well 
as the stable neighborhoods in their status position of destination. However, with the current 
state of statistical programs, it is not possible yet to integrate diagonal reference models in 
multilevel analyses. 
 Another direction for future investigation concerns the inclusion of additional, 
intermediary variables at the neighborhood level. The central assumption in this chapter was 
that neighborhoods vary in their capacity to exercise collective social control. Due to a lack of 
available data, it was impossible to test this assumption directly. Therefore, structural 
variables were used of factors that that constrain social interaction between neighborhood 
members, according to social disorganization theory. Several U.S. studies indicate that social 
contacts between neighborhood members and levels of collective efficacy indeed mediate the 
effects of these traditional disorganization indicators on crime (Bellair 1997; Sampson et al. 
1997). Expanding on this, it would be interesting to examine whether the same holds true for 
the effects of neighborhood improvement on victimization. 
 Finally, the results clearly show that victimization in one’s own neighborhood is not 
only dependent upon individual and neighborhood characteristics, but also upon the city’s 
social context. Individuals living in cities with a large number of inhabitants, high mean 
income and low levels of public social control run higher risk of becoming the victim of a 
crime, after the effects of individual and neighborhood characteristics are taken into account. 
This finding constitutes an addition to social disorganization theory, which has explained 
crime by focusing primarily on the internal characteristics of neighborhoods. These city-level 
effects support the assumption that social contexts beyond and external to neighborhoods are 
relevant for understanding local differences in crime rates. On one hand, the crime-reducing 
effect of public social control points toward a hierarchical effect through city policy (Bursik 
& Grasmick 1993). On the other hand, the effect of city size on victimization may reflect the 
crime-inducing potential of spatial proximity to social disorganization (Morenoff et al. 2001; 
Smith et al. 2000). More detailed studies on these two types of contextual effects external to 
neighborhoods provide intriguing paths for future inquiry. 
 
 
5. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
BURGLARY PREVENTION* 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Burglary prevention measures reduce the chance of burglary victimization. However, in evaluations of 
situational prevention efforts the possibility of crime displacement has been a general concern. Yet studies have 
found only limited ‘target displacement’ (offenders exercising their criminal actions against alternative targets 
at other locations). Furthermore, rational choice theorists state that due to crime-specific restrictions serious 
arguments can be made against the likelihood of widespread ‘offence displacement’ (offenders switching to 
alternative delinquent activities). This chapter examines target and offence displacement using large-scale 
Dutch victimization data from nearly 70,000 respondents located in 2,137 neighborhoods in 514 cities. The 
results indicate that individual-level prevention measures reduce burglary risk, whereas high city-wide levels of 
prevention increase risk. In addition, after adjusting for city-level prevention, the neighborhood level of 
prevention is unrelated to burglary victimization within the neighborhood. Therefore, indications of target 
displacement are particularly strong when studying large areas, in which offenders may decide to redirect their 
attention in response to situational prevention. This suggests that burglars may be harder to deter than has been 
suggested in small-scale evaluation studies, which offer little evidence of target displacement. Finally, this study 
finds indications of offence displacement. Well-protected households tend to experience higher risk of 
vandalism. However, the overall risk of victimization (theft including burglary, violence and vandalism) is 
reduced with higher levels of preventive action, which underlines the overall effectiveness of such actions. 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Many households take precautionary measures to prevent burglary victimization. In the 
Netherlands, 96% of all households in 1999 had taken at least one precautionary action 
against burglary. Such situational prevention, which reduces the opportunity to commit a 
crime at a specific place, seems to be effective in reducing burglary risk. Dutch households 
that took five prevention measures had an average burglary risk of 0.5%, while those that took 
none ran an 8% risk (Intomart 1995).1 Though burglary prevention measures lead to risk 
reduction for the household itself, crime displacement may be an unintended consequence 
(Barr & Pease 1990; Cornish & Clarke 1987; Hesseling 1994). Displacement can occur in 
                                                          
* This chapter is a revised version of an article published (in Dutch) in Tijdschrift voor Veiligheid en 
Veiligheidszorg (Van Wilsem 2003). An earlier version was presented at the Workshop on Advanced Methods of 
Analysis in Environmental Criminology at the Netherlands Institute for the Study of Criminality and Law 
Enforcement, Leiden, the Netherlands, August 30–31, 2002. 
1 In the Dutch Police Population Monitor 1993 on which these results are based, the five prevention measures are 
burglary alarm, extra locks on doors or windows, leaving house lights on while nobody is at home, lighting on 
the house’s exterior and possession of a dog. 
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various ways: other targets are selected, offenders switch to alternative offences, crimes are 
committed at other times, offenders change their modus operandi, etcetera (Hesseling 1994; 
Reppetto 1976). Situational prevention measures have often been criticized for this reason. 
Rather than reducing crime, they are said merely to lead to a redistribution of criminal 
incidents (Barr & Pease 1990). 
 This chapter focuses on two types of crime displacement: offence displacement and 
target displacement. The first variant deals with households that have taken burglary 
prevention measures and afterwards run higher risk of other types of crime, such as vandalism 
or pick-pocketing. In such cases, offenders may have shifted to other types of criminal 
activities against which targets are less well protected (Cornish & Clarke 1987; Hesseling 
1994). The second variant, target displacement, deals with the geographic shift of offender 
activities, that is, burglaries are committed at other places as a consequence of situational 
prevention. 
In an extensive literature review, Hesseling (1994) listed findings on crime 
displacement for a large number of evaluation studies on situational prevention. Based on this 
review, he concluded that crime displacement is seldom complete and sometimes is even 
absent. However, many studies in Hesseling’s review were based on a small number of areas, 
and they were not all focused specifically on crime displacement (Eck 1997). To establish 
target displacement, studying only a small number of alternative places to which offenders 
might displace their actions is especially a drawback. Since the range of alternative operating 
places for offenders is potentially much larger, the displacement may have been beyond the 
reach of these evaluation studies. Therefore, the finding that crime rates did not increase in 
areas directly adjacent to a place that had installed situational prevention (Allatt 1984; 
Forrester et al. 1988; Lindsay & McGillis 1988; Miethe 1991) offers insufficient support for 
the entire absence of target displacement. Probably, patterns of target displacement are more 
likely to be observed the larger the alternative space that is being studied in which offenders 
may displace their actions. 
Because offenders have many behavioral options to choose from, it is hard to 
document target and offence displacement completely (Barr & Pease 1990; Hesseling 1994; 
Trasler 1986). However, a large-scale Dutch victimization survey – the Police Population 
Monitor, which contains over 70,000 respondents distributed across most neighborhoods and 
cities of the Netherlands – may offer the most optimal possibilities for this purpose. The first 
research question of this chapter is whether burglary prevention measures taken by 
households lead to higher burglary risk among other households. Although this is an indirect 
way to assess target displacement, compared to offender-oriented data it offers better 
opportunities to examine burglary patterns across large spatial areas. By distinguishing 
between the prevention behavior of members of the same neighborhood and members of the 
same city, it examines which spatial context is important for the study of target displacement. 
Do prevention measures taken by neighborhood members lead to increased risk among other 
households within the same neighborhood, because offenders search for suitable targets 
within that area? Or, are the preventive actions taken by households in the wider area also 
important, for example, because prevention by households in other neighborhoods leads to 
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displacement to one’s own neighborhood? Therefore, not only is it necessary to answer the 
question of whether offenders choose for target displacement, but also which alternative 
targets are among their likely options: direct neighbors of the original targets, other 
neighborhood members or even households in other parts of the city.  
The second research question is whether well-protected households run higher 
victimization risks of other types of neighborhood crime, such as other types of theft or 
vandalism. If this is the case, the higher victimization risk may be due to offence 
displacement in response to burglary prevention measures, because households have protected 
themselves less well against crimes other than burglary. 
 
 
5.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Different criminological theories lead to differing hypotheses on crime displacement. 
Positivistic interpretations of traditional theories (e.g., strain/anomie theory) argue that 
criminal dispositions need to be expressed. Thus, the ‘demand’ for committing crimes is 
inelastic in these theories’ models of individual actions (Reppetto 1976). Extending this line 
of reasoning, crime reduction could take place only if the root causes of criminality are taken 
away, if possible, or by disabling the offender’s ability to commit crimes through 
incarceration. Therefore, according to these positivistic models, situational prevention 
measures would lead only to a different way in which delinquent behavior is exercised – at 
another place, with another crime, with different modus operandi, etcetera. Eventually, 
criminal dispositions are thus expressed after all (Clarke 1995). Implicitly, this means that 
offenders are flexible in their behavior, with respect to the types of crime they commit as well 
as the places where they can commit them (Hesseling 1994). However, which type of 
displacement is most likely under which circumstances cannot be inferred from these theories. 
 In contrast, the rational choice theory of criminal behavior assumes that situational 
prevention can be effective in reducing crime (Cornish & Clarke 1986, 1987). The reason for 
this diverging hypothesis is that the rational choice model of individual behavior differs on 
three accounts from positivistically interpreted criminological theory. First, it is assumed that 
behavior is purposive. This means that individuals take actions with the aim of realizing 
specific goals. In the case of a burglary, the leading motive is usually material gain, while for 
some cases of violent crime attaining status may be a main purpose. Second, there is no 
inherent or external pressure toward deviance. Rather, criminal decisions are made by 
evaluating the costs and benefits associated with the alternative courses of action, given the 
restrictions in terms of time, space, skills and social context (Cornish & Clarke 1986). Third, 
an explicit distinction is made between criminality and criminal events (Clarke 1995). Not 
only are they different phenomena, but their causal factors are also different. Whereas various 
psychological and social mechanisms – such as personality disorder, dysfunctional family 
situation and income inequality – are associated with long-term criminal involvement 
(criminality), situational cues determine whether a criminal act is committed at a specific time 
and place. With this distinction, rational choice theorists argue that situational prevention can 
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indeed lead to crime reduction, not by driving back criminal involvement, but by reducing the 
number of situations that facilitate the commission of crimes (Felson & Clarke 1998; 
Hesseling 1995). 
 
5.2.1 Offence Displacement 
From the three assumptions stated above, it might be inferred that crime displacement takes 
place only under specific conditions. With respect to offence displacement, crime targets who 
have protected themselves against burglary might run higher chance of becoming the victim 
of a crime other than burglary. However, given the first assumption on the purposiveness of 
individual action, it is likely that this increased risk would be restricted to crimes that share 
the purpose of achieving material gain, as is the aim of most instances of burglary. Here, an 
additional assumption is that well-protected targets remain attractive targets for other property 
crimes because of their possession of luxury goods. However, some burglars may be driven 
mainly by goals other than material rewards, such as thrill-seeking. These offenders are more 
likely to replace their burglar activities with other, thrill-oriented theft crimes or crimes of a 
different nature, such as vandalism. For instance, Forrester et al. (1988) found that during a 
burglary prevention project in Rochdale (United Kingdom), the number of police reports of 
vandalism increased. However, taking the purposiveness of action as the leading assumption 
on individual behavior, it is unlikely that crimes driven by other motives, such as violence, 
will become the delinquent activities that burglars turn to in response to situational prevention 
(Cornish & Clarke 1987). The hypothesis on offence displacement therefore reads: the better 
that crime targets have protected themselves against burglary, the higher their chances of 
becoming the victim of a theft crime other than burglary.  
A restrictive factor for offence displacement is that each type of offence has its own 
choice-structuring properties: skills required, physical risks, average reward per offence, 
etcetera (Cornish & Clarke 1987). The elements that attract offenders to specific types of 
crimes are not by definition found in other delinquent activities. Thus, experience acquired as 
a burglar may not be useful for all kinds of property crimes. In conclusion, offence 
displacement is assumed to be partial: because of crime-specific restrictions, not every burglar 
will decide to shift activities to other types of theft. 
 
5.2.2 Target Displacement 
Similar to offence displacement, the spatial displacement of offenders is also expected to be 
restricted. In this respect, a common assumption regarding the travel patterns of offenders is 
that most crimes are committed within the area that offenders are acquainted with through 
their routine activities (Brantingham & Brantingham 1993; Felson & Clarke 1998). This 
‘awareness space’ is different for each person, but it includes the vicinities of home, work and 
school, important places for leisure and the paths connecting these places. The awareness 
space is generally not restricted to one’s own neighborhood, but stretches out across various 
parts of the town or city of residence. According to Rengert and Wasilchick (1985), burglaries 
in Philadelphia were committed in close range to offenders’ travel path from home to work. In 
British research among 77 burglars, Forrester et al. (1988) found that 85% of the burglars 
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indicated they had committed their crimes within a five-mile range of their home. Based on 
interviews with more than 100 burglars in St. Louis, Wright and Decker (1994) concluded 
that many targets are selected within the area where the offender engages in daily, routine 
activities. 
Assuming that most crimes are committed in the area in which offenders are 
acquainted through their routine activities, target displacement is most likely within this area. 
If some targets have taken prevention measures, offenders are expected to turn to alternative 
targets in this awareness space. This alternative target may be a neighbor of the original 
target, but other targets within the offender’s awareness space (for instance, in another part of 
the city) may be eligible as well. This means that the prevention behavior of targets located 
relatively far away may be important for understanding differential burglary risk. However, 
Miethe (1991) assumed that if offenders displace their actions to alternative targets, they 
would tend to select direct neighbors of the original target, because this type of displacement 
involves a minimum amount of additional effort. The present chapter argues that this 
assumption may be too restrictive, since the selection of other targets within the awareness 
space may yield more benefits and involve fewer costs. Therefore, Miethe’s (1991) finding 
that there is little indication of target displacement to direct neighbors or adjacent areas offers 
insufficient support for an absence of target displacement. Furthermore, given the theoretical 
assumptions and empirical findings available, it is unlikely that offenders would respond to 
burglary prevention measures by broadening the area in which they operate beyond their 
awareness space, since this shift involves search costs and a higher (perceived) chance of 
getting caught, while the size of the benefits would remain uncertain (Wright & Decker, 
1994).  
Target displacement is thus assumed to occur most frequently within the offender’s 
awareness space. The better other targets within this space have protected themselves against 
burglary, the less attractive they are to offenders, and the more likely it is that offenders will 
turn to alternative, more suitable targets. Assuming that, for most people, the awareness space 
is located primarily within their city of residence, the target displacement hypothesis reads: 
the more prevention measures taken by other targets within one’s city of residence, the higher 
the risk of burglary victimization (adjusting for the household’s own number of prevention 
measures taken). To test this hypothesis, prevention levels of neighborhoods were examined 
apart from city prevention levels. This way, it was possible to ascertain whether indications of 
target displacement point to burglar movement within the city, or rather, if the prevention 
behavior of fellow neighborhood members is more relevant for understanding the spatial 
displacement of burglary. 
In addition, this chapter explores whether the effectiveness of prevention measures 
taken by a household depends on characteristics of the surrounding environment. For 
example, according to Miethe and McDowall’s (1993) Seattle victimization survey data, 
prevention measures are not effective in preventing burglary in disorganized neighborhoods. 
They argued that adverse neighborhood conditions may be so overwhelming that individual 
prevention behavior no longer serves as a discriminating factor for target selection. 
Furthermore, Miethe and Meier (1994) found that prevention measures decrease burglary risk 
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most in neighborhoods in which others have protected themselves well. Possibly, individual 
prevention behavior becomes more important in conditions where target displacement is most 
likely. To build on these findings, this chapter examines whether the effectiveness of 
prevention measures depends on characteristics of the neighborhood and city of residence, 
such as residential mobility and high average levels of prevention. 
 Finally, it may be that situational prevention results in unintended positive effects, or, 
following Clarke (1995), a ‘diffusion of benefits’. Several evaluation studies of situational 
prevention have documented that reductions of risk are not reserved to secured objects, but 
also extend to objects in close proximity that are not protected (Clarke 1995; Eck 1997; 
Felson & Clarke 1998; Miethe 1991). For instance, Poyner (1997) found that car-related 
crime declined at all parking lots at the University of Surrey (United Kingdom) after 
surveillance cameras were installed, despite the fact that these cameras covered only a 
selection of the parking lots. In such cases, situational prevention constitutes a collective 
facility, with benefits to all objects nearby. Objects without these measures themselves but 
which benefit from prevention measures elsewhere have been labeled ‘free-riders’ (Miethe 
1991). Felson and Clarke (1998) argued that this phenomenon may take place if offenders are 
unsure of the physical range of prevention. This results in the outcome that all targets within 
the area are left undisturbed. 
 The prediction derived from this viewpoint is contrary to the target displacement 
hypothesis. Instead of increasing victimization risk, other targets’ prevention efforts would 
reduce the chance of victimization (Marvell & Moody 1998). Despite this contrast, both 
approaches do not rule each other out, if displacement and free-rider effects are assumed to 
occur at different levels of the spatial structure. Presumably, free-rider effects of burglary 
prevention may occur within a small unit, such as a flat or housing block. However, because 
the data available offer no detail at this level of analysis, it is impossible to test the free-rider 
assumption. On the other hand, an offender is unlikely to avoid a complete neighborhood or 
city because of its general level of prevention. Therefore, at higher levels of analysis (such as 
the neighborhood or city), prevention is assumed to lead to target displacement. 
 
 
5.3 DATA AND METHODS 
 
5.3.1 Data 
This study used data on victimization, prevention activities and other target characteristics 
from the Dutch Police Population Monitor (PPM) 1999. The PPM is a large-scale 
victimization survey conducted in the Netherlands’ 25 police regions. For each region, data 
were gathered for at least 1,000 respondents and often for considerably more. Since the 
current study deals not only with the effects of individual prevention on victimization, but 
also with the effects of the prevention behavior of others within the same neighborhood and 
city, it is important to assess these two factors reliably. Since the level of prevention cannot be 
estimated adequately from one observation within such a unit, respondents were selected who 
reside in neighborhoods that contain at least five respondents. Although this criterion is an 
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arbitrary one, analyses based on data selections chosen using different criteria (for instance, 
10, 20 or 50 respondents per neighborhood) yielded similar results. To illustrate this point, 
Appendix D shows the findings of analyses based on a selection of respondents that belonged 
to a neighborhood in which at least 20 respondents were present.  
For 90% of the neighborhoods in the current selection, the number of observations at 
the city level was at least twice that at the neighborhood level. From the original number of 
77,539 respondents in the 1999 version of the PPM, 69,819 remained after this selection was 
made. These respondents resided in 2,137 neighborhoods, 60% of the total number of areas 
for which data on prevention was available. Four-digit zip codes were used to define 
neighborhoods, since this is the only small-scale spatial identifier in the data that allows 
matching with census data. The neighborhoods selected for the current analyses had an 
average of some 6,400 residents. The neighborhoods are distributed across 514 municipalities, 
constituting 96% of the total number in the Netherlands. For approximately 60% of these 
cities, estimations of the mean number of prevention measures were based on data of all 
neighborhoods within city boundaries. On average, data were available for 91% of the 
constituent neighborhoods. 
 
5.3.2 Operationalizations 
Respondents were asked whether they had been the victim of a burglary during the past 
twelve months. Separate questions were asked for completed and attempted burglaries, which 
allowed for a separate modeling of prevention effects for these two types of burglary. It was 
assumed that the target’s preventive efforts had stronger effects for completed burglaries than 
for attempts. Although prevention measures have a deterrent effect as well (which would lead 
to a smaller chance of both attempted and completed burglaries), they are primarily aimed at 
restricting the opportunities for illegal entrance to a house. As an exception, leaving lights on 
while nobody is at home is not a target-hardening measure, but rather one of general 
deterrence. Therefore, its effects were expected to be equally strong for completed and 
attempted burglaries. Table 5.1 describes the variables used in this research. The table shows 
that 2.4% of all respondents reported a completed burglary, while 4.3% experienced an 
attempted burglary. Furthermore, for violence, car-related theft, car vandalism and other 
vandalism, respondents were asked whether they had been the victim of these crimes during 
the past year. Since this chapter is also concerned with offence displacement from burglary to 
another type of crime, only those incidents were selected that were reported by the victim to 
have taken place within the neighborhood of residence. 
At the individual level, several control variables were included. Thus, by adjusting for 
compositional heterogeneity, contextual hypotheses on victimization were tested more 
adequately. First of all, several household and respondent characteristics associated with 
victimization were included in the explanatory models: gender, age, household composition 
and ethnicity. The measure for household composition indicates whether the respondent was 
single (1) or not (0). A dummy variable on ethnicity indicates if the respondent was of non-
Western origin, with respondents coming from Suriname, the Antilles, Turkey and Morocco 
Chapter 5 
 100 
(the main immigrant groups in the Netherlands) being coded as 1 and the others as 0.2 The 
respondents’ educational level provides an indication of their attractiveness as targets, with 
higher educational levels pointing towards greater attractiveness, due to their likely 
possession of more luxury goods. This variable consists of seven categories: primary, lower 
vocational, lower general, intermediate vocational, intermediate/higher general, vocational 
college and university. Additional indicators of target attractiveness were whether the 
household lives in a detached house (1 = yes, 0 = no) and whether the household owns the 
house in which it resides (1 = yes, 0 = no). Furthermore, respondents’ routine daily activities 
were measured with two variables that indicate exposure to offenders and personal 
guardianship over domestic property (Miethe et al. 1987). First, respondents were asked 
whether they perform a paid job (1) or not (0). Also, respondents were asked how many hours 
on average the house is left unoccupied each week. The six possible answers ranged from ‘0 
to 1 hour’ (1) to ‘more than 40 hours’ (6). No answer to this question was provided by 2,722 
respondents (3.9%). These respondents were assigned the mean value in order to prevent 
sample loss. By using a dummy variable that indicates whether the respondent had a missing 
value on this variable, it was possible to explore whether this group deviated in its relation to 
victimization from the assigned missing value. Furthermore, to adjust for criminal 
opportunities provided by the presence of cars, respondents were asked how many cars the 
household possessed. 
 For four types of burglary prevention measures, respondents were asked whether they 
had undertaken them (1) or not (0). These are burglar alarm, extra locks/bolts on doors or 
windows, leave lights on while nobody is at home and lighting on the house exterior. From 
this, the number of prevention measures taken by the household was derived. In order to rule 
out the possibility that some measures were taken after a burglary had taken place, only those 
prevention measures were included that were present prior to a reported burglary (Miethe 
1991). On average, households took 2.3 prevention measures against burglary (Table 5.1). 
Looking at each prevention measure separately, it appears that extra locks, leaving lights on, 
and exterior lighting were the actions undertaken most frequently. More than 70% of all 
respondents answered that they had taken these measures in order to prevent burglary. A 
burglar alarm was less common, being present in 9% of the households. 
 Neighborhood data were matched to the individual-level data. Following Shaw and 
McKay’s (1942) social disorganization theory, victimization was assumed to be partly 
dependent on social conditions within the target’s living environment. Crime was expected to 
be more prevalent in neighborhoods with a social composition that hampers the realization of 
collective social control. Previous research has demonstrated that this is the case, especially in 
neighborhoods with high levels of socioeconomic disadvantage, residential mobility and 
ethnic heterogeneity (Bellair 1997; Sampson et al. 1997). The findings in Chapter 4 also 
corroborated these hypotheses. 
                                                          
2 There may be non-Western minorities among ethnic groups in the category ‘elsewhere in the world’, but these 
cannot be distinguished from other Western ethnic groups. 
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Table 5.1 Description of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 Mean SD Min. Max. 
Individual (N=69,819)     
Victim completed burglary       .024   .154   0  1 
Victim attempted burglary       .043   .203   0  1 
Victim car-related theft in neighborhood       .040   .189   0  1 
Victim violence in neighborhood       .024   .154   0  1 
Victim car vandalism in neighborhood       .128   .334   0  1 
Victim other vandalism in neighborhood       .065   .247   0  1 
Male       .442   .497   0  1 
Age 45.85 16.65 15 98 
Alone       .199   .399   0  1 
Ethnic minority       .021   .144   0  1 
Educational level    4.086 1.750   1  7 
Working for paid labor       .584   .493   0  1 
Frequency nobody at home    3.852 1.511   1  6 
Missing value frequency nobody at home       .039   .194   0  1 
Home owner       .641   .480   0  1 
Detached house       .152   .359   0  1 
Number of cars   1.14   .717   0  7 
Number of burglary prevention measures     2.294   .954   0  4 
Prevention: burglar alarm       .086   .281   0  1 
Prevention: extra locks/bolts       .733   .442   0  1 
Prevention: leave lights on       .764   .425   0  1 
Prevention: exterior lighting       .710   .454   0  1 
Neighborhood (N=2,137)     
Socioeconomic disadvantage     -.025    .972    -6.36        3.77 
Residential mobility     4.099 2.397         .820      44.96 
Percentage non-Western immigrants     6.658 9.095 0 82 
Percentage youngsters (aged 15-24)  11.86 2.962 5 40 
Mean number of prevention measures taken by 
households 
    2.329    .349      .50        3.67 
City (N=514)     
Number of inhabitants (natural log)      9.857    .846     6.91      13.50 
Mean income (* 1000 Dutch guilders) 32.84 2.714 27.8     47.2 
Mean number of prevention measures taken by 
households 
   2.400    .224     1.26        3.14 
 
Neighborhood socioeconomic disadvantage was operationalized by constructing an index that 
includes mean income per income recipient, the percentage of residents with a low income3 
and the percentage of residents between ages 15 and 64 living on public benefit. In this index 
of disadvantage, the variables were weighted in proportion to their factor loadings 
(respectively, –0.85, 0.95 and 0.81). The level of ethnic heterogeneity was indicated by the 
percentage of non-Western ethnic minorities.4 The percentage of youngsters aged 15 to 24 
was included to control for the proximity of potential offenders. The indicators for 
socioeconomic neighborhood disadvantage, ethnic heterogeneity and percentage of 
youngsters were taken from census data (Kerncijfers Viercijferige Postcodegebieden 1999) 
provided by the Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Residential mobility was calculated as the 
ratio of residential moves into the neighborhood (inflow) to the total number of neighborhood 
                                                          
3 Below the 40% line of the national income distribution. 
4 This concerns Turkey and countries in Africa, Latin America or Asia, with the exception of Japan and 
Indonesia (with this last country, the Netherlands had colonial relations in the past). 
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inhabitants. This measure was based on information provided by the Dutch postal service 
(PTT). Furthermore, to estimate the level of prevention within neighborhoods, the mean 
number of prevention measures taken per household was calculated by aggregating individual 
responses from the Police Population Monitor. 
 At the city level, three predictors were included in the analyses: mean income per 
income recipient, total number of inhabitants (subjected to natural log transformation to 
induce normality of distribution)5 and mean number of prevention measures taken per 
household. The first two indicators were taken from the Statistical File on Dutch 
Municipalities from the CBS,6 and the third indicator was calculated by aggregating the 
individual responses on prevention activities from the Police Population Monitor. The 
distribution of prevention measures differs across cities, as it does across neighborhoods. The 
lowest level of prevention was found in Vlieland (an island in the north of the Netherlands), 
with 1.26 prevention measures on average per household. The highest prevention level was 
found in Loosdrecht, a small, affluent town near Amsterdam, which averaged 3.14 prevention 
measures per household. 
 
5.3.3 Methods 
Because the data used here had a nested structure (individuals within neighborhoods within 
cities), hierarchical modeling techniques were used to account for the correlation of 
measurement errors between the different levels (Snijders & Bosker 1999). Since the 
dependent variables in this research are dichotomous (victim/not victim), use of logistic 
models was appropriate. At the individual level, the distribution of measurement error was 
assumed to be binomial and therefore was fixed to the value of 1. In analyses that allow for 
extra-binomial error, the individual error term did not diverge substantially from this value. 
By using hierarchical modeling techniques, the individual and collective effects of prevention 
measures were disentangled, which allowed for better interpretation of macro-level results 
compared to analyses of aggregated data. 
 To explore whether the reliability of parameter estimates is negatively affected by 
strong correlation between predictor variables, it is important to examine the potential for 
multicollinearity (Land et al. 1990). Low values for variance inflation factor (VIF) scores 
(below 4) and condition indices (below 12) indicate no serious multicollinearity problems 
(Belsley et al. 1980). 
 
 
5.4 RESULTS 
 
Table 5.2 displays the results of the hierarchical models with which burglary victimization 
was predicted as a function of individual, neighborhood and city characteristics. Separate 
                                                          
5 The current selection of Dutch municipalities had an average population of 30,000. 
6 See http:\\statline.cbs.nl. 
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analyses were conducted for completed burglary and attempted burglary. For both types, four 
models with different specifications were estimated. As neighborhood and city levels of 
prevention measures (taken by households) were quite strongly correlated (r = 0.64, see 
Appendix E), the effects of these aggregated prevention predictors were first estimated 
separately. Model 1 deals with the effect of neighborhood levels of prevention on burglary 
victimization, while model 2 deals with the effects of city levels of prevention. Model 3 
includes both predictors. This enables us to compare the results between models with different 
specifications and examine whether the outcomes on the effects of aggregated prevention are 
similar. Finally, model 4 distinguishes between types of prevention measures taken. This 
enables us to examine the effectiveness of specific prevention strategies. 
 All models display an inverse relation between the number of prevention measures 
taken by the household and burglary victimization. The results in model 1 indicate that, 
controlling for the other predictors in the model, the chance of becoming the victim of a 
completed burglary for a household that has taken no prevention measures is 4.8%, while it is 
2.2% for a household that has taken one precautionary action and 0.2% for a household that 
has taken all four prevention measures (on which questions were asked in the survey). 
Furthermore, from models 1 and 2 it appears that neighborhood and city levels of prevention 
are positively related to both completed and attempted burglary. In model 3, which includes 
the effects of prevention at both levels (and individual-level prevention as well), city levels of 
prevention are still positively related to burglary, while neighborhood levels of prevention are 
not. This corroborates the hypothesis on target displacement that suggests that burglars tend to 
displace their actions within the area they are acquainted with through their routine activities. 
The assumption is that much of this area lies within the offender’s city of residence. Thus, the 
positive effect of neighborhood levels of prevention on burglary may be an outcome of the 
fact that well-protected neighborhoods tend to be located within well-protected cities. 
Figure 5.1 displays a graphic plot of the way in which the risk of a completed burglary 
is dependent upon household prevention behavior and the mean level of prevention of 
residents of the same city. The predicted risk in this plot is calculated from the results of 
model 2 in Table 5.2. The figure clearly shows that burglary risk is lower, the more 
prevention measures a household has taken, yet higher the more prevention measures are 
taken by households within the same city. For example, households that have taken two 
prevention measures and live in a well-protected city have a predicted risk equal to a 
household that has taken one prevention measure but lives in a poorly protected city. 
Furthermore, for this broad selection of Dutch cities, the average amount of prevention 
measures against burglary taken by households is 2.40. In a city with this average level of 
prevention, a household that increases its number of prevention measures from two to three 
reduces its predicted victimization risk of a completed burglary from 1.06% to 0.50%, 
provided that the other households in the same city do not change their prevention behavior as 
well. However, if 25% of the households also decide to take an additional measure against 
burglary (which increases the average level of prevention by households to 2.65), the 
predicted risk of a completed burglary then amounts to 0.59%. Again, this shows that the 
chance of becoming the victim of a burglary depends not only on personal prevention 
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behavior, but also on the prevention behavior of other households within the same city. 
Therefore, although every household benefits from taking prevention measures against 
burglary, there is a downside to the collective effect of these measures. No matter what other 
households do, individual households benefit from taking precautions against burglary. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of this pay-off structure is sub-optimal at the city level (where 
there are many well-protected households), because the potential for target displacement is 
large within such a context. Nevertheless, the overall result of the installment of additional 
prevention measures across a city’s population is one of considerable burglary reduction. 
 
Figure 5.1 Predicted Chance of a Completed Burglary, by Number of Prevention of 
  Prevention Measures Taken by Household and within the City of  
  Residence 
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The results in model 4 indicate that different types of preventive actions vary in their 
effectiveness in reducing burglary risk. Furthermore, prevention measures are more effective 
in reducing the chance of a completed burglary, rather than preventing attempted burglary. At 
the individual level, installing locks or bolts on doors/windows is the most effective action to 
prevent burglary, completed as well as attempts. To illustrate, the predicted chance of a 
completed burglary for a household that has installed locks is 1.1%, while it is 4.4% for a 
household that has not done so, according to the coefficients of model 4. For attempted 
burglaries, these risks are 3.1% and 7.3%, respectively. Installing lighting on the house’s 
exterior is also effective in reducing burglary risk, yet the effect is smaller than that of the 
installation of extra locks. Predicted risks of completed and attempted burglary for households 
that have taken this measure are 2.4% and 4.7%, respectively. Leaving lights on while nobody 
is at home prevents both types of burglaries, but is relatively more effective against completed 
burglaries. Furthermore, installing a burglar alarm is positively related to attempted burglary, 
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but inversely related to completed burglaries. Possibly, this is due to a selection effect, since 
this measure is likely to be taken mainly by the most attractive targets. At the city level, target 
displacement seems to take place mainly as more households possess burglar alarms, 
considering the positive relation of this measure with both completed and attempted 
burglaries. Also, both types of burglary become more prominent with higher city-wide 
implementation of extra locks and bolts. Completed burglary also becomes more likely as 
more households within the city leave lights on. 
As mentioned in section 5.2.2 of this chapter, burglary prevention measures may be 
more effective in some types of spatial contexts than in others. To test whether the data 
supports this assumption, the effects of prevention measures were allowed to vary across 
contexts in the multilevel model. Also, interaction effects between the number of prevention 
measures and neighborhood and city characteristics were specified and included in the 
explanatory model. Table 5.3 summarizes the results of these analyses, showing the 
coefficients for the random slopes and the interaction effects. The coefficients for the main 
effects of these terms (see Table 5.2) did not change substantially. According to the random 
slopes, the effect of prevention measures varies only across neighborhoods and only for 
attempted burglary. For this type of crime, the effectiveness of prevention measures seems 
somewhat less in neighborhoods with high proportions of youngsters. Possibly, if these 
groups are responsible for some of the burglaries, they may be less experienced than older 
burglars and try to commit burglaries with less regard for the prevention measures taken by 
the target. For completed burglary, results for the interaction terms suggest that prevention 
measures are most effective in cities with high general levels of prevention. Indeed, this 
finding supports the assumption that prevention is even more important to reduce the risk of 
burglary in a context that induces target displacement. 
 
Table 5.3 Random Slopes (Varying between Neighborhoods/Cities) and Interaction 
  Effects for Number of Prevention Measures on Burglary Victimization 
  
COMPLETED 
BURGLARY 
 
ATTEMPTED 
BURGLARY 
Random slope # prevention measures   
city level  .02  .02 
neighborhood level  .02      .05** 
 
Interaction terms 
  
#prevention measures*socioeconomic disadvantage -.00 -.02 
#prevention measures*% non-western immigrants -.00  .00 
#prevention measures*residential mobility  .02  .38 
#prevention measures*% youngsters  .01    .02* 
#prevention measures*city size (ln)  .01 -.04 
#prevention measures*mean number of prevention 
measures in city 
 -.33* 
 
-.17 
* p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed) 
 
With respect to the other determinants of completed and attempted burglaries, similarities as 
well as differences were found. Both types of burglary occur more often among the higher 
educated, in detached houses, in neighborhoods with many youngsters, in cities with high 
Unintended Consequences of Burglary Prevention 
 107 
average income and in cities with larger populations. Only for completed burglary is the risk 
higher for people with paid jobs, home owners and inhabitants of neighborhoods with high 
levels of socioeconomic disadvantage and residential mobility. Conversely, only for 
attempted burglary is the risk lower with increasing age, for single-person households and for 
ethnic minorities, while the chance is higher for households often absent from home and for 
inhabitants of neighborhoods with high levels of ethnic heterogeneity. 
 
Table 5.4 Multilevel Logistic Regression Coefficients of Victimization of Car- 
  Related Theft, Violence, Car Vandalism, Other Vandalism and Total 
  Victimization (Including Burglary) on Prevention Measures Taken by 
  Household (and Other Characteristics, Not Shown) 
 CAR-
RELATED 
THEFT 
 
VIOLENCE 
 
CAR 
VANDALISM 
 
OTHER 
VANDALISM 
TOTAL 
VICTIM-
IZATION 
 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
 
Individual 
          
Number of 
prevention measures 
-.01 - -.01 - .07** - .08** - -.08** - 
Burglar alarm -   .15* -  .17 
 
-   .02 -   .24** -   .11** 
Extra locks/grills 
 
- -.03 - -.03 -   .18** -   .13** - -.16** 
Leave lights on 
 
-  .02 -  .00 -   .17** -   .07 -   .05** 
Exterior lighting 
 
- -.09 - -.06 -  -.09** -  -.04 - -.18** 
* p<.05, ** p<.01 
 
Finally, several other types of victimization were examined to see whether they are 
positively related to burglary prevention measures. If that is the case then offence 
displacement may have occurred, with offenders switching to alternative delinquent activities 
in response to the target’s precautionary actions against burglary. Table 5.4 presents the 
results of these analyses. These are logistic regression coefficients controlled for the 
individual and contextual (not related to prevention) predictors from Table 5.2. For each 
dependent variable, two analyses were conducted. Model 1 shows the relation between the 
number of prevention measures taken by a household and victimization of a certain offence. 
In model 2, this relation is specified by the type of prevention measure taken. From the results 
of model 1 (Table 5.4), we can conclude that car-related theft victimization is not more likely 
among households that have protected themselves well against burglary. This finding offers 
no support for a possible displacement towards other theft offences. As expected, violent 
victimization is unrelated to the number of prevention measures taken against burglary. 
However, contrary to expectations, the risk of becoming the victim of vandalism, both car-
related and otherwise, is positively related to the number of burglary prevention measures 
taken. As far as this points towards offence displacement, some burglars are possibly 
primarily driven by thrill-seeking and find a suitable substitute in damaging private property. 
Also, some instances of vandalism might have accompanied (attempted) burglaries. From the 
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next-to-last column in Table 5.4, we can conclude that the overall risk of victimization 
(vandalism, violence and theft, including burglary) is lower the more prevention measures are 
taken by a household, despite the indications of crime displacement that were found. 
The models 2 for the various types of crime (Table 5.4) indicate a higher risk for car-
related theft, other vandalism and overall victimization among households that have installed 
burglar alarms. For other vandalism and overall victimization, risk is also higher for 
households that leave lights on while nobody is at home. Extra locks and bolts on doors and 
windows is associated with higher risk of car vandalism and other vandalism, but also with 
lower overall risk. Finally, lighting on the house’s exterior is related to lower risk of both car 
vandalism and overall victimization. 
 
 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In research on the effectiveness of burglary prevention measures, attention should be paid not 
only to the intended consequences (preventing burglary at a specific place), but also to 
unintended consequences, such as target and offence displacement. So far, few studies have 
dealt with this topic (Allatt 1984; Lindsay & McGillis 1988; Miethe 1991), although for 
crimes other than burglary, more research has been done on displacement subsequent to 
situational prevention. The overall conclusion from reviews of these evaluation studies is that 
crime displacement is seldom complete and it usually occurs only to a limited extent (Clarke 
1995; Eck 1997; Felson & Clarke 1998; Hesseling 1994). 
 This chapter used data from a large-scale Dutch victimization survey to estimate the 
effects of prevention measures taken by other households on individual burglary risk. In 
contrast to previous, small-scale evaluation studies, this study showed comparatively clearer 
indications of target displacement. The chance of becoming the victim of a burglary was 
higher, the more prevention measures were taken by households in the same city. This finding 
suggests that offenders focus their attention on alternative targets within the city, but not 
necessarily on the ones in close proximity to the original target. Indeed, the crime-inducing 
effects of neighborhood-level prevention on burglary, which would point towards target 
displacement within the neighborhood of the original target, were weaker than the effects at 
the city level. According to environmental criminologists (Brantingham & Brantingham 
1993), it is plausible that offenders commit crimes within the area they are acquainted with 
through their routine activities (home, work/school, leisure).  
This chapter hypothesized that most of this area lies within the offender’s city of 
residence and, thus, target displacement is most likely to occur within the city. Therefore, the 
prevention activities undertaken by households within this area are relevant for understanding 
target displacement: the more prevention measures undertaken by households within the city, 
the greater the potential for target displacement and, therefore, the larger a household’s risk of 
being the victim of a burglary. In addition, this chapter’s findings suggest that within a large-
scale context of high prevention levels, the effectiveness of taking additional prevention 
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measures is largest. Thus, within such a context, every household is at higher risk, but 
especially those that have taken few precautionary measures. 
 In light of these findings, research on target displacement should focus not on a small 
scale, but rather stretch out to a wider area, such as a city. Offenders may be able to displace 
their delinquent actions relatively easy to other places within a town or city, if these areas are 
also a part of their awareness space. It is possible that previous research has seldom 
documented target displacement because too much attention has gone out to targets and 
neighborhoods adjacent to the original target, while offenders may also select targets in 
entirely different places. This idea needs more empirical testing, not only for burglary but also 
for other types of crime and situational prevention efforts (e.g., the effects of camera 
surveillance on street violence). 
 Furthermore, households that are well protected against burglary were found not to be 
at higher risk for car-related theft and violent victimization in the neighborhood. Offence 
displacement was expected to be most likely to occur towards car-related theft, since it shares 
the aim of material reward with burglary offences. In this respect, future research might look 
into whether households that are well protected against burglary run higher risk of still other 
types of theft (e.g., pick-pocketing), because they have guarded themselves less well against 
these offences and remain attractive targets due to their ownership of luxury goods. 
Furthermore, victimization of vandalism is more likely to occur among households that have 
taken many precautionary actions to prevent burglary. This finding might reflect offence 
displacement. However, caution is warranted in drawing conclusions on this matter, because 
these data provide no conclusive evidence that offenders have shifted their delinquent 
activities to other types of crime. An alternative option is that well-protected households run 
higher risks anyway because they are the most attractive targets for vandalism, and that 
vandalism is committed by non-burglar offenders. Therefore, offender-oriented research may 
reveal the extent to which burglars are willing and able to change their type of delinquent 
activities in response to situational prevention. More generally, this line of questioning builds 
upon previous research on whether offenders tend to be generalists or specialists (Clarke 
1995; Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990).  
 Finally, another interesting path for future research includes the examination of 
additional unintended consequences of situational prevention. An example of a negative 
consequence is an increase in the seriousness of crimes committed, for example, offenders 
turning to violent modi operandi, committing more damage or stealing goods with more value 
than would have been the case with less prevention measures.7 Therefore, studies assessing 
the effectiveness of burglary prevention should not focus solely on incidence control, but on 
general damage control as well. Does the overall material damage suffered from burglary 
decrease with increasing levels of prevention? Or, does an increase in the seriousness of 
burglaries prevent this? Furthermore, empirical criminological research has paid little 
attention to unintended positive consequences of situational prevention. In this respect, an 
interesting example is the free-rider effects of situational prevention (Miethe 1991; Poyner 
                                                          
7 Clarke (1995: 120), for example, mentions the example of coin machines in the New York subway. These 
machines were made bullet proof, which incited offenders to resort to gasoline-fueled attacks on these machines. 
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1997), in which risk reduction stretches out beyond the protected object to objects in close 
proximity. In such cases, the preventive effect is larger than anticipated. Therefore, future 
research on the conditions under which this phenomenon occurs would be very relevant for 
policy making. 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This book deals with the distribution of criminal victimization across social groups and spatial 
areas. Why do certain kinds of people run higher risk of victimization than others? Why do 
spatial units, such as neighborhoods, cities and countries, differ in their rates of victimization? 
The present study shows that, to answer these two questions, characteristics of individual 
crime targets are important, as well as properties of the surrounding spatial context. Thus, an 
individual’s risk of becoming the victim of a crime is not only determined by personal 
characteristics, but may also depend on the type of neighborhood, city and even the country 
where the individual lives. Little, however, is known about which type of social context 
determines individual risk. Closely related to this research problem is the question of why 
spatial units – neighborhoods, cities and countries – vary in their victimization rates. Are 
these differences the consequence of differing social contexts? Or, are crime outcomes at 
these levels the product of the types of individuals that live within these units?  
An example of an explanation that emphasizes the impact of social context on crime is 
one that highlights the amount of collective social control exercised by community members. 
Such examples have been labeled contextual explanations of crime. On the other hand, an 
explanation that emphasizes the distribution of individual-level mechanisms, is one that 
focuses on the age distribution within neighborhoods, with high rates of victimization 
expected for neighborhoods populated by many youngsters, who run higher risks than the 
elderly. Such examples, which focus on the distribution of lower-level components within 
spatial units, have been labeled compositional explanations of crime.  
To disentangle contextual and compositional effects in shaping victimization 
differences between neighborhoods, cities and countries, this study used insights derived from 
strain/anomie theory (Merton 1957), social disorganization theory (Shaw & McKay 1942) and 
routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson 1979). Each of these theories highlights a separate 
aspect of a crime’s basic elements: strain/anomie theory concentrates on the importance of a 
motivated offender; routine activity theory emphasizes the characteristics of a suitable target; 
while social disorganization theory focuses on the absence of local guardians. 
In short, strain/anomie theory argues that crime rates are higher the more uneven the 
distribution of material resources is across a society. Under such circumstances, the poor are 
most likely to suffer from relative deprivation, and they will be more motivated to try to alter 
their disadvantaged position by committing theft or to express their frustration through violent 
crime. Because the country level is assumed to be a likely frame of reference on which people 
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base the evaluation of their material position, strain/anomie theory seems most suited to 
explain cross-national differences in crime. Thus, the larger the national levels of material 
inequality, the higher a country’s rate of victimization is expected to be, due to the resulting 
larger supplies of motivated offenders.  
Social disorganization theory aims to explain crime differences between 
neighborhoods. Its main argument is that local crime rates will be higher, the more the 
neighborhood context restricts collective social control by community members. For instance, 
within a neighborhood, high levels of socioeconomic disadvantage, residential mobility and 
ethnic heterogeneity hamper the collective ability to conduct informal surveillance (Sampson 
et al. 1997; Sampson & Groves 1989). Thus, since these conditions lead to a lack of local 
guardians, they are accompanied by higher rates of victimization.  
According to routine activity theory, the risk of becoming the victim of a crime is a 
function of individual (or household) characteristics. Assuming that offenders avoid risk and 
effort when committing crimes, yet also try to optimize profits within these constraints, 
routine activity theory argues that those targets that best satisfy these conditions are the most 
suitable ones for offenders. Therefore, offenders are most likely to select targets that are 
readily accessible, are associated with a low risk of being caught and, simultaneously, offer 
access to a high reward (Cornish & Clarke 1986). In addition, spatial units (neighborhoods, 
cities, countries) that are composed of many suitable targets, are expected to have higher rates 
of victimization. 
The present study subjected hypotheses on victimization at the individual, 
neighborhood, city and country levels to empirical tests within a multilevel design. It thus 
offers three types of improvement compared to previous research. Firstly, it assessed whether 
social contexts larger than neighborhoods have an independent impact on victimization and, 
also, why this is the case. Using a cross-national sample, this was done by relating country-
level strain-inducing circumstances to individual victimization, while adjusting for 
compositional (individual and regional) differences. Also, using a national Dutch sample, this 
research tested whether control- and opportunity-related city features have independent effects 
on victimization, adjusting for compositional (individual and neighborhood) differences. In 
many previous studies, hypotheses were not tested at the level at which the theory’s 
mechanism is specified, for instance individual-level hypotheses were tested with city-level 
data. Other studies that did test hypotheses at the appropriate level restricted the impact of 
social context on victimization to neighborhood circumstances and did not examine the 
impact of the larger environment. 
Secondly, this study examined the extent to which compositional differences shape 
macro-level crime outcomes. For neighborhoods, this was also done in previous multilevel 
crime studies (e.g., Rountree et al. 1994; Wittebrood 2000). However, for crime differences 
between cities and countries, the compositional explanation for varying crime rates, provided 
by routine activity theory and social disorganization theory, had not been tested with data at 
the appropriate levels of explanation. Therefore, employment of this procedure represents an 
improvement in the research field. 
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Furthermore, apart from the theoretical and empirical research possibilities offered by 
the use of a multilevel framework, this study presents a third type of improvement by its use 
of a broad analytical lens to examine the social and spatial distribution of victimization. More 
specifically, it tested hypotheses on victimization (1) across several types of spatial units (i.e., 
neighborhoods, cities and countries), (2) using a large number of observations for each of 
these units and (3) for a number of types of crime (homicide, non-lethal violence, burglary, 
personal theft, car-related theft, car vandalism and other vandalism). This enabled us to verify 
general hypotheses across crimes or rather, if appropriate, to test the specificity of hypotheses 
to certain crimes. 
In order to address these issues empirically, victimization survey data were used. This 
type of data is less selective than offender-oriented data with respect to the criminal incidents 
they cover, since it also includes incidents unknown and unsolved by the police (unlike arrest 
data). Moreover, survey respondents are more likely to give honest answers on criminal 
victimization. This is often not the case with self-reports on offending. The victimization 
survey data used in this research offer information on the characteristics of crime targets, as 
well as spatial details on the neighborhoods, cities and countries that are associated with 
victimization risk. Therefore, the hypotheses of routine activity theory and social 
disorganization theory on the importance of target suitability and the absence of local 
guardians through neighborhood disorganization could be tested in a straightforward manner. 
However, victimization survey data do not allow for direct inferences on the behavior of 
individual offenders, since they do not offer information on this. This research therefore used 
theoretical assumptions to model the behavior of offenders; and hypotheses were empirically 
tested to verify the validity of these assumptions. Since strain/anomie theory is engaged with 
the induction of offender motivation, hypotheses derived from this theory were therefore 
tested indirectly in this research. To be more specific, the unequal distribution of material 
resources across a society was argued to increase the supply of motivated offenders, which in 
turn affects the likelihood of victimization. 
This concluding chapter summarizes the results of this study by answering its two 
central questions: (1) Which types of social context determine individual victimization risk, 
and why do they do so? (2) Why do spatial units differ in their rates of victimization? The rest 
of this chapter is divided into two parts.  
Section 6.2 reviews the empirical findings of this research. Section 6.2.1 discusses the 
findings of Chapters 2 and 3, which dealt with explanations for cross-national crime 
differences. Chapter 2 offered a description of country-level victimization rates for homicide, 
various types of theft, non-lethal violence and car vandalism. Also, associations were 
examined between national victimization rates and country levels of strain-inducing 
circumstances, social disorganization and criminal opportunities. Chapter 3 used individual-
level data to ascertain the extent to which cross-national differences in victimization rates 
were the outcome of varying social context and composition. Section 6.2.2 summarizes the 
results of Chapters 4 and 5, which focused on victimization patterns within a single country, 
the Netherlands. Chapter 4 concentrated on the impact of socioeconomic neighborhood 
dynamics, and on the extent to which city-level control-related features independently affect 
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victimization. Chapter 5 examined whether the effects of preventive actions taken by other 
crime targets suggested target displacement, by increasing other households’ risk of burglary 
victimization. Section 6.2.3 recapitulates the main empirical findings of the study as a whole. 
Subsequently, the second part of this chapter, section 6.3, discusses implications of the 
present research. First, the theories used in this research are reviewed for their tenability to 
account for victimization patterns (section 6.3.1). Then the data and methods used are 
reviewed and several suggestions are provided on how improvements can be made in this 
direction (section 6.3.2). The third section recommends interesting avenues for future studies 
in this research field. The chapter then concludes with some implications for crime-control 
policy based on the empirical results found in this book (section 6.3.4). 
 
 
6.2 SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
6.2.1 Cross-National Differences in Victimization 
 
Chapter 2 
Official crime rates have traditionally been used in research on cross-national crime 
differences. However, for most crime types, the comparability of these rates across countries 
has been problematic. In different countries, victims have varying propensities of reporting 
the crimes they experienced to the police (Goudriaan et al. 2003; Van Kesteren et al. 2000). In 
consequence, many criminal incidents are not included in official crime data. Furthermore, 
official crime data suffer from definitional inconsistencies across countries (Neapolitan 1997). 
Therefore, various types of measurement problems limit the usefulness of official crime 
registrations for assessing the distribution of crime across countries. A notable exception to 
this rule is homicide data. The fundamental nature of this crime makes it less sensitive to 
problems associated with differences in crime definitions and reporting selectivity. National 
rates of homicide are therefore universally considered to be the most reliable data source for 
cross-national studies of crime (Neapolitan 1997).  
Since 1989, the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) has offered new 
comparative possibilities for cross-national crime research. The ICVS survey data for 
representative samples of national populations offer two main advantages compared to 
official crime data. Firstly, through identical questionnaires the ICVS uses standard 
victimization definitions across countries. Secondly, it includes incidents not reported to the 
police. Therefore, the ICVS data mitigate the two main sources of unequal measurement error 
across nations that are present in cross-national police data. 
 Considering that previous cross-national crime research based on official data was 
either based on a single type of crime (homicide) or on multiple types of crime but with data 
of questionable comparative quality (all other crimes), several basic issues had yet to be 
satisfactorily addressed. Chapter 2 made an attempt to overcome these comparative problems 
by combining World Health Organization (WHO) mortality statistics on homicide with ICVS 
data on theft, assault and vandalism for 27 Eastern European and Western countries. With 
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these data, Chapter 2 first of all, explored whether homicide rates are distributed across 
countries in a similar fashion to crime rates for other offence types. This was done in order to 
find out whether homicide rates are representative for rates of other crimes as well. Second, 
using comparable data for all offence types under examination, the chapter assessed relations 
with indicators derived from the various theoretical traditions (strain/anomie theory, social 
disorganization theory, routine activity theory). Third, with this theoretical framework, it 
compared relations between rates of self-reported victimization and predictors of crime (e.g., 
income inequality) with the same relations obtained for rates of police-reported victimization. 
This way, it explored whether multivariate results are distorted by differences in the extent to 
which victims in different countries report crimes to the police. Therefore Chapter 2 
addressed three research questions: 
- How do national homicide rates relate to victimization rates for other crimes? 
- To what extent are cross-national differences in victimization related to varying 
country levels of strain-inducing circumstances, social disorganization and criminal 
opportunities, and do these relations vary across crimes? 
- Are the structural correlates of victimization rates different for self-reported and 
police-reported victimization, and if so, why? 
 
related to various types of theft as well as non-lethal violence. This suggests that the position 
of homicide in country victimization patterns is not atypical, compared to the other crime 
types studied here. Overall, it seems that high levels of victimization within nations co-occur 
for different types of crime (mainly in Eastern European countries and the United States, 
Australia and New Zealand), with the exception of car damage, which has high rates in a 
distinct group of countries (e.g., Malta and the Netherlands).  
 Furthermore, the multivariate results suggest that several structural factors have a 
crime-inducing impact. First, hypotheses derived from strain/anomie theory and social 
disorganization theory are corroborated across crime types. For non-lethal violence, theft and 
car damage, victimization rates are higher among countries with high levels of income 
inequality. These findings support strain/anomie theory, because this theory predicts that 
structural constraints on access to material resources leads to more criminal activity, since the 
disadvantaged try to obtain these resources illegally and they may express frustration about 
blocked material opportunities. Furthermore, rates of theft and violent victimization are 
positively related to national divorce rates. Because a high rate of divorce indicates a 
diminished collective ability to supervise youngsters within communities, this result possibly 
suggests that high rates of victimization are a country-level consequence of a large number of 
areas with ineffective surveillance.  
 Second, GDP per capita is found to be negatively related to both theft and homicide. 
This result does not support claims by Miethe et al. (1987) and Bennett (1991a) that the 
prediction of violence is beyond the realm of an opportunity-oriented theory. Rather, it is in 
line with Kick and LaFree’s (1985) hypothesis that societal development is associated with a 
declining number of homicide opportunities. According to this line of reasoning, the process 
The findings of Chapter 2 show, first of all that national rates of homicide are positively 
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of economic development within a country goes hand in hand with labor and educational 
requirements as well as an increased potential for geographic mobility, which decrease 
interpersonal contacts among intimates. Thus, since the people who are most likely to be 
involved with each other in homicides (family members, friends) interact less frequently, the 
opportunity for this crime is reduced. However, the inverse relation between GDP per capita 
and theft contradicts the routine activity hypothesis, which states that theft takes place most 
frequently in countries with relatively many attractive targets. Alternatively, according to this 
study’s results, low GDP per capita may be indicative of high levels of absolute deprivation, 
rather than a small number of attractive targets, as was suggested by Krahn et al. (1986). 
Chapter 2 also explored whether the results of these analyses are different for country 
rates of victimization incidents that were reported to the police. In previous cross-national 
crime research, official crime data were used, which are based on such police reports. 
Therefore, it is relevant to assess whether cross-national differences in the reporting of crimes 
to the police lead to biased multivariate results, compared to results derived from rates of self-
reported victimization (which also include incidents not reported to the police). The additional 
analyses on rates of police-reported victimization show that many relations between 
victimization rates and national crime-inducing circumstances turn to non-significance (e.g., 
the relation between the various types of theft and GDP per capita). In fact, this suggests that 
victims in non-Western countries are less likely to report the crimes they experienced to the 
police than victims in more developed countries, rather than that theft rates are equal across 
countries at varying stages of development. Ultimately, the use of police-reported 
victimization rates therefore seems to result in misguided findings. These results also support 
the present study’s claim that victimization data on self-reported incidents (i.e., including 
ones not reported to the police) are to be preferred to assess the impact of social context on 
the types of crime examined here, such as burglary, non-lethal violence and vandalism of 
private property. 
 
Chapter 3 
While Chapter 2 used aggregated victimization data, Chapter 3 built upon the country-level 
results found in Chapter 2 by using individual-level data from the ICVS on victimization of 
theft, non-lethal violence and car vandalism. The aims in this chapter were twofold. Firstly, 
country-level hypotheses derived from strain/anomie theory, social disorganization theory and 
routine activity theory were tested within a multilevel design. This procedure takes into 
account that countries differ in their distributions of opportunity- and disorganization-related 
target and area characteristics. This allows for an examination of whether the adjustment for 
compositional heterogeneity changes country-level results on victimization. For instance, 
does an association between income inequality and victimization indicate that the country’s 
material context stimulates the activity of offenders? Or, is this result spurious, because 
countries with high income inequality systematically consist of more people prone to 
victimization, due to their characteristics as a target? Furthermore, since the analyses were 
performed at the individual level as well, they also examined whether country characteristics 
independently determine individual victimization risk (Lynch 1993). 
Conclusions and Discussion 
 117 
 Secondly, compositional explanations of cross-national crime differences, derived 
from social disorganization theory and routine activity theory, were tested by treating social 
disorganization and criminal opportunities as individual- and regional-level phenomena. 
Therefore, the analyses performed in Chapter 3 enabled an examination of the way in which 
the differential distribution of these phenomena across countries is related to macro-level 
crime outcomes. As such, the hypotheses from these theories on cross-national crime 
differences were tested more appropriately compared to previous country-level research. 
Furthermore, this chapter distinguished whether the victimization incident occurred in the 
target’s neighborhood or elsewhere. This was done because some risk factors are not expected 
to operate in a general manner, but rather, only in specific settings (such as community 
cohesion, which decreases risk solely within the target’s neighborhood).  
 Chapter 3 thus addressed two research questions: 
- To what extent are crime-inducing circumstances at the country level related to 
victimization, after compositional heterogeneity is adjusted for? 
- To what extent do compositional differences between countries with respect to social 
disorganization and suitable targets explain cross-national differences in 
victimization? 
 
The country-level results in Chapter 3 yield significant positive effects of income inequality 
on victimization of theft, non-lethal violence and car vandalism. Again, these findings are in 
accordance with Merton’s (1957) and Blau and Blau’s (1982) versions of strain/anomie 
theory, which assume that offenders will be most motivated to commit crimes within a 
context of unequal distribution of material resources. Although in Chapter 2 of this book as 
well as in previous cross-national studies, positive associations between income inequality 
and crime were also reported (Gartner 1990; Krahn et al. 1986; Neapolitan 1998), the 
country-level results in Chapter 3 are simultaneously adjusted for compositional heterogeneity 
between countries through a multilevel design, and are therefore more conclusive. In addition, 
the results in this chapter provide strong support that, in order to understand the supply size of 
motivated offenders, material inequalities need to be taken into account across a national 
scale, rather than a subnational (regional) scale. Indeed, national levels of income inequality 
consistently predict victimization risk across multiple types of crime, whereas regional levels 
of educational inequality do not. 
 Two additional country-level results were found as well. First, divorce rates are 
positively related to three of the nine victimization types considered here, though controlling 
for compositional differences reduces the strength of this relation for one of them (burglary). 
This offers only limited support for the assumption that national divorce rates reflect 
community-level compositional differences in social disorganization. Alternatively, for 
violence in the neighborhood, the positive association with divorce rates may suggest a higher 
potential for conflict between former spouses. Second, GDP per capita is inversely related to 
theft and violence, yet controlling for individual and regional characteristics reduces the 
magnitude of this association in several instances. To some extent, this country-level indicator 
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therefore seems to reflect compositional differences with respect to target suitability and 
social disorganization. 
With respect to characteristics of individual targets, the most consistent relation across 
the crime types considered was found for age. Youngsters run higher victimization risk 
compared to older people. This finding is consistent with many previous studies and supports 
Hindelang et al.’s (1978) ‘principle of homogamy’. That principle suggests that social 
categories resembling offender populations are the most likely to interact with offenders and 
thus be victimized. For specific crimes, other individual target characteristics are found to be 
related to victimization as well. For instance, men and more generally people who are 
engaged in many non-domestic activities, run higher risk of violent victimization outside the 
neighborhood. Non-domestic activity is also associated with higher risk of theft and 
vandalism within the neighborhood, probably due to lower levels of personal guardianship 
over property. Target attractiveness, in terms of income and educational level, is associated 
with a higher risk of theft victimization, but sometimes these indicators are also related to 
vandalism risk, which suggests that affluent targets are also attractive to offenders of 
vandalism. Community cohesion, which is measured at the individual level in this chapter, 
consistently reduces victimization risk within the neighborhood across the different types of 
crime. City size (also measured at the individual level) is positively related to most types of 
victimization, inside and outside the neighborhood. Victimization of car-related crime (theft, 
vandalism) is more likely the more cars are owned by a household. These individual-level 
findings are in line with results of previous studies on victimization (e.g., Hindelang et al. 
1978; Lee 2000; Wittebrood & Nieuwbeerta 2000). 
 Furthermore, both national context and composition were found to be important in 
shaping country-level victimization rates. Although the impact of country context (and 
especially, income inequality) is larger in most instances, for six of the nine types of 
victimization, cross-national differences drop by one-third or more after compositional 
heterogeneity is taken into account. More specifically, with respect to composition, it appears 
that systematic cross-national differences in the extent to which people live close to 
disorganized areas partly explains variations between countries in rates of victimization. 
Higher rates are especially found in countries that consist of relatively more urban residents, 
and in some cases, where countries consist of many regions with low average social cohesion. 
Furthermore, though related to victimization at the individual level, non-domestic activities 
such as working at a paid job and going out for recreation do not receive empirical support as 
compositional explanatory factors for cross-national differences. This contradicts Cohen and 
Felson’s (1979) prediction that a country will have higher crime rates, the more the routine 
activities of its population offer criminal opportunities by spending less time at home. On the 
other hand, their hypothesis that crime rates will increase as households own more removable 
luxury goods (which increases their attractiveness as crime targets), was corroborated for car-
related theft and vandalism. Victimization rates for these offences were higher, the more cars 
were owned by households. 
 Finally, the analyses explored conditional effects by specifying interaction effects 
between the supply of motivated offenders (national income inequality) and the dimensions of 
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lack of local guardians and target suitability (e.g., lack of neighborhood cohesion and 
exposure to offenders by engaging in non-domestic activities). The results provide scarce 
support for the conjecture that the combination of these risk factors produces additional 
crime-inducing effects. Possibly, the presence of spatial heterogeneity within large areas, such 
as countries, decreases the chance that these factors occur at the same time and place. As 
suggested by Smith et al. (2000), finding significant interaction results on the interrelatedness 
between crime-inducing structural factors may be most likely with the use of small spatial 
units. 
 
6.2.2 Victimization Differences between Neighborhoods and Cities 
Chapters 4 and 5 provided a more detailed look at the distribution of victimization across 
neighborhoods and municipalities within one country. For this purpose, Dutch victimization 
survey data were used from the Police Population Monitor 1999. The general aim of this 
country-specific perspective was twofold: (1) to expand on the social disorganization 
approach by identifying additional neighborhood conditions that increase the likelihood of 
victimization and (2) to expand on previous neighborhood-oriented research by exploring 
whether control- and opportunity-related conditions that are present outside the neighborhood 
(i.e., at the city level) independently affect victimization. 
 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 focused on the impact of neighborhood socioeconomic dynamics on victimization. 
Traditionally, social disorganization theory predicts that disadvantaged neighborhoods 
experience more crime, because their inhabitants have few resources with which to organize 
the area for the collective good (see, e.g., Sampson et al. 1997). Thus, a common-sense 
argument would be that crime may be reduced by increasing neighborhood status through 
improving local housing and stimulating the inflow of more affluent households. On the other 
hand, alternative interpretations of the social processes responsible for neighborhood 
improvement suggest that they may stimulate local crime rather than reduce it (Covington & 
Taylor 1989; Taylor & Covington 1988). Previous research on social disorganization found 
neighborhoods with high levels of social instability and heterogeneity to be disorganized and 
therefore its residents were more likely to become crime victims (Bellair 1997; Sampson et al. 
1997). Similar circumstances may be present in neighborhoods experiencing intensive 
improvement of their socioeconomic status, since they are confronted with the strong inflow 
of new (affluent) residents as well as the simultaneous presence of low-income and high-
income households. 
 Chapter 4 also included an examination of whether victimization is related to city-
level conditions that indicate the spatial proximity of social disorganization and formal 
control exercised by police officials. By doing so, it examined how the varying controls that 
are present in social contexts overarching neighborhoods (city) or external to them (other 
neighborhoods) affect victimization. This builds upon the suggestion by Bursik and Grasmick 
(1993) that neighborhood order cannot be understood solely in terms of the internal capacity 
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for organization, but that it is also dependent on the availability of external resources for 
social control. The research questions in Chapter 4 were two: 
- To what extent is the socioeconomic improvement of neighborhoods related to 
victimization, and to what extent are conditions of social instability and heterogeneity 
responsible for this relation? 
- To what extent do control-related conditions that are external to neighborhoods 
predict victimization, in addition to neighborhood-level conditions of social 
disorganization? 
 
The findings in Chapter 4 show that the chance of becoming the victim of a crime is not only 
higher in disadvantaged neighborhoods, but also in neighborhoods that experienced strong 
socioeconomic improvement over the four-year period between 1994 and 1998. The finding 
on the relation between disadvantage and crime is consistent with many previous studies (e.g., 
Sampson et al. 1997; Wittebrood 2000). The finding on improving neighborhoods sheds new 
light on the way in which a neighborhood’s socioeconomic structure affects local crime. 
Improving neighborhoods are usually not among the most disadvantaged, yet they do attract 
relatively much crime. These findings are verified for five different types of victimization: 
burglary, car-related theft, violence, car vandalism and other vandalism. It appears that the 
strong inflow of new (affluent) residents, which occurs more often in improving 
neighborhoods compared to stable and declining ones, is one of the main causes of high 
victimization risk in these neighborhoods. This is in line with one of the central assumptions 
of social disorganization theory, which holds that residential instability decreases the potential 
for collective social control, because there are few social contacts between inhabitants of 
unstable neighborhoods.  
Social heterogeneity between community members was also expected to increase 
neighborhood disorganization and, ultimately, local crime. Nevertheless, income 
heterogeneity within neighborhoods was not found to be related to victimization, and 
therefore, it does not affect the relation between neighborhood socioeconomic dynamics and 
victimization. In addition, some interaction results suggest that attractive targets are especially 
at risk in neighborhoods where socioeconomic improvements are taking place. This may be 
because targets in such neighborhoods live in close proximity to potential offenders, as many 
low-income households are still resident in the neighborhood. Also, affluent households may 
be faced with feelings of resentment from longer time inhabitants. These residents may hold 
new, high-income residents responsible for the rapid social changes happening around them 
and for the exit of former residents with whom social contacts were maintained. 
Apart from socioeconomic composition and residential instability, other neighborhood 
circumstances are related to victimization as well. High risks were also found for inhabitants 
of neighborhoods with relatively high proportions of youngsters and non-Western 
immigrants. The first effect points toward the crime-inducing impact of offender proximity 
(as young people are disproportionately represented among offender populations), while the 
latter effect may be the outcome of social disorganization caused by ethnic heterogeneity. 
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Finally, the results in Chapter 4 show that victimization in one’s own neighborhood is 
not only dependent upon individual and neighborhood characteristics, but also upon the city’s 
social context. Individuals living in cities with a large population, high average income and 
low levels of public social control (exercised by police officials), run higher risk of becoming 
the victim of a crime, after the effects of individual and neighborhood characteristics are 
accounted for. These findings expand on social disorganization theory, which has primarily 
focused on the internal characteristics of neighborhoods to explain crime. The observed city-
level effects support the assumption that social contexts beyond and external to 
neighborhoods are relevant for understanding local variations in rates of victimization (Bursik 
& Grasmick 1993).  
 
Chapter 5 
Finally, Chapter 5 tested hypotheses from routine activity theory by focusing on the relation 
between target-hardening prevention measures and burglary. More specifically, while 
addressing the deterrent effect of prevention measures taken by a household, it also examined 
whether the precautionary measures taken by other households led to externalities in a process 
of target displacement. Empirical studies on this issue have found little evidence for spatial 
displacement of burglars (Hesseling 1994; Miethe 1991; Allatt 1984), but these studies mostly 
concentrated on alternative targets in close proximity to the original target (e.g., neighbors).  
This chapter examined possible externalities of prevention behavior on a larger scale 
(i.e., in the city of residence). Assuming that burglary offenders displace their actions within 
the area they are acquainted with through their daily activities, they are likely to choose 
alternative targets within the city, though not necessarily nearby the original target. Hence, the 
prevention behavior of potential targets throughout a city may be relevant for the prediction of 
individual households’ burglary risk. Offence displacement was also examined, by looking at 
the relation between burglary prevention measures and victimization of crime types other than 
burglary. Well-protected targets might possibly suffer higher risk of other crimes if offenders 
decide to shift to alternative delinquent activities against which targets have protected 
themselves less well.  
The research questions of Chapter 5 were therefore as follows: 
- To what extent does individual burglary risk depend upon the preventive actions taken 
by other targets within the same city (adjusting for the number of prevention measures 
taken by the target itself)? 
- To what extent are burglary prevention measures associated with higher victimization 
risk for crimes other than burglary? 
 
At the household level, the findings from Chapter 5 show that prevention measures 
substantially reduce burglary risk. Installment of extra locks or bolts on doors and windows is 
especially effective. However, for both completed offences and attempts, the chance of 
becoming victim of a burglary is higher, the more prevention measures are taken by other 
households in the same city. This finding indicates that offenders focus their attention on 
alternative targets within the city, but not necessarily on ones in close proximity to the 
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original target. Indeed, the crime-inducing effects of neighborhood-level prevention on 
burglary – which would point towards target displacement within the neighborhood of the 
original target – are weaker than the effects of prevention at the city level. According to 
environmental criminologists (Brantingham & Brantingham 1993), it is plausible that 
offenders commit their crimes within the area they are acquainted with through routine 
activities (home, work/school, leisure). This chapter hypothesized that most of this area lies 
within the city, and therefore, target displacement is most likely to occur within the same city. 
For this reason, prevention measures taken by households within this area are relevant for 
understanding target displacement: the more prevention activities have been taken by other 
households within the same city, the greater the potential for target displacement and, 
therefore, the larger a household’s risk of being the victim of a burglary. In addition, 
interaction results suggest that the effectiveness of taking additional prevention measures is 
largest within a large-scale context of high prevention levels. Thus, within such a context, 
every household suffers from the adverse effects of target displacement, but especially those 
that have taken few precautionary measures. 
 Offence displacement was expected to be most likely toward car-related theft, since 
this offence shares the aim of material reward with burglary offences. However, households 
that are well protected against burglary were found not to be at higher risk for car-related theft 
or for violent victimization in the neighborhood. Yet, victimization of vandalism is more 
common among households that took many precautionary actions to prevent burglary. 
Possibly, this finding reflects the occurrence of offence displacement. However, caution is 
warranted in drawing conclusions on this matter, because these data do not provide conclusive 
support of offenders having shifted their delinquent activities to other types of crime. An 
alternative option is that well-protected households run higher risks anyway, because they are 
the most attractive targets for vandalism, but that other offenders (non-burglars) are 
responsible for this. Offender-oriented research might reveal the extent to which burglars are 
willing and able to change their type of delinquent activities in response to situational 
prevention. 
 
6.2.3 Recapitulation of the Main Findings 
This study dealt with two main questions: (1) Which types of social context determine 
individual victimization risk, and why do they do so? (2) Why do spatial units differ in their 
amounts of victimization? Given the findings summarized above, what are the answers to 
these two questions? Starting with the first one, apart from individual target characteristics 
(such as age and daily activities), victimization risk is also determined by neighborhood, city 
and country characteristics. Social circumstances associated with neighborhood 
disorganization, such as lack of community cohesion, neighborhood socioeconomic 
disadvantage, residential mobility, ethnic heterogeneity and rapid socioeconomic 
improvement, increase the risk of victimization of theft, violence and vandalism (Chapters 3, 
4 and 5). City-level circumstances also independently affect risk. Indeed, the occurrence of 
most types of victimization are found to increase, the larger the city’s population (Chapters 3, 
4 and 5). Furthermore, the risk of theft victimization is higher, the higher the city’s average 
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income and the less public social control is exercised by police (Chapter 4). Also, high city-
wide levels of burglary prevention measures taken by households are associated with higher 
burglary risk, adjusting for individual-level and neighborhood-level prevention behavior 
(Chapter 5). Country characteristics are the third type of contextual forces that affect 
individual victimization. Adjusting for compositional heterogeneity between countries, 
national levels of income inequality are positively related to victimization of theft, violence 
and vandalism (Chapter 3). 
Reviewing these results, it is fair to say that social contexts larger than neighborhoods 
are important in and of themselves for understanding differentiation in victimization risk. This 
conclusion is a substantial addition to the research field, which has concentrated on the impact 
of individual characteristics on crime, and the extent to which the internal organization of 
neighborhoods offers protection against offenders (Bursik & Grasmick 1993). City-level 
circumstances may reflect the availability of local government resources to deter crime (e.g., 
the level of public social control exercised by police). Also, city characteristics may be 
indicative of the spatial proximity of socially disorganized neighborhoods (e.g., the city’s 
population size) or the potential for target displacement (e.g., the mean number of burglary 
prevention measures taken by city inhabitants). At the country level, the amount of income 
inequality is taken to reflect the degree to which less-affluent inhabitants suffer from relative 
deprivation, and ultimately, the size of the supply of motivated offenders. 
With respect to the second main question, why do spatial units, such as 
neighborhoods, cities and countries, differ in their amounts of victimization?, the answer 
resembles the one given for the first question on individual victimization risk: social context 
as well as the composition of lower level units within this context determine macro-level 
crime outcomes. Again, target characteristics as well as neighborhood, city and country 
characteristics are important for understanding why neighborhoods, cities and countries vary 
in their victimization rates. 
To offer more detail on this general conclusion, differences in the distribution of 
individual target characteristics partly explain why neighborhoods, cities and countries have 
varying victimization rates. For Dutch neighborhoods and cities, this compositional 
explanation was especially supported for violent victimization, with initial crime differences 
being reduced by more than a quarter after adjusting for individual characteristics (Chapter 4). 
Thus, neighborhood rates of violent victimization are higher, the more these neighborhoods 
consist of suitable targets. Furthermore, for all crime types considered in this research, 
victimization rates for cities can largely be understood as a consequence of the types of 
neighborhoods they are composed of (Chapter 4). Support for the compositional explanation 
was also found for cross-national differences in victimization: differences in car ownership 
explain much of the varying victimization rates between countries for car-related crime. Also, 
country victimization rates for most types of crime are higher, the more the country is 
composed of large-city residents (Chapter 3). Yet, it should be noted that although urbanism 
was measured at the individual level, this result probably reflects compositional differences 
with respect to the types of cities within countries.  
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Furthermore, contextual mechanisms appear to be even more important than 
compositional differences in explaining macro-level crime outcomes (Chapters 3 and 4). 
Whereas neighborhood victimization rates can be explained to a substantial degree as a 
consequence of neighborhood context (e.g., residential mobility), the same can be concluded 
for city victimization rates and city context (e.g., city size), as well as country victimization 
rates and country context (e.g., income inequality). 
 
 
6.3 DISCUSSION 
 
6.3.1 Theoretical Assessment  
This book put forth three general theories for the explanation of victimization patterns: 
strain/anomie theory, social disorganization theory and routine activity theory. This section 
evaluates the issues on which improvements have been made for each of these theories with 
respect to theoretical formulation and hypothesis testing. 
 To start with, strain/anomie theory was used to explain country-level crime 
differences, with its assumption that national levels of income inequality determine the supply 
of motivated offenders. This theory received ample empirical support: income inequality was 
indeed shown to have positive effects on victimization of theft, violence and car vandalism. 
This was the case both for national victimization rates (Chapter 2) as well as for individual 
victimization risk (Chapter 3). Empirical tests of hypotheses derived from strain/anomie 
theory were improved in several ways. First, unlike previous country-level research (e.g., 
Messner 1989; Neapolitan 1998), by employing multilevel models the association between 
income inequality and crime was adjusted for compositional differences within countries with 
respect to the number of suitable targets and degree of social disorganization (Chapter 3). 
Therefore, these multilevel tests were more conclusive than the tests conducted in previous 
research, which relied solely on country-level data. Second, strain/anomie theory was 
supported regardless of whether self-reported rates of victimization were used or police-
reported rates (Chapter 2). This suggests that results on the relation between income 
inequality and crime are robust, despite the presence of varying selectivity between countries 
in the reporting of crimes to the police. Third, strain/anomie theory was tested and supported 
for multiple types of crime, instead of only homicide, as was the case in many previous 
studies (Chapters 2 and 3). Fourth, country-level inequality was found to be positively related 
to victimization, with tests that simultaneously control for subnational levels of inequality 
(Chapter 3). The measure for regional-level inequality did not yield significant results, which 
supports the assumption that the national level is the likely frame of reference on which 
people base the evaluation of their material position. On this matter, Messner and Tardiff 
(1986) argued that national mass media may be an important means whereby people compare 
themselves with others. Mass media may also provide tools for people to develop shared 
norms on valued goals (i.e., material success). In sum, the results of this research show that 
strain/anomie theory is suitable for explaining cross-national crime differences, but not for 
explaining crime variance within countries. 
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 Some limitations of the empirical tests of strain/anomie theory need to be mentioned 
as well. The first is that its hypotheses were tested with the use of cross-sectional data. In 
future studies, the use of longitudinal cross-national data would provide an additional way in 
which strain/anomie theory could be evaluated, by examining whether changes in inequality 
are followed by expected changes in victimization rates. This would allow for an even more 
rigorous causal interpretation of the relationship. Furthermore, the association between 
income inequality and crime was tested for a relatively modest number of nations (mostly 
Western or Eastern European), due to the restricted availability of individual-level data on 
victimization across a broader range of crimes. Therefore, similar analyses should be 
conducted in the future for a wider range of countries in order to validate the present findings. 
Finally, since victimization data were used, no direct inferences could be drawn on individual 
offender behavior. In consequence, it was possible to test the country-level assumptions of 
strain/anomie theory (i.e., that national inequality stimulates the supply of motivated 
offenders and therefore increases victimization risk), but not the individual-level assumptions 
(i.e., the deprived are the most likely group to commit crimes under conditions of inequality). 
Offender-oriented data may offer more possibilities for testing this latter assumption. 
Social disorganization theory is designed to explain victimization risk as a 
consequence of neighborhood conditions. As such, it suggests that social disorganization is 
partly responsible for shaping neighborhood crime levels. This study made improvements 
with respect to several issues of theoretical specification and hypothesis testing. First, and 
similar to strain/anomie theory, hypotheses derived from social disorganization theory were 
tested and supported across a wide range of different crime types: theft, violence and 
vandalism. Second, apart from individual risk and neighborhood crime differences, this theory 
was also used as a compositional explanation for why larger spatial units (e.g., cities and 
countries) vary in their crime volumes, since these larger units differ in their distribution of 
disorganized neighborhoods. Empirical tests of this compositional explanation were 
performed and supported for the first time within a multilevel design. Therefore, these tests 
were more conclusive than previous city-level and country-level tests (e.g., Gartner 1990; 
Land et al. 1990; Sampson 1986). Third, following suggestions of Bursik and Grasmick 
(1993) and Morenoff et al. (2001), social disorganization theory was extended by proposing 
that levels of local crime are determined not only by neighborhood structures, but also by 
social conditions in overarching contexts. Indeed, victimization was found to be positively 
related to city-level circumstances that were suggestive of poor local police performance and 
the spatial proximity of socially disorganized neighborhoods. Fourth, new perspectives were 
derived on the relation between neighborhood socioeconomic change and social 
disorganization. Traditionally, it has been assumed that social disorganization is most likely to 
occur in disadvantaged and deteriorating neighborhoods (Kornhauser 1978; Shaw & McKay 
1942; Skogan 1990). By arguing that change directed towards improving neighborhood 
socioeconomic status is also accompanied by social disorganization, explanations were 
offered for crime differences between seemingly well-off neighborhoods. In short, inhabitants 
of gentrifying neighborhoods run high victimization risk because the process of 
socioeconomic improvement is accompanied by social instability and heterogeneity. These 
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hypotheses were corroborated for five different types of crime, using a sample of more than 
2,500 Dutch neighborhoods. 
 Routine activity theory was used to explain why some individuals run greater 
victimization risk than others, with the highest risks expected for targets who are readily 
accessible, offer a low risk of being caught, and simultaneously, give access to a high reward. 
Furthermore, as a compositional explanation, it was argued that spatial units that consist of 
many suitable targets are assumed to have higher victimization rates compared to areas with 
fewer attractive targets. Again, one of the strong points on hypothesis testing for this theory 
was that it was done for multiple types of crime. With respect to individual victimization risk, 
results support routine activity theory across different crime types. Secondly, routine activity 
theory was tested as a compositional explanation for city and country crime differences within 
a multilevel design. This was not done in previous empirical research. With some exceptions, 
little support was found for the theory’s claim that differential distribution of individual 
characteristics accounts for varying levels of crime across cities and countries. Third, using 
insights from environmental criminology on the likely places for offenders to commit crimes, 
new predictions were derived with respect to target displacement. Arguing that offenders may 
respond to burglary prevention measures by committing crimes elsewhere within their 
awareness space, it was assumed that burglars search for alternative targets within the same 
city, but not necessarily in close proximity to the original target (as previously predicted by 
routine activity theorists). The data supported this hypothesis on crime displacement, with 
high city levels of prevention leading to increased victimization risk. These findings suggest 
that under such circumstances, the potential for target displacement is high. 
 Nevertheless, two limitations should be mentioned with respect to the current tests of 
the displacement hypotheses derived from routine activity theory. First, because victimization 
data were used, the inferences on offender behavior are by necessity indirect. Offender-
oriented research may reveal more directly the extent to which burglars are willing and able to 
shift their delinquent activities in response to situational prevention. Yet, unlike victimization 
data, offender data have the serious drawback of being incomplete, because they refer to 
offenders who have been caught. This group may be a selective sample of the total burglar 
population. Second, this research used cross-sectional data to test the displacement 
hypotheses. Even more conclusive results may be found with longitudinal data on prevention 
behavior and victimization: are increases in the prevention efforts by city residents followed 
by burglary patterns that are suggestive of target displacement? 
In this section on theoretical assessment, a comment may also be made on theoretical 
integration. This study used a theoretically integrated perspective to explain victimization, by 
including assumptions on the importance of offender motivation, target suitability and the 
lack of local guardianship through social disorganization. The merits of such a perspective are 
supported by the data, since each of these three elements affects victimization outcomes, at 
the individual level as well as at aggregated levels. Future research should therefore continue 
to employ theoretical models that include insights derived from strain/anomie theory, social 
disorganization theory and routine activity theory. In addition, the predictive power of another 
type of theoretical integration was empirically evaluated in this study. By specifying 
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interaction hypotheses that include elements of the different theories, this study explored 
whether the effects of target suitability on victimization are dependent on strain-inducing 
circumstances and social disorganization. Previous efforts to empirically investigate the 
merits of hypotheses derived from theoretical integration are scarce (but see Miethe & 
McDowall 1993; Smith et al. 2000). This study found little significant interaction results, 
especially in the cross-national analyses where national indicators were part of the interaction 
terms. Small units of analyses may possibly yield more significant interaction results, because 
they suffer less from spatial heterogeneity compared to larger units. Combinations of risk 
factors in small units are therefore more likely to converge at the same place and exert 
additional crime-inducing effects (Smith et al. 2000). 
 
6.3.2 Assessment of Data and Methods 
The data on criminal victimization used in this research – the International Crime Victims 
Survey and the Dutch Police Population Monitor – include many respondents across a large 
number of different contexts; at the neighborhood level, as well as at the city and country 
level. As such, they are very suitable for this study’s purpose of simultaneously assessing the 
impact of individual and contextual traits on victimization. Though other cross-national data 
sets may offer more cases at the country level (e.g., the WHO data on homicide), they do not 
allow for a disentanglement of contextual and compositional influences, since they are 
aggregated data. Therefore, these traditional data sources have more limited potential for 
interpretative purposes, compared to individual-level ICVS data. Furthermore, the ICVS data 
offer comparable estimates for many different crime types, unlike cross-national police 
registrations on crime, which suffer from severe measurement problems due to definitional 
inconsistencies and differences in selectivity of reporting to the police (Neapolitan 1997). 
Therefore, the ICVS data offer optimal possibilities to compare victimization across countries 
and across crime types. 
For the study of neighborhood and city differences in crime, the Police Population 
Monitor offers a wider scope than other victimization data that include respondents clustered 
within small spatial units. These other surveys were often done within a single city or a few 
cities (e.g., Miethe & McDowall 1993; Vélez 2001). The Police Population Monitor is among 
the very few sources of data that allow for the specification of city-level effects on 
victimization. Again, in contrast to official crime data for cities and neighborhoods, which do 
exist for a large number of social contexts, the Police Population Monitor offers the 
opportunity to disentangle the impact of individual and contextual characteristics. 
Furthermore, multilevel models offer the most appropriate tools for statistical analysis, 
considering the hierarchical structure of the data, with individuals nested within spatial units 
(Snijders & Bosker 1999). 
 Apart from the empirical merits of the data used, future research could improve on 
several data-related issues. First, the use of neighborhood context to predict victimization 
within the neighborhood has proven fruitful, in this research as well as in previous studies 
(e.g., Sampson et al. 1997; Wittebrood 2000). However, victimization outside the 
neighborhood is also likely to be determined by the area in which an individual is located at 
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that moment in time. Since some crime incidents take place outside the neighborhood, data 
are needed on the spatial environment in which people routinely move about outside their 
own neighborhood of residence. This point was also mentioned in Chapter 3, in which 
victimization outside the neighborhood was found to occur more often among large-city 
residents, probably because their daily routines bring them into socially disorganized areas 
more regularly than small-town residents. Nevertheless, this issue needs more empirical 
specification. A possibility would be to employ multilevel models with multiple 
memberships, which include contextual properties of other environments where targets 
perform their routine activities (e.g., school, work, area they travel through when getting to 
work or school, favored places for leisure). 
 Second, empirical tests of the theories used to predict victimization would be 
improved by the simultaneous inclusion of variables on intermediary mechanisms derived 
from the different theoretical perspectives. Empirical results including such variables would 
offer even better explanatory possibilities, with respect to the predictive power of the various 
theories as well as the interpretation of relations between census indicators and crime. For 
strain/anomie theory, this requires data on relative deprivation (e.g., by gauging respondents’  
satisfaction with their current income). For social disorganization theory, variables would be 
needed on social interaction between community members, trust and willingness to intervene 
for the public good (Bellair 1997; Bursik & Grasmick 1993; Sampson et al. 1997). An 
additional, and interesting, point for data improvement would be the inclusion of 
neighborhood features of physical design, in order to explore how community cohesion and 
the built environment are intertwined. Furthermore, improving upon tests of routine activity 
theory would require the inclusion of more direct measures on the exact types of activities 
that people perform in their daily lives, as well as indicators on the possession of specific 
luxury goods (Mustaine & Tewksbury 1998). 
Third, to improve the measurement of social context properties through survey 
variables (e.g., neighborhood disorganization), ecometric techniques should be applied more 
often (Raudenbush & Sampson 1999). By simultaneously modeling the impact of item 
difficulty, individual respondent traits and random error at the separate levels distinguished 
(including the social context of interest), ecometric indicators offer improvements to the 
measurement of collective properties, with respect to quality as well as potential for 
evaluation of internal consistency. The present research included an ecometric measure on 
city-level police performance (Chapter 4), which was found to be inversely related to 
victimization of burglary and car-related theft. Due to data constraints, no other contextual 
properties could be measured in this study with the application of ecometric techniques. Other 
interesting examples of the application of ecometric measurements can be found in 
Raudenbush and Sampson (1999) and Sampson et al. (1997). 
 
6.3.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
Apart from providing empirical answers to research questions, this study also raises new 
research problems. Suggestions can be made of interesting paths for future study on three 
general issues: (1) bringing together characteristics of offenders, targets and situations; (2) 
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specifying spatial influences and spatial dependency and (3) assessing the extent to which the 
relation between crime and social context is a reciprocal one. 
 The first issue – bringing together characteristics of offenders, targets and situations – 
should be seen as an extension of the present research, which offers detail on targets and 
(neighborhood-level) situations, yet no detail on the offenders involved. More specific 
information on the criminal incident as a whole offers opportunities for examining offender 
decision making as an outcome of the interplay between offender characteristics, situational 
cues and the criminal opportunities at hand provided by the available targets. The empirical 
question to be addressed is therefore: which combinations of offenders, targets and situations 
are most likely to result in crime? In this direction, interesting studies on violence have been 
done by Miethe and Drass (1999) for the United States and by Beke et al. (2002) for the 
Netherlands. 
Bringing more detail to criminal incidents may help our understanding of how 
offender characteristics (motivation, skills, planning) interact with situational contingencies. 
For instance, chronic delinquents may react differently to certain situations than novice 
offenders. Furthermore, more knowledge is needed on the places where offenders decide to 
commit crimes. According to environmental criminology (Brantingham & Brantingham 
1993), offenders are most likely to commit crimes in the areas they are acquainted with 
through routine activities. However, little empirical research has been conducted on the 
spatial behavior of offenders to test this hypothesis (but see Rengert & Wasilchick 1985; Van 
Koppen et al. 2001; Wright & Decker 1994). In addition, the motivation for offending (pursuit 
of material gain, fun, revenge, etc.) as well as the relation between victim and offender 
(strangers, acquaintances, family members) are also interesting features of crime that are 
worth specifying in future research. They may possibly improve our understanding of the way 
in which routine activities of everyday life and the social disorganization of neighborhoods 
are related to specific instances of crime. For example, it would be interesting to explore 
whether acts of vandalism committed by youngsters in their pursuit of fun occur during 
different types of daily activities (e.g., just passing by) and neighborhood conditions (e.g., 
especially in disorganized neighborhoods), compared to acts of vandalism committed by ex-
spouses in order to take revenge. As such, a further specification of the characteristics of 
offenders, victims and situations offers new possibilities for testing criminological theories 
(Miethe & Meier 1994). Several sources of data may provide detailed information on crimes, 
such as content analyses of police files (e.g., Miethe & Drass 1999), incident descriptions by 
victims in victimization surveys and interviews with delinquents on offender decision making 
(e.g., Wright & Decker 1994).  
The second issue that would prove worthwhile for future research – specifying spatial 
influences and dependency – relates to one of the main concerns of this book. Given the 
results presented here that neighborhood, city and country characteristics affect crime, it 
remains relevant to answer the question of why this is the case, and how spatial influences are 
specifically delineated. For instance, due to data constraints, the neighborhood effects found 
in this study refer to spatial influences of four-digit zip codes, which on average consist of 
several thousand people. Although the results corroborate the assumption that crime is 
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increased by structural features suggestive of social disorganization, one of the substantive 
questions remaining is whether smaller spatial units, such as street blocks, are even more 
appropriate for understanding the realization or absence of collective social control, as 
suggested by Taylor (1997). Sherman et al. (1989) and Block (2000) conducted interesting 
research in which descriptions of the spatial distribution of crime are based on small units. In 
addition, the use of more detailed place identifiers may offer better possibilities for testing 
criminological interaction hypotheses between routine activities and social disorganization, as 
has been suggested and empirically validated by Smith et al. (2000). 
 Furthermore, another way in which substantive questions on the relation between 
spatial structure and crime may be better answered, is by the use of more sophisticated 
methods of analysis that allow for the identification of spatial dependency, such as 
Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) (Anselin 1999). Such analyses shed more light on 
how local crime levels are interrelated and whether these relations persist after adjusting for 
structural crime-inducing features, which may also be spatially clustered (Baller et al. 2001). 
If they do persist, the spatial clustering of crime may suggest diffusion processes (Cohen & 
Tita 1999), in which case theoretical elaboration would be needed to account for spatial 
patterning. In this respect, social learning theory (Akers 1998), social network research (Burt 
1987) and threshold models of behavior (Granovetter 1978) may offer general insights on the 
diffusion of behavior across a population. 
The third interesting avenue for future research on crime – assessing the extent to 
which the relation between crime and social context is a reciprocal one – is based on the idea 
that crime may not only be an outcome of restrictive social circumstances, but also a cause of 
them. Local crime has been argued to be a determinant of various types of behavior, such as 
moving house, fear, lack of informal surveillance and the installment of precautionary 
measures. For instance, Morenoff and Sampson (1997) found that high neighborhood 
homicide rates and its spatial proximity led to population decreases in Chicago during the 
period 1970–90. According to Liska and Bellair (1995), robbery rates affected the racial 
composition of U.S. cities during 1950–90, with high crime rates stimulating ‘white flight’.  
Furthermore, whereas social disorganization theory has emphasized that 
neighborhood-level social control reduces crime, community decline theorists have focused 
on the reverse relationship. According to this perspective, street crime reduces informal 
surveillance through collectively shared fear, which in turn increases crime (Skogan 1986). 
Indeed, personal victimization and local disorder have been found to be related to fear of 
crime (Rountree 1998; Van Wilsem 1997). As a result of crime and fear, neighborhoods may 
get caught in a spiral of decay in which crime feeds upon crime. In an analysis of British 
neighborhoods, Markowitz et al. (2001) offered support for community decline theory with 
their finding that crime and disorder increase fear, which in turn decreases local cohesion 
among community members. On the other hand, a functionalist view on crime would suggest 
that violation of collectively shared norms may unite neighborhood residents due to collective 
outrage (Durkheim 1893). The results of Bellair’s (2000) study on crime patterns in Seattle 
neighborhoods suggest that crime has both positive and negative consequences of 
victimization risk. Robbery rates decreased the amount of informal surveillance exercised by 
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neighborhood residents, which in turn increased robbery, while on the other hand, burglary 
rates increased surveillance, which in turn reduced robbery rates. 
 Finally, another consequence of crime may extend to the self-protective efforts of 
crime targets. A market perspective on crime suggests that rational targets only engage in 
costs to install prevention measures if the risk of victimization is sufficiently large (Cook 
1986; Van Dijk 1994). On the other hand, in situations where offender activity is low, or 
where local governments expend substantial resources to deter criminals by active police 
surveillance and incapacitation, rational targets may respond by reducing their self-protection 
efforts. As a result, they become more attractive targets and criminal activity is again 
increased. 
 All three examples on the social consequences of crime present fascinating research 
problems that have not received much attention in empirical studies. Therefore, additional 
studies along these lines are needed, preferably with time-series data for neighborhoods and 
cities. To my knowledge, the consequences of crime on social context have thus far not been 
examined systematically in the Netherlands. A suitable data source to examine research 
problems of this kind is the Police Population Monitor, considering its repeated (bi-annual) 
measurements across a large number of different contexts. 
 
6.3.4 Implications of the Research Findings for Crime-Reduction Strategies 
This final section of this book formulates some recommendations on crime control based on 
the empirical results of this study. It discusses the potential for crime-reduction strategies for 
each of a crime’s necessary elements – motivated offenders, lack of local guardians and 
suitable targets. Further it provides some examples of the magnitude of intervention effects by 
offering estimates of predicted victimization risk for burglary, which are derived from the 
regression coefficients in this research. It should be emphasized that these effects should be 
interpreted with prudence, since they relate to estimates derived from the log-odds of 
victimization as a linear function of crime-inducing circumstances. In reality, these relations 
may not be perfectly linear, and they may be conditioned by the presence of other social 
conditions that were not included in this research. Furthermore, while concentrating on policy 
suggestions that stem from the present study’s empirical results, it should also be noted that 
other possibilities for crime intervention exist as well which were not a focus here, such as 
family-level intervention (e.g., parenting courses) and the deterrent and incapacitative effects 
of incarceration and fining. For a detailed overview of possible intervention strategies to 
control crime see, for instance, Sherman et al. (1997). 
 To begin, attempts to reduce the supply of motivated offenders may be a hard task. 
Assuming that this constituting element of crime rates is determined by the way income is 
distributed at the national level, little short-term change can be expected from efforts to 
reduce inequalities in material ownership. In the Netherlands, only modest change has been 
documented with respect to the national income distribution (Pommer et al. 2003), while 
Muller (1988) demonstrated that income inequality is quite a stable feature of societies in 
general. Nevertheless, according to results of the current research, small decreases in income 
inequality may yield substantial reductions in national victimization rates. For instance, the 
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predicted risk of burglary victimization in the Netherlands (which had a gini coefficient of 
32.6 in 1992) was 3.78%, after controlling for other country-level, regional-level and 
individual-level predictors (see Chapter 3). For a country with a gini coefficient one unit 
lower (31.6), this predicted risk for burglary would be 3.60%. To indicate the practical 
implications of these findings for a total population of approximately 6.9 million households 
(i.e., the population size of the Netherlands in 2002), this adds up to an expected reduction of 
approximately 12,000 burglary victims on a yearly basis (248,400 versus 260,820). Future 
cross-national studies on crime should explore the extent to which the effects of income 
inequality on crime are conditioned by welfare programs aimed at enhancing educational and 
employment opportunities for the disadvantaged. According to Savolainen (2000), income 
inequality has less crime-inducing consequences the more national governments spend on 
social welfare, because under such conditions, the poor are less likely to be severely deprived. 
 Reducing the lack of local guardianship is another way in which crime may be 
reduced. Along this line, three types of neighborhood action against crime have been 
distinguished: locality development, social planning and social action (Bursik & Grasmick 
1993). Locality development emphasizes the articulation of behavioral norms and the 
stimulation of social interaction between community members. Indeed, Chapter 3 found 
higher victimization risks for several types of crime for residents of communities with little 
social interaction among neighbors. Also, Chapters 4 and 5 found neighborhood conditions 
suggestive of social disorganization (such as residential mobility) to be related to 
victimization. In this respect, in order to realize collective social control and the prevention of 
local crime, the existence of social bonds between neighbors may be more important than the 
strength of these bonds (Bellair 1997). Furthermore, policy evaluations suggest that 
community programs have been least successful in severely disorganized areas, which are 
most in need of crime prevention.  
According to McCarthy and Zald (1987), if resources for self-organization are lacking, 
linkages should be developed with organizations outside the collectivity. Social planning by 
outside specialists may then be effective in reducing crime. Along this line of policy, Skogan 
(1990) emphasized the potential of community policing, in which favorable relations are 
developed between police officials and local residents. Indeed, in Chapter 4 of this research, 
satisfactory police performance was found to be associated with lower victimization risk for 
theft (see also Vélez 2001; Zhao et al. 2002). For a city where the local police perform 
average, the predicted risk of burglary victimization (adjusted for the other covariates in the 
model, see Table 4.3) was found to be 4.10%. In comparison, in a city where satisfaction with 
local police performance was better than in 95% of cities in the Netherlands, this predicted 
risk was 3.81%. Thus, for a city with 10,000 households the expected difference between 
having police operating average and police operating at high levels of public satisfaction is 
approximately 30 victims of burglary (381 versus 410).  
Finally, social action by redevelopment of neighborhood land use may have positive 
as well as negative consequences. As demonstrated in the current research, socioeconomic 
improvement of neighborhoods (over a four-year period) is accompanied by social instability 
and victimization of inhabitants (see also Covington & Taylor 1989; Taylor & Covington 
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1988). In consequence, victimization risks are high especially in improving neighborhoods, as 
is also the case for severely disadvantaged (both stable and declining) neighborhoods. On the 
other hand, in neighborhoods that have become affluent after a process of improvement, 
victimization risks are not very high. Yet the improvement process may be accompanied by 
the decline of other neighborhoods nearby. Therefore, more knowledge is needed on the long-
term effects of changes in neighborhood status. Do affluent households move away in 
response to local disorder? Do disadvantaged households concentrate at other places because 
the standard of living in the gentrified neighborhood becomes too high for them? Or, does the 
local population eventually stabilize? The first two options would lead to community decline 
and crime displacement, respectively, while the last option may generate a new sense of 
community among neighborhood inhabitants and lead to declining crime levels. 
 Reducing the number of suitable targets is the third strategy for crime prevention. 
Efforts aimed at blocking criminal opportunities fall under the domain of situational crime 
prevention (Clarke 1995; Eck 1997). For this type of prevention, many different courses of 
action are undertaken: target-hardening against burglary, street lighting, camera surveillance, 
limiting access to public streets and hardening public telephone coin boxes. These widely 
varying prevention efforts share the implicit notion that they do not attempt to change the 
disposition of criminals to commit crimes in general, but rather, to prevent the commission of 
a crime at a specific place. It is hard to make an overall judgement on the effectiveness of 
situational crime prevention, not only because it incorporates so many different phenomena, 
but also because scientifically sound evaluation studies are rare (Eck 1997). Nevertheless, 
situational crime prevention often seems to result in the prevention of crimes at a specific 
place. The present study found an example of this, in that burglary risk was lower the more 
prevention measures were taken by a household.  
A general concern with respect to situational crime prevention is the possibility that it 
leads to crime displacement and not to overall crime reduction. Suggestions of crime 
displacement were found in the present study as well, with high overall city levels of burglary 
prevention leading to increased burglary risk. The following example provides an indication 
of the magnitude of target displacement for completed burglary. In a Dutch city with average 
levels of burglary prevention taken by households (2.40 measures), a household that increases 
its number of prevention measures from two to three reduces its predicted victimization risk 
of a completed burglary from 1.06% to 0.50%, provided that the other households in the same 
city do not change their prevention behavior. However, if 25% of the households also decide 
to take an additional measure against burglary (which increases the average level of 
prevention by households to 2.65), the predicted risk of a completed burglary then amounts to 
0.59%. Although this decrease in expected burglary risk is less than the 0.50% achieved when  
other households did not upgrade their prevention measures, the overall result is still one of 
considerable burglary reduction. Therefore, in concordance with Hesseling’s (1994) 
conclusion based on an extensive review of evaluation studies, it should be emphasized that 
although target displacement may occur in response to situational prevention, it does not seem 
to be complete when it comes to burglaries in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, future evaluation 
studies on the effectiveness of situational crime prevention should continue to focus on the 
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host of alternative delinquent actions open to offenders, in terms of other places and crime 
types. The present study’s findings on the adverse effects of high city-wide levels of 
prevention on burglary risk suggest that burglars may respond to situational prevention by 
offending at other places in the same city, probably the ones they know by routine. This 
assumption should be tested empirically with data for other places and for other types of 
crime and prevention efforts as well (e.g., for the impact of camera surveillance on street 
robbery). Finally, apart from changes in crime incidence, future evaluation studies should also 
look at changes in crime seriousness after the installment of situational prevention. If crimes 
are not prevented, but if they do become less serious, situational prevention may have had 
positive consequences after all. On the other hand, negative consequences may also occur if 
the seriousness of crimes increases, for example, if offenders turn to violent modi operandi, 
commit more damage or steal goods with more value than would have been the case with less 
preventive measures. Therefore, a twofold focus is warranted when assessing the 
effectiveness of situational prevention: general damage control as well as incidence control. 
 Despite the presence of various strategies to reduce crime, it must be mentioned that 
certain characteristics of people and places are beyond the reach of preventive interventions, 
such as the target’s age and population size of the city of residence. For instance, with respect 
to age, the predicted risk of burglary victimization for a 30-year-old respondent was 4.56% 
(see Table 4.3), while for a 60-year-old it was 3.70%. In addition, the predicted burglary risk 
for an inhabitant of a Dutch city with a population of 10,000 was 3.59%, while for a city with 
100,000 inhabitants it was 5.92%. Being suggestive of proximity and exposure to offenders 
through routine activities and the proximity to socially disorganized areas, these examples 
suggest that criminal victimization remains partly dependent on such ‘fixed’ characteristics, 
which offer little room for change by intervention. 
 Nevertheless, the policy suggestions presented here are in line with this study’s 
finding that victimization is dependent on individual behavior as well as social context. 
Likewise, in order to prevent crime, possibilities for intervention are present at different 
levels: that of individual targets, neighborhoods, local governments and national 
governments. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Table A1 Relations between ICVS Response Rates and National Victimization Rates 
(N=21) 
  
Uncontrolled (bivariate) 
Controlled for the predictors in 
Table 2.3 (multivariate) 
Burglary -.18 -.18 
Personal theft -.33  .01 
Car-related theft -.13 -.20 
Non-lethal violence -.43  .02 
Car vandalism   -.43* -.36 
* p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
Table A2 Relations between PMP Response Rates and Regional Victimization Rates 
  (N=25) 
  
Uncontrolled (bivariate) 
Controlled for the predictors in 
Table 4.3 (multivariate) 
Burglary -.26  .00 
Car-related theft -.15  .02 
Non-lethal violence -.35  .01 
Car vandalism -.10  .01 
Other vandalism -.24 -.01 
* p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
The city-level variance in public social control indicate the differences between cities in 
perceived police functioning in an ecometric measure, given item variance within individuals 
and individual variance within cities. The item-level model on public social control for 
individual j within city k on item i is:  
  Yijk = β0jk + Σβp(Xijk) + εijk ,  
where Xijk is the item on public social control, and βp is the regression coefficient of the effect 
of this item on public social control, which indicates its ‘difficulty’: the lower βp, the less 
often respondents agree with this item. β0jk is the respondent’s latent score, controlled for the 
difficulty of the items to which valid answers were given. On the individual level, the model 
is: 
  β0jk=β0k + Σβq(Xjk) + µ0jk ,  
with β 0k being the city-specific score (which is divided into an overall average γ00 and a city-
specific residual score υk), Xjk are individual characteristics for which the model is controlled 
(as will be explained in more detail below), βq is the regression weight assigned to these 
individual-level covariates, and µ0jk is the variance between individuals within city k. By 
holding constant for various individual characteristics associated with the perception of public 
social control, the city score on public social control (υk) is not distorted by compositional 
differences between cities. 
 In the ecometric analysis of city-level public social control, thirteen individual 
characteristics are adjusted for: gender, age, marital status (being single or not), belonging to 
an ethnic minority, educational level, working for paid labor, being a home owner, living in a 
detached house, and victimization of burglary, car-related theft, violence, car vandalism, or 
other vandalism. By controlling for the effect of victimization on public social control, the 
reciprocal effect between these two characteristics is taken into account: victimization 
becomes more likely with low levels of public social control, while simultaneously, victims 
may perceive public social control to be lower than non-victims. Therefore, conservative 
estimates are offered of the effect of public social control on victimization. 
Table B1 presents the results of the ecometric analysis. Respondents agree the least 
with the third item (‘The police tries hard in this neighborhood’), while the second item (‘The 
police reacts to local problems’) leads to most agreements.  On the individual level, there are 
also differences in the propensity to perceive public social control. Males, older people and 
singles more often report the presence of public social control than females, youngsters and 
married people, while educational level and home ownership is negatively related to public 
social control. Furthermore, victims of crime (especially violence) generally perceive lower 
levels of public social control than non-victims. 
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Table B1 Multilevel Regression of Public Social Control on Items and Individual 
  Characteristics 
  
b-coefficient 
 
Intercept 
  
  2.016** 
 
Item 
 
The police offers protection around here (ref.) 
The police reacts to local problems     .162** 
The police tries hard in this neighborhood    -.276** 
The police handles matters efficiently in this neighborhood    -.261** 
 
Individual 
 
Male      .055** 
Age      .004** 
Single      .005** 
Ethnic minority  -.048 
Educational level     -.021** 
Working for paid labor -.003 
Home owner     -.020** 
Detached house   .008 
Victim burglary   .000 
Victim car-related theft      -.044** 
Victim violence     -.124** 
Victim car vandalism     -.100** 
Victim other vandalism     -.101** 
 
Variance components 
 
Between cities    .016 
Between individuals    .471 
Between items    .814 
* p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed test) 
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SAMENVATTING 
(SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTIE 
 
In deze studie staat centraal op welke manier slachtofferschap van criminaliteit is verdeeld 
over een samenleving, zowel in sociale als ruimtelijke zin. Waarom lopen sommige sociale 
groepen, zoals bijvoorbeeld jongeren, een hoger risico om slachtoffer van een misdrijf te 
worden dan anderen? En waarom zijn er verschillen tussen buurten, steden en landen in de 
mate van criminaliteit? Uit deze studie is gebleken dat bij het beantwoorden van deze twee 
vragen rekening moet worden gehouden met zowel individuele kenmerken van doelwitten 
van criminaliteit (potentiële slachtoffers) als met kenmerken van de hen omringende 
ruimtelijke omgeving. Met andere woorden, het risico op slachtofferschap wordt niet alleen 
bepaald door individuele kenmerken van doelwitten, maar ook door het type buurt, stad en 
land waarin zij wonen. Er is niettemin weinig bekend over de mate waarin de ruimtelijke 
omgeving van invloed is op slachtofferschap. Nauw verwant hieraan is de vraag waarom 
ruimtelijke eenheden – zoals buurten, steden en gemeenten – onderling verschillen in hun 
mate van criminaliteit. Komen deze verschillen voort uit de sociale omstandigheden die zich 
daar voordoen, of juist vooral uit het type doelwitten die in de omgeving wonen?  
Een verklaring die de invloed benadrukt van sociale context op criminaliteit is er 
bijvoorbeeld één die zich concentreert op de hoeveelheid collectieve sociale controle die 
wordt uitgeoefend door buurtbewoners. Dergelijke voorbeelden worden contextuele 
verklaringen van criminaliteit genoemd. Anderzijds is een voorbeeld van een verklaring die 
de nadruk legt op de ruimtelijke verdeling van individuele kenmerken, één waarin de 
leeftijdsverdeling binnen buurten centraal staat, waarbij hogere slachtoffercijfers worden 
verwacht in buurten met veel jongeren, die een hoger risico lopen dan ouderen. Zulke 
voorbeelden, met de nadruk op individuele kenmerken van doelwitten, worden 
compositionele verklaringen van criminaliteit genoemd. 
 Om contextuele en compositionele invloeden van elkaar te onderscheiden bij de 
verklaring van verschillen in slachtofferschap tussen buurten, steden en landen wordt in deze 
studie gebruik gemaakt van inzichten uit de strain/anomie-theorie (Merton 1957), de sociale 
desorganisatietheorie (Shaw & McKay 1942) en de routine activiteitentheorie (Cohen & 
Felson 1979). Elk van deze drie theorieën benadrukt een ander aspect van de basiselementen 
van een misdrijf: strain/anomie theorie richt zich op het belang van de gemotiveerde dader, de 
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routine activiteitentheorie benadrukt het element van het geschikte doelwit, terwijl de sociale 
desorganisatietheorie gericht is op de afwezigheid van lokale bescherming. 
 In de strain/anomie theorie wordt verondersteld dat criminaliteitscijfers hoger zijn, 
naarmate de materiële hulpbronnen in een samenleving ongelijker zijn verdeeld. Onder zulke 
omstandigheden lijden de minstbedeelden onder relatieve deprivatie, en neemt de kans toe dat 
zij zullen proberen hun achterstandspositie te verbeteren via diefstal, of hun frustratie 
hieromtrent te uiten door geweldsmisdrijven te plegen. Omdat wordt aangenomen dat mensen 
hun materiële positie, mede onder invloed van massamedia, vergelijken met mensen binnen 
hetzelfde land (en dus niet alleen met anderen binnen een kleinere ruimtelijke omgeving), lijkt 
strain/anomie theorie vooral geschikt om verschillen in criminaliteit tussen landen te 
verklaren. Hoe groter de inkomensverschillen binnen een land, des te hoger het verwachte 
niveau van slachtofferschap, vanwege een grote ‘aanvoer’ van gemotiveerde daders. 
 De sociale desorganisatietheorie beoogt criminaliteitsverschillen tussen buurten te 
verklaren. Het centrale idee binnen deze theorie is dat het lokale niveau van criminaliteit 
hoger zal zijn naarmate de sociale context van de buurt de realisering van collectieve sociale 
controle beperkt. Eerder onderzoek heeft bijvoorbeeld uitgewezen dat grote sociaal-
economische achterstand van een buurt, verhuismobiliteit en etnische heterogeniteit in een 
buurt remmend werken op het gezamenlijke vermogen van buurtgenoten om informele 
controle uit te oefenen (Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson & Groves 1989). Met andere woorden, 
aangezien deze omstandigheden leiden tot een gebrek aan lokale bescherming gaan zij 
gepaard met een hoog niveau van slachtofferschap. 
  Volgens de routine activiteitentheorie is het risico om slachtoffer te worden van een 
misdrijf afhankelijk van individuele (of huishoudens-)kenmerken. Onder de aanname dat 
daders – net als ieder ander individu – met hun handelingen zoveel mogelijk proberen risico 
en inspanning te vermijden en tegelijkertijd zo hoog mogelijke opbrengsten te realiseren, 
wordt verondersteld dat doelwitten die het meest aan deze criteria voldoen, het meest geschikt 
zijn voor daders. Daders zullen daarom met name doelwitten selecteren die makkelijk 
toegankelijk zijn, die gepaard gaan met een lage pakkans en die tegelijkertijd veel 
opbrengsten opleveren (Cornish & Clarke 1986). In het verlengde hiervan wordt 
verondersteld dat ruimtelijke eenheden (buurten, steden, landen) die bestaan uit veel geschikte 
doelwitten hogere slachtoffercijfers zullen hebben.  
 In dit onderzoek zijn hypothesen omtrent slachtofferschap, die uit de bovengenoemde 
drie theorieën zijn afgeleid, empirisch getoetst op individueel, buurt-, gemeente- en 
landniveau binnen een multilevel-design. Daarmee werden drie belangrijke verbeteringen 
geleverd ten opzichte van eerder onderzoek op dit terrein. In de eerste plaats is nagegaan of 
sociale contexten die het buurtniveau ontstijgen (steden, landen) een zelfstandige invloed 
uitoefenen op de individuele kans op slachtofferschap, en ook waarom dit het geval is. Aan de 
hand van internationale gegevens is nagegaan of nationale kenmerken, die relatieve deprivatie 
in de hand zouden kunnen werken, gerelateerd zijn aan de individuele kans op 
slachtofferschap. Hierbij is tegelijkertijd rekening gehouden met compositionele verschillen 
tussen landen op individueel en regioniveau (bijvoorbeeld wat betreft leeftijd). Daarnaast is 
aan de hand van Nederlandse gegevens nagegaan of gemeentelijke kenmerken die gerelateerd 
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zijn aan de mate van controle en criminele gelegenheid, een zelfstandige invloed uitoefenen 
op slachtofferschap. Ook hierbij is tegelijkertijd rekening gehouden met compositionele 
verschillen op buurt- en individueel niveau. Dit vormt de eerste verbetering ten opzichte van 
eerder onderzoek, waarin hypothesen vaak niet zijn getoetst op het niveau waarop zij zijn 
geformuleerd; bijvoorbeeld, hypothesen op het individuele niveau zijn daarin getoetst met 
gegevens op stadsniveau. Ander onderzoek waarin hypothesen wel op het juiste niveau 
werden getoetst, beperkten zich wat betreft de invloed van sociale context op slachtofferschap 
tot buurtomstandigheden, en richtten zich, in tegenstelling tot deze studie, niet ook nog eens 
op de invloed van een grotere ruimtelijke omgeving. 
Ten tweede is in deze studie nagegaan in hoeverre de ruimtelijke verdeling van 
individuele kenmerken over buurten, steden en landen – zogenaamde  compositionele 
verschillen – geaggregeerde criminaliteitscijfers bepalen. Een voorbeeld hiervan is het 
vaststellen in hoeverre landen verschillen wat betreft slachtofferschap, omdat zij in 
uiteenlopende mate zijn samengesteld uit alleenstaanden, die een hoger risico lopen. Voor 
buurten is dit al eerder gedaan aan de hand van multilevel-onderzoek (bijv., Rountree et al. 
1994; Wittebrood 2000). Daarentegen is de compositionele verklaring die wordt geleverd 
door de sociale desorganisatietheorie en de routine activiteitentheorie voor gemeenten en 
landen niet eerder getoetst aan de hand van gegevens die aansluiten bij het sociale niveau 
waarop hun verklaring is gebaseerd (resp. buurt en individu). Om die reden vormt deze stap 
een vooruitgang voor het onderzoeksveld. 
 Ten derde wordt in deze studie gebruik gemaakt van grootschalige gegevens, waarmee 
wordt geprobeerd algemene patronen op dit onderzoeksgebied te systematiseren. Dit komt tot 
uitdrukking in het feit dat hypothesen omtrent slachtofferschap worden getoetst (1) voor een 
groot aantal respondenten uit verschillende sociale categorieën, (2) voor verschillende typen 
ruimtelijke eenheden (buurten, gemeenten, landen), (3) aan de hand van een groot aantal 
waarnemingen op elk van deze aggregatieniveau’s, en (4) voor uiteenlopende vormen van 
criminaliteit (moord/doodslag, niet-dodelijk geweld, inbraak, ‘persoonlijke’ diefstal, 
autogerelateerde diefstal, autovandalisme en overig vandalisme). Dit laatste bood de 
mogelijkheid om algemene hypothesen omtrent slachtofferschap meerdere keren te toetsen, of 
juist delictspecifieke hypothesen te toetsen.  
Om hier empirisch onderzoek naar te verrichten, zijn gegevens gebruikt uit 
slachtofferenquêtes. Deze gegevens hebben als voordeel dat zij minder selectief zijn dan 
dadergeoriënteerde gegevens, omdat in slachtofferenquêtes ook misdrijven worden 
meegerekend die niet bekend zijn bij de politie, of niet door hen zijn verwerkt in een aangifte 
(in tegenstelling tot arrestatiecijfers). Verder geven respondenten in enquêtes meer 
betrouwbare antwoorden omtrent slachtofferschap dan omtrent daderschap. 
De slachtofferenquêtegegevens die in dit onderzoek zijn gebruikt bieden informatie 
omtrent kenmerken van potentiële doelwitten en ruimtelijke kenmerken van buurten, steden 
en landen die gerelateerd zijn aan criminaliteit. Op die manier zijn de hypothesen van de 
routine activiteitentheorie en de sociale desorganisatietheorie, omtrent de geschiktheid van 
doelwitten en het gebrek aan lokale bescherming, op directe wijze getoetst. Deze gegevens 
bieden echter geen mogelijkheden om het gedrag van daders rechtstreeks uit af te leiden. 
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Hieromtrent zijn daarom aannames geformuleerd, en de bijbehorende hypothesen zijn aan de 
hand van empirische gegevens getoetst. Aangezien strain/anomie-theorie gericht is op de mate 
waarin mensen gemotiveerd zijn tot daderschap, zijn de hypothesen van deze theorie dus 
indirect getoetst in dit onderzoek. Daarbij werd uitgegaan van de aanname dat de ongelijke 
verdeling van hulpbronnen in een samenleving het aantal daders bepaalt, en daarmee van 
invloed is op de kans op slachtofferschap van een misdrijf. 
 Deze samenvatting geeft de resultaten van dit onderzoek weer met antwoorden op de 
twee centrale onderzoeksvragen: (1) Welke typen sociale context zijn van invloed op de 
individuele kans op slachtofferschap van criminaliteit? (2) Waarom verschillen ruimtelijke 
eenheden in het niveau van slachtofferschap? In hoofdstuk 2 en 3 is ingegaan op 
criminaliteitsverschillen tussen landen en de invloed van landenkenmerken op individueel 
slachtofferschap. Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 waren gericht op buurt- en gemeenteverschillen in 
slachtofferschap binnen Nederland, en de invloed van buurt- en gemeentekenmerken op 
individueel slachtofferschap. 
 
 
NATIONALE VERSCHILLEN IN SLACHTOFFERSCHAP VAN CRIMINALITEIT 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 
In voorgaand landenvergelijkend criminaliteitsonderzoek zijn vaak officiële misdrijfgegevens 
gebruikt. De vergelijkbaarheid van deze cijfers tussen landen is echter problematisch, omdat 
de bereidheid van slachtoffers om een delict bij de politie te rapporteren verschilt tussen 
landen (Goudriaan et al. 2003; Van Kesteren et al. 2000). Daarnaast verschillen de definities 
van misdrijfcategorieën, bijvoorbeeld diefstal, tussen landen (Neapolitan 1997). Voor 
moordcijfers gelden deze internationale vergelijkingsproblemen echter in veel mindere mate. 
Om die reden worden moordcijfers algemeen gezien als de meest betrouwbare gegevensbron 
voor landenvergelijkend onderzoek naar criminaliteit (Neapolitan 1997). 
 Sinds 1989 vormt de International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) een alternatieve bron 
van informatie voor landenvergelijkend criminaliteitsonderzoek. De gegevens uit de ICVS 
bieden twee belangrijke voordelen ten opzichte van officiële criminaliteitsstatistieken. Ten 
eerste worden via standaard vragenlijsten in ieder land identieke definities van delicten 
gehanteerd. Ten tweede worden ook incidenten meegeteld waarvan slachtoffers aangeven dat 
zij deze niet bij de politie hebben gemeld. Met de ICVS-gegevens worden daarom de twee 
belangrijkste bronnen van ongelijke meetfouten tussen landen aanzienlijk verkleind in 
vergelijking met officiële criminaliteitsstatistieken. De beperkingen die aan deze enquête zijn 
verbonden, zoals verschillen tussen landen in de mate waarin mensen bereid waren mee te 
werken aan het onderzoek, lijken de vergelijkbaarheid van de slachtoffercijfers tussen landen 
nauwelijks nadelig te beïnvloeden. 
 In hoofdstuk 2 zijn voor 27 Westerse en Oost-Europese landen analyses uitgevoerd op 
een combinatie van moordcijfers van de World Health Organization (WHO) en ICVS-
gegevens omtrent diefstal, mishandeling en vandalisme. Uit de resultaten van deze analyses 
blijkt dat landelijke moordcijfers positief samenhangen met verschillende vormen van diefstal 
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en niet-dodelijk geweld. Hieruit blijkt dat de positie van moord in het algemene 
criminaliteitsprofiel van landen vaak niet afwijkt, maar juist in overeenstemming met de 
omvang van andere typen misdrijven. Vaak komen dus hoge criminaliteitscijfers in een land 
voor met betrekking tot verschillende typen delicten, zoals moord, inbraak en autodiefstal 
(vooral in Estland, Litouwen en de Verenigde Staten). Een uitzondering vormt het delict 
autovandalisme, dat een hoog niveau kent in een aparte groep landen (Nederland en Malta). 
 Daarnaast blijkt uit de multivariate resultaten dat verschillende landkenmerken 
samenhangen met het nationale niveau van slachtofferschap. Voor niet-dodelijk geweld, 
diefstal en autovandalisme werden hogere slachtoffercijfers gevonden naarmate de 
inkomensongelijkheid hoger is. Deze bevindingen vormen een ondersteuning voor de 
strain/anomie-theorie. Vanuit deze theorie wordt immers verondersteld dat structurele 
beperkingen op de toegang tot materiële hulpbronnen leiden tot meer criminele activiteit, 
omdat de minstbedeelden onder dergelijke omstandigheden de meeste reden hebben om te 
proberen deze hulpbronnen illegaal te verkrijgen. Verder zijn nationale gewelds- en 
diefstalcijfers positief gerelateerd aan echtscheidingscijfers. Mogelijk wijst deze bevinding 
erop dat een hoog echtscheidingscijfer leidt tot geringere sociale controle. Dit kan komen  
door de afbraak van sociale bindingen binnen families en een verminderd collectief vermogen 
tot toezicht van jongeren (Sampson & Groves 1989; Gartner 1990). 
 Verder blijkt het Bruto Nationaal Produkt (BNP) per hoofd van de bevolking negatief 
samen te hangen met nationale slachtoffercijfers voor zowel diefstal als moord. De negatieve 
relatie tussen diefstal en BNP per hoofd van de bevolking is in tegenstelling met de routine 
activiteitentheorie, die ervan uitgaat dat diefstal het meest voorkomt in landen met een groot 
aantal aantrekkelijke (welvarende) doelwitten. Het is mogelijk dat een laag BNP per hoofd 
van de bevolking in plaats daarvan duidt op een hoog niveau van absolute materiële 
deprivatie, wat mogelijk juist de aanzet geeft tot het plegen van meer diefstallen. 
 Tot slot is bekeken of de resultaten veranderen indien een selectie werd gehanteerd 
van slachtoffers die het misdrijf hadden aangegeven bij de politie. Hiermee kon worden 
nagegaan of nationale verschillen in de geneigdheid van slachtoffers om delicten aan te geven 
leidde tot een vertekening in vergelijking met algemene slachtoffercijfers (waarin ook 
degenen worden meegeteld die het delict niet hebben aangegeven). Deze aanvullende 
analyses geven aan dat verschillende relaties tussen slachtofferschap en de bovenvermelde 
landkenmerken niet langer significant zijn (bijv. het negatieve verband tussen diefstal en BNP 
per hoofd van de bevolking). Dit duidt erop dat politie-gerapporteerde slachtoffercijfers leiden 
tot vertekenende uitkomsten. Slachtoffergegevens die gebaseerd zijn op zelf-rapportage 
(inclusief de incidenten die niet aan de politie zijn doorgegeven) verdienen daarom de 
voorkeur bij het vaststellen van de invloed van sociale context op criminaliteit. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 
Daar waar in hoofdstuk 2 gebruik werd gemaakt van geaggregeerde gegevens, bouwt 
hoofdstuk 3 voort op deze resultaten door individuele ICVS-gegevens uit 18 landen te 
gebruiken omtrent diefstal, niet-dodelijk geweld en autovandalisme. Dit is gedaan omwille 
van twee doelen. Ten eerste worden hypothesen op het nationale niveau, afgeleid uit de 
Summary in Dutch 
 150
strain/anomie-theorie, sociale desorganisatietheorie en routine activiteitentheorie, getoetst 
binnen een multilevel design. Aan de hand hiervan wordt rekening gehouden met het feit dat 
landen verschillen in hun verdeling van gelegenheids- en controlegerelateerde kenmerken van 
individuen en buurten (die samenhangen met slachtofferschap). Op deze manier zijn 
hypothesen op het nationale niveau strenger getoetst dan in eerder onderzoek, waarin alleen 
gebruik werd gemaakt van geaggregeerde gegevens. Aangezien de analyses zijn uitgevoerd 
op het individuele niveau, kan daarnaast worden nagegaan of landenkenmerken (zoals 
inkomensongelijkheid) de individuele kans op slachtofferschap zelfstandig beïnvloeden. 
 Ten tweede kan zodoende worden nagegaan in hoeverre criminaliteitsverschillen 
tussen landen worden bepaald door compositionele verschillen wat betreft sociale 
desorganisatie (op lokaal niveau) en criminele gelegenheden (op individueel niveau). Met 
andere woorden, deze analyses maakten het mogelijk om te achterhalen op welke manier de 
verdeling van deze kenmerken gerelateerd is aan de criminaliteit op nationaal niveau. 
Vergeleken met eerder criminologisch onderzoek dat plaats vond op basis van geaggregeerde 
gegevens, zijn de hypothesen uit de sociale desorganisatietheorie en routine activiteitentheorie 
in deze studie daarom beter getoetst. 
 Uit de resultaten in hoofdstuk 3 blijkt dat inkomensongelijkheid een positief effect 
uitoefent op slachtofferschap van diefstal, niet-dodelijk geweld en autovandalisme. Deze 
bevindingen zijn wederom een bevestiging van Merton’s (1957) en Blau en Blau’s (1982) 
formuleringen van de strain/anomie-theorie, waarin wordt aangenomen dat daders het meest 
gemotiveerd zijn om delicten te plegen naarmate de verdeling van welvaart in een 
samenleving schever is. Hoewel een soortgelijke bevinding ook werd gedaan in hoofdstuk 2 
en in eerder criminologisch onderzoek (Gartner 1990; Neapolitan 1998), is bij de bevinding in 
hoofdstuk 3 voor het eerst tegelijkertijd rekening gehouden met compositionele verschillen 
tussen landen via een multilevel design. Er is daarmee aangetoond dat het verband tussen 
inkomensongelijkheid en criminaliteit niet terug te voeren is op een uiteenlopende verdeling 
tussen landen van het type doelwitten en de mate van lokale sociale controle. 
 Voor het nationale echtscheidingscijfer geldt dat deze positief gerelateerd is aan drie 
van de negen onderscheiden vormen van slachtofferschap. Door te controleren voor 
compositionele verschillen op individueel en regio-niveau werd deze relatie voor slechts één 
vorm van slachtofferschap minder sterk (inbraak), wat een beperkte indicatie vormt dat 
nationale echtscheidingscijfers een afspiegeling zijn van compositionele verschillen tussen 
landen wat betreft sociaal gedesorganiseerde gemeenschappen. Daarentegen geldt voor het 
BNP per hoofd van de bevolking wel dat de oorspronkelijk gevonden negatieve relatie wordt 
verkleind als rekening wordt gehouden met individuele doelwitkenmerken en regionale 
omgevingskenmerken. Dit landenkenmerk lijkt daarmee in zekere mate een afspiegeling van 
de hoeveelheid geschikte doelwitten en gedesorganiseerde gemeenschappen. 
 Verschillende individuele en regionale kenmerken bleken ook gerelateerd aan de kans 
op slachtofferschap. De meest consistente samenhang voor uiteenlopende vormen van 
criminaliteit werd gevonden voor leeftijd: jongeren worden vaker slachtoffer van een misdrijf 
dan ouderen. Verschillende andere kenmerken zijn aan specifieke delicten gerelateerd. Zo 
bleken mannen en, zoals verwacht, mensen die ’s avonds regelmatig de deur uitgaan een 
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hoger risico te lopen op slachtofferschap van geweld buiten de eigen woonbuurt. 
Buitenhuisactiviteiten zijn verder ook positief gerelateerd aan diefstal en vandalisme binnen 
de eigen buurt. Opleidingsniveau en gepercipieerde inkomenspositie hangen samen met 
diefstal en vandalisme, en lijken daarmee indicatoren te zijn voor de aantrekkelijkheid van 
een doelwit voor deze delicten. Sociale cohesie binnen de lokale gemeenschap reduceert de 
kans op slachtofferschap in de eigen buurt voor alle onderscheiden vormen van criminaliteit. 
Tenslotte hangt stadsgrootte positief samen met de meeste vormen van slachtofferschap: hoe 
groter de stad, des te groter de kans om slachtoffer te worden van een misdrijf. 
 Wat betreft de verklaring van verschillen tussen landen in slachtofferschap bleek dat 
zowel de nationale context als compositionele verschillen van belang zijn. Hoewel de invloed 
van de nationale context meestal groter bleek dan die van compositie, namen 
landenverschillen in zes van de negen vormen van criminaliteit af met tenminste eenderde 
indien rekening wordt gehouden met compositionele verschillen. Vooral de mate waarin 
inwoners van een land in de buurt wonen van geringe collectieve sociale controle is een 
belangrijke compositionele verklaringsfactor, gezien de bevindingen dat slachtoffercijfers 
vooral hoog zijn in landen met veel grotestadsbewoners en regio’s met een geringe mate van 
sociale interactie tussen buurtbewoners. 
 
  
VERSCHILLEN IN SLACHTOFFERSCHAP TUSSEN BUURTEN EN GEMEENTEN 
 
In hoofdstuk 4 en 5 wordt op meer gedetailleerde wijze de verdeling van slachtofferschap 
over buurten en gemeenten binnen één land bestudeerd: Nederland. Hiervoor zijn gegevens 
gebruikt uit de Politiemonitor Bevolking 1999, waarin slachtoffergegevens beschikbaar zijn 
voor ongeveer 70.000 respondenten, verspreid over meer dan 2000 buurten en 500 
gemeenten. In dit deel van de studie stonden twee aspecten centraal: (1) het identificeren van 
aanvullende buurtomstandigheden die vanuit het sociale desorganisatieperspectief van invloed 
zijn op slachtofferschap, en (2) het nagaan of buurtoverstijgende omstandigheden (op 
gemeenteniveau) een onafhankelijke invloed uitoefenen op slachtofferschap, en zo ja waarom 
dit zo is. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt bekeken op welke wijze slachtofferschap wordt beïnvloed door de 
sociaal-economische dynamiek op buurtniveau. Traditiegetrouw wordt in de sociale 
desorganisatietheorie aangenomen dat vooral achterstandsbuurten met veel criminaliteit te 
maken hebben, omdat de inwoners van deze buurten weinig hulpbronnen tot hun beschikking 
hebben om de buurt te organiseren (Sampson et al. 1997). Vanuit een ‘common-sense’ 
redenering zou daarom kunnen worden verondersteld dat de criminaliteit verminderd zou 
kunnen worden in deze buurten, door de status van de buurt te laten stijgen, bijvoorbeeld door 
het verbeteren van het lokale woningaanbod en de instroom van welvarende huishoudens. 
Vanuit een alternatieve optiek kan echter worden aangenomen dat een dergelijk proces juist 
gepaard gaat met criminaliteitsverhogende omstandigheden (Covington & Taylor 1989; 
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Taylor & Covington 1988). Uit eerder onderzoek vanuit het sociale desorganisatieperspectief 
is gebleken dat sociale controle minder voorkomt in buurten met een hoge mate van sociale 
instabiliteit (door veel verhuizingen) en heterogeniteit (bijvoorbeeld veel verschillende 
nationaliteiten), en de kans op slachtofferschap daarom hoger is (Bellair 1997; Sampson et al. 
1997). Dergelijke omstandigheden zijn regelmatig juist ook aanwezig in buurten die een 
sterke sociaal-economische verbetering achter de rug hebben, omdat in deze buurten vaak 
sprake is van een sterke instroom van nieuwe (welvarende) bewoners. Dit geldt ook voor de 
gelijktijdige aanwezigheid in een buurt van lage inkomensgroepen en hoge inkomensgroepen. 
 Inderdaad blijkt uit de resultaten dat de kans op slachtofferschap in de eigen buurt van 
vijf verschillende typen misdrijven (inbraak, autogerelateerde diefstal, geweld, 
autovandalisme en overig vandalisme) niet alleen hoger is in achterstandsbuurten, maar ook 
in buurten die tussen 1994 en 1998 een sociaal-economisch verbeteringsproces hebben 
ondergaan. Met name de hoge instroom van nieuwe bewoners, die in deze buurten aanzienlijk 
groter is dan in stabiele en verslechterende buurten, is een belangrijke oorzaak hiervan. Dit is 
in overeenstemming met de sociale desorganisatietheorie, waarin wordt aangenomen dat 
sociale instabiliteit leidt tot verminderde sociale controle en meer criminaliteit, omdat er 
weinig contacten zijn tussen bewoners onder dergelijke omstandigheden. 
 Enkele overige buurkenmerken bleken eveneens van invloed op slachtofferschap van 
criminaliteit in de eigen buurt. Zowel een hoog percentage jongeren als een hoog percentage 
allochtonen blijken in verband te staan met een hoger risico op slachtofferschap. Het eerste 
effect duidt mogelijk op de nabijheid van potentiële daders (aangezien jongeren 
oververtegenwoordigd zijn in daderpopulaties), terwijl het tweede effect wellicht wijst op het 
effect van sociale desorganisatie die voortkomt uit etnische heterogeniteit. 
 Verder bleek uit de resultaten van hoofdstuk 4 dat verschillende gemeentelijke 
kenmerken een onafhankelijke invloed uitoefenen op slachtofferschap. Hiermee wordt 
voortgebouwd op suggesties van Bursik en Grasmick (1993) dat de veiligheid in een buurt 
niet alleen afhankelijk is van buurtinterne omstandigheden, maar ook van omstandigheden in 
andere buurten of overstijgende (gemeentelijke) contexten. Inwoners van grote steden, 
gemeenten met een hoog gemiddeld inkomen en gemeenten met een laag niveau van publieke 
controle door politieagenten lopen een hoger risico slachtoffer te worden van een misdrijf in 
de eigen buurt, onafhankelijk van individuele en buurtkenmerken. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt ingegaan op de relatie tussen inbraakpreventiemaatregelen en 
slachtofferschap van inbraak. Centraal staat daarbij of er naast het preventieve aspect van 
individuele maatregelen indicaties worden gevonden van doelwitverplaatsing. Met andere 
woorden, leiden de preventiemaatregelen die getroffen zijn door andere huishoudens tot een 
proces van verplaatsing van daders, die het individuele risico op inbraak vergroten? 
Empirische studies op dit gebied hebben weinig indicaties gevonden voor doelwitverplaatsing 
(Hesseling 1994; Miethe 1991; Allatt 1984), maar deze hebben zich veelal gericht op 
alternatieve doelwitten in directe nabijheid van het oorspronkelijke doelwit, bijvoorbeeld een 
aangrenzend gebied. Mogelijk is de mate van doelwitverplaatsing daardoor onderschat. 
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 In hoofdstuk 5 wordt mogelijke doelwitverplaatsing als gevolg van inbraakpreventie 
bestudeerd over een groter gebied, de gemeente. Verondersteld wordt dat inbrekers hun 
delinquente activiteiten plegen en verplaatsen binnen het gebied waarmee zij door hun 
dagelijkse activiteiten vertrouwd zijn (Brantingham & Brantingham 1993). Daarom zullen zij 
in geval van situationele preventie op een bepaalde plek elders binnen dezelfde gemeente 
gaan opereren. Derhalve wordt aangenomen dat het preventiegedrag van andere doelwitten in 
de gemeente van belang is om het risico op slachtofferschap van inbraak te bepalen. Hoe meer 
preventiemaatregelen andere gemeentegenoten hebben genomen, des te groter het potentieel 
voor doelwitverplaatsing en des te hoger de kans op inbraak. 
Uit de bevindingen van hoofdstuk 5 blijkt dat individueel genomen 
preventiemaatregelen inderdaad effectief zijn in het voorkomen van inbraak. Vooral het 
aanbrengen van extra sloten op deuren en ramen reduceert het risico op slachtofferschap. 
Voor zowel pogingen als voltooide inbraken blijkt echter ook dat de kans op inbraak groter is, 
naarmate andere huishoudens in dezelfde gemeente meer preventiemaatregelen hebben 
getroffen. Dit duidt erop dat inbrekers hun aandacht verleggen naar alternatieve doelwitten in 
de gemeente, maar niet noodzakelijkerwijs naar degenen in nabijheid van het oorspronkelijke 
doelwit. Verder zijn de indicaties voor doelwitverplaatsing binnen de buurt beduidend minder 
sterk, gezien de kleinere positieve effecten van preventie op buurtniveau. 
 Ook is bestudeerd of zich indicaties van delictverplaatsing voordeden, door na te gaan 
hoe inbraakpreventiemaatregelen gerelateerd zijn aan andere vormen van slachtofferschap. 
Goed beschermde doelwitten lopen mogelijk een hoger risico om slachtoffer te worden van 
andere vormen van criminaliteit, als daders besluiten zich op deze delicten toe te leggen, en 
indien het doelwit zich hiertegen minder goed heeft beschermd. 
 Hoewel autogerelateerde diefstal gemeen heeft met inbraak dat zij gericht is op het 
verkrijgen van materieel gewin, bleek uit de resultaten niet dat goed tegen inbraak 
beschermde doelwitten vaker slachtoffer werden van deze alternatieve vorm van diefstal. Ook 
geweldsslachtofferschap bleek niet gerelateerd te zijn aan het aantal 
inbraakpreventiemaatregelen. Slachtofferschap van vandalisme deed zich echter wel vaker 
voor onder goed beschermde doelwitten. Het is mogelijk dat dit duidt op delictverplaatsing. 
We moeten echter voorzichtig zijn met het trekken van conclusies hieromtrent, omdat de 
gegevens geen uitsluitsel bieden of dezelfde daders hun patroon van overtredingen hebben 
gewijzigd als gevolg van de getroffen inbraakpreventie. Een alternatieve mogelijkheid is dat 
goed beschermde doelwitten sowieso een hoger risico lopen op slachtofferschap van 
vandalisme, omdat zij hiervoor aantrekkelijke doelwitten zijn, maar dat niet voormalig 
inbrekers maar andere daders hiervoor verantwoordelijk voor zijn. 
 
 
AFSLUITING 
 
In hoofdstuk 6 werden, naast een samenvatting van de resultaten en aanbevelingen voor 
toekomstig onderzoek, ook enkele beleidsoverwegingen geformuleerd (zie 6.3.4). Om de 
mate van criminaliteit in een buurt, stad, of land te beperken zijn interventies mogelijk met 
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betrekking tot ieder van de drie basiselementen van criminaliteit: de dader, het doelwit en de 
afwezigheid van lokale bescherming. Verondersteld werd dat de motivatie tot daderschap 
gerelateerd is aan de verdeling van materiële hulpbronnen over een samenleving, waarbij een 
grote mate van ongelijkheid zou leiden tot een sterkere dadermotivatie onder de 
minderbedeelden. Volgens de resultaten van dit onderzoek zou een geringe afname in 
inkomensongelijkheid inderdaad al kunnen samengaan met een aanzienlijke reductie van 
criminaliteit. 
 Ook is het van belang om lokale bescherming te realiseren via het stimuleren van 
contacten tussen buurtbewoners, aangezien uit de internationale gegevens van dit onderzoek 
blijkt dat inwoners van hechte gemeenschappen minder kans hebben om slachtoffer te worden 
van een misdrijf binnen hun eigen buurt. Wat betreft de controle die wordt uitgeoefend door 
de politie, blijkt uit de resultaten van de Nederlandse gegevens dat deze een preventieve 
werking heeft ten aanzien van diefstal, maar niet ten aanzien van geweld en vandalisme.  
Een belangrijke bevinding was verder dat criminaliteitsproblemen niet alleen groot 
zijn in achterstandsbuurten, maar ook in buurten die (tussen 1994 en 1998) een proces van 
sterke sociaal-economische verbetering hebben doorgemaakt. Dergelijke processen gaan 
namelijk vaak samen met een grote instroom van nieuwe (welvarende) bewoners. De sociale 
instabiliteit die hiermee gepaard gaat zorgt mogelijk voor een gebrek aan collectieve sociale 
controle. Deze bevinding nuanceert beleidsverwachtingen omtrent de positieve effecten van 
buurtverbetering, in ieder geval voor de korte termijn. Nader onderzoek moet uitwijzen op 
welke manier de veiligheid zich in dergelijke buurten over een langere periode ontwikkelt. 
 Ten slotte kan criminaliteit worden bestreden door doelwitten minder geschikt te 
maken voor daders. Inderdaad blijkt uit de resultaten van dit onderzoek bijvoorbeeld dat anti-
inbraakmaatregelen effectief zijn: hoe meer er door een huishouden worden genomen, des te 
kleiner de kans op inbraak. Wel is het zo dat dergelijke gelegenheidsbeperkende maatregelen 
verplaatsing van criminaliteit in de hand kunnen werken. Hoe beter andere huishoudens uit 
dezelfde gemeente zich hebben beveiligd, des te hoger het individuele risico op inbraak, 
mogelijk omdat inbrekers als reactie op preventiemaatregelen elders gaan opereren. Ook 
blijken goedbeveiligde huishoudens een hoger risico te lopen op slachtofferschap van 
vandalisme, maar het is niet zeker of dit komt doordat inbrekers andere delicten gaan plegen 
(delictverplaatsing). Niettemin lijkt het nettoresultaat van preventieactiviteiten positief: 
ondanks indicaties voor criminaliteitsverplaatsing, lijkt het algemene risico op 
slachtofferschap erdoor te worden verkleind. Een interessante invalshoek voor toekomstig 
onderzoek heeft betrekking op veranderingen in de ernst van gepleegde misdrijven als reactie 
op inbraakpreventiemaatregelen. Gaat ook de totale hoeveelheid schade omlaag door een 
verminderd aantal inbraken, of wordt dit teniet gedaan doordat inbrekers ernstiger delicten 
gaan plegen met meer vernieling en een grotere buit? 
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